Soignier v. Fletcher Clerk\u27s Record v. 2 Dckt. 37123 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-29-2010
Soignier v. Fletcher Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 37123
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation







Mary Killins oignier 
PLAINTIFFIRE P T 
v. 
W. Kent Fletcher, 
IAPPELLA 
Appealed from the Distri t ourt of the Fifth 
Judicial Di trict for the tate ofldaho 
in and for assia ounty 
Honorable Michael R. rabtree, District Judge 
\len B. Ellis 
Attorney for PlaintiffIRespondent 
MicheUe Point 
for Defendant/Appellant 
ileftJ'ns:=:::"ti!iTf'f:::l.--1-___ ---' 20_ 
..W4 9 2010 
Mary KiIlins Soignier. 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
W. Kent Fletcher. 
Defendant! Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 










SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 37123-2009 
DISTRICT COURT NO. CV 2009-517 
------------------------------) 
********************************* 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
********************************* 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
********************************* 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
********************************** 
Allen B. Ellis Michelle R. Points 
Ellis, Brown & Sheils, Chartered 
PO Box 388 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley 
PO Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701 Boise, Idaho 83701 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Mary KUHns Soignier vs. \V. Kent Fletcher 
District Court Case No. CV-2002-517 
Supreme Court Case No. 37123-2009 
DOCUMENT NAME DATE FILED 
Table of Contents 
Index 
ROA 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 03/25/09 
Summons 03/25/09 
Acknowledgment of Service 04/06/09 
Acknowledgment of Service 04/07/09 
Answer to Complaint, and Demand for Jury Trial 04/09/09 
Stipulation for Change of Venue: Order Thereon 04/13109 
ROA Printout from Ada County 04/13/09 
In the Matter of Change of Venue - Order 05/19/09 
Amended Answer to Complaint and Demand for 05/19/09 
Jury Trial 
Motion for Summary Judgment 06/15/09 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for 06/15/09 
Summary Judgment 

















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Mary KilHns Soignier vs. W. Kent Fletcher 
District Court Case No. CV-2002-517 
Supreme Court Case No. 37123-2009 
DOCUMENT NAME 
Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher 
Notice of Hearing 
Motion for Disqualification Without Cause 
Notice of Hearing - Motion for Disqualification 
without Cause 
Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Disqualification 
Without Cause 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of John F. Magnuson 
Affidavit of Mary Killins Soignier 
Affidavit of Allen B. Ellis 
Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice of Association of Counsel 
Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 




























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. \V. Kent Fletcher 
District Court Case No. CV-2002-517 
Supreme Court Case No. 37123-2009 
DOCUMENT NAME 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher 
Court Minutes 
Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Order and Judgment 
Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and 
Attorney Fees 
Affidavit of Michelle R. Points Setting Forth 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice of Hearing 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice of Appeal 






























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Mary KilHns Soignier vs. W. Kent Fletcher 
District Court Case No. CV-2002-517 
Supreme Court Case No. 37123-2009 
DOCUMENT NAME 
Reply to Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Costs and 
Attorney Fees 
Supplemental Affidavit of Michelle R. Points in 
Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Court Minutes 
Memorandum Opinion Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Attorney's 
Fees and Costs 













Mary Killins Soignier vs. W. Kent Fletcher 
District Court Case No. CV-2002-517 
Supreme Court Case No. 37123-2009 
DOCUMENT NAME DATE FILED 
Table of Contents 
Index 
ROA 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 03/25/09 
Summons 03/25/09 
Acknowledgment of Service 04/06/09 
Acknowledgment of Service 04/07/09 
Answer to Complaint, and Demand for Jury Trial 04/09/09 
Stipulation for Change of Venue: Order Thereon 04/13/09 
ROA Printout from Ada County 04/13109 
In the Matter of Change of Venue - Order 05/19/09 
Amended Answer to Complaint and Demand for 05/19/09 
Jury Trial 
Motion for Summary Judgment 06/15/09 




















Mary Killins Soignier vs. W. Kent Fletcher 
District Court Case No. CV-2002-S17 
Supreme Court Case No. 37123-2009 
DOCUMENT NAME 
Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher 
Notice of Hearing 
Motion for Disqualification Without Cause 
Notice of Hearing - Motion for Disqualification 
without Cause 
Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Disqualification 
Without Cause 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of John F. Magnuson 
Affidavit of Mary Killins Soignier 
Affidavit of Allen B. Ellis 
Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice of Association of Counsel 
Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's 






























Mary Killins Soignier vs. W. Kent Fletcher 
District Court Case No. CV -2002-517 
Supreme Court Case No. 37123-2009 
DOCUMENT NAME 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher 
Court Minutes 
Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Order and Judgment 
Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and 
Attorney Fees 
Affidavit of Michelle R. Points Setting Forth 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice of Hearing 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
Notice of Hearing 

































Mary Killins Soignier vs. W. Kent Fletcher 
District Court Case No. CV-2002-517 
Supreme Court Case No. 37123-2009 




Supplemental Affidavit of Michelle R. Points in 
Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Court Minutes 
Memorandum Opinion Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Attorney's 












Time: 10:28 AM 
Page 1 of 3 
Judicial District Court - Cassia Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0000517 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 
User: SUTHERLAND 





















































New Case Filed - Other Claims 
Plaintiff: Soignier, Mary Killins Notice Of 
Appearance Allen BEllis 
Defendant: Fletcher, W Kent Notice Of 
Appearance Michelle R Points 
Judge 
Roderick B Wood 
Roderick B Wood 
Roderick B Wood 
Filing: J1 - Special motions, petitions and Roderick B Wood 
pleadings -Order Granting Change Of Venue PAY 
TO NEW COUNTY 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/10/2009 10:00 Michael R Crabtree 
AM) MSJ (1 hr) 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion Michael R Crabtree 
for Summary Judgment 
Motion for Summary Judgment Michael R Crabtree 
Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher Michael R Crabtree 
Notice of Hearing Michael R Crabtree 
Motion for Disqualification without Cause Rule Michael R Crabtree 
40(d)(1 ) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/20/200910:00 Michael R Crabtree 
AM) Motion for Disqualification without Cause 
Notice of Hearing - Motion for Disqualification Michael R Crabtree 
without Cause 
Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Disqualification Michael R Crabtree 
wlo Cause 
Affidavit of Mary Killins SOignier Michael R Crabtree 
Affidavit of John F Magnuson 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Allen BEllis 
Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Michael R Crabtree 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice of Association of Counsel: Jeffrey Strother Michael R Crabtree 
with Allen Ellis for PL 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of W Kent Fletcher 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 8/10/2009 
Time: 10:02 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Denise Schloder 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Tape Number: 
Party: Mary SOignier, Attorney: Allen Ellis 
Party: W Fletcher, Attorney: Michelle Points 
00001.0 
Michael R Crabtree 
Michael R Crabtree 
Date: 1/8/2010 
Time: 10:28 AM 
epage 2 of 3 
Judicial District Court - Cassia Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0000517 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 
User: SUTHERLAND 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 
Date Code User Judge 
8/10/2009 HRHD TARA Hearing result for Motion held on 08/10/2009 Michael R Crabtree 
10:00 AM: Hearing Held MSJ (1 hr) 
9/10/2009 MEMO TARA Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's Michael R Crabtree 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
9/22/2009 JDMT TARA Order & Judgment Michael R Crabtree 
CDIS TARA Civil Disposition entered for: Fletcher, W Kent, Michael R Crabtree 
Defendant; Soignier, Mary Killins, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 9/22/2009 
.,10/1/2009 MOTN NEVAREZ Motion for An Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Michael R Crabtree 
MEMO NEVAREZ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and Michael R Crabtree 
Attorney Fees 
AFFD NEVAREZ Affidavit of Michell R Points Setting Forth Michael R Crabtree 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
10/7/2009 HRSC TARA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/25/200909:00 Michael R Crabtree 
AM) TCC: Michelle Points to initiate 
NOHR NEVAREZ Notice of Hearing 11/25/2009@9:00a.m. Michael R Crabtree 
10/13/2009 MOTN NEVAREZ Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees Michael R Crabtree 
MEMO NEVAREZ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Michael R Crabtree 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
NOHR NEVAREZ Notice of Hearing 11/25/2009@9:00 a.m. Michael R Crabtree 
10/22/2009 SUTHERLAND Notice of Appeal Michael R Crabtree 
10/26/2009 SUTHERLAND Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of Michael R Crabtree 
Transcripts For Appeal Per Page Paid by: Ellis, 
Brown & Sheils, Chartered Receipt number: 
0012320 Dated: 10/26/2009 Amount: $100.00 
(Check) 
SUTHERLAND Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Michael R Crabtree 
Supreme Court Paid by: Ellis, Allen B (attorney 
for Soignier, Mary Killins) Receipt number: 
0012322 Dated: 10/26/2009 Amount: $101.00 
(Check) For: Soignier, Mary Killins (plaintiff) 
11/19/2009 TARA Reply to Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Costs and Michael R Crabtree 
Attorney Fees 
TARA Supplemental Affidavit of Michelle R. Points in Michael R Crabtree 
Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
11/25/2009 ADVS TARA Hearing result for Motion held on 11/25/2009 Michael R Crabtree 
09:00 AM: Case Taken Under Advisement 
Motion for Fees & Costs 
TCC: Michelle Points to initiate 
00001.1. 
Date: 1/8/2010 
Time: 10:28 AM 
Page 30f3 
Judicial District Court - Cassia 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0000517 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 
User SUTHERLAND 





















Court Minutes Michael R Crabtree 
Hearing type: Motion for Fees and Costs 
Hearing date: 11/25/2009 
Time: 8:58 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Tape Number: CHAMBERS 
Party: Mary Soignier, Attorney: Allen Ellis 
Party: W Fletcher, Attorney: Michelle Points 
Notice of Transcript Lodged Michael R Crabtree 
Transcript Filed Michael R Crabtree 
Memorandum Opinion GRANTING in Part and Michael R Crabtree 
DENYING in Part Defendant's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs 
Judgment (in favor of Kent Fletcher $8,283.00) Michael R Crabtree 
Civil Disposition entered for: Fletcher, W Kent, Michael R Crabtree 
Defendant; Soignier, Mary Killins, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 1/7/2010 
00001.2 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at -Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 









CaseNo.CV· OC 0905785 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
W. Kent Fletcher, 
Defendant. 
Comes now the plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier, through her attorney of record, and complains 
and alleges against defendant W. Kent Fletcher as follows: 
I 
At all times relevant, defendant W. Kent Fletcher ("Fletcher") was an attorney at law duly 
licensed by the State of Idaho with offices forthe practice of law located in Burley, Idaho. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - J 
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II 
At all times relevant, an attorney/client relationship existed between defendant Fletcher and 
Zachary A. Cowan ("Cowan"). 
III 
Prior to his death, decedent Cowan was a beneficiary of the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust which 
beneficiary status was scheduled to terminate by the terms of the trust on November 7,2003, to wit, 
decedent's fiftieth birthday, at which time portion of the trust assets were to be conveyed to Cowan 
outright. As found by the magistrate court In the Matter of the Estate of Zachary A. Cowan (Cassia 
County Case No. CV-2006-1234), the trust was formally terminated on March 4,2005. Upon 
termination of the trust and by its terms, a substantial portion of the trust assets was conveyed to 
decedent Cowan prior to his death in 2006. A copy of the trust is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
IV 
In May of2005, decedent Cowan retained and instructed defendant Fletcher to prepare a last 
will and testament. Included in Cowan's instructions was the direction that property owned by him, 
which had previously been subsumed in trusts in which he was a beneficiary, be devised to plaintiff 
Mary Killins Soignier. Defendant Fletcher prepared the aforesaid testamentary instrument which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and incorporated herein by reference. 
V 
In drafting decedent Cowan's last will and testament (Exhibit 2), defendant Fletcher 
negligently failed to ascertain that decedent Cowan held no interests in trusts and the last interest 
held was in the Leonarda Cowan trust which interest terminated as early as November 7, 2003 (the 
decedent's fiftieth birthday) or as late as March 4, 2005 (the Final Release and Discharge of the 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
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trustee), two months earlier. That is, defendant Fletcher drafted a will (Exhibit 2) in which 
decedent's bequest to plaintiff Soignier, i.e., "beneficial interest in trusts", would be frustrated 
because the Leonarda Cowan Trust had been terminated prior to decedent's execution of the will. 
VI 
Further, defendant Fletcher negligently failed to advise decedent Cowan that upon his death 
there were no trust interests, as such, to be conveyed and that Cowan's testamentary intent vis-a-vis 
plaintiff Soignier, as set forth in the will authored by Fletcher, would be frustrated. 
VII 
As a proximate result of defendant Fletcher's negligence as aforesaid, the probate court 
ruled, in pertinent part, on September 18, 2007, as follows: 
Mr. Cowan signed a "Final Release and Discharge" agreement on 
March 4, 2005. His beneficial interest share in the corpus of The 
Leonarda A. Cowan Trust was delivered over to him. The Trust was 
terminated. 
At the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any 
interest in any trusts. 
After such review, it is evident the affidavits do not provide the Court 
with any factual insight regarding how the existing facts, as applied 
the testator's Will, evidences any ambiguity. Therefore, this Court 
does not find a latent ambiguity in regards to the testator's intent. 
The fact that the testator did not have an interest in any trust at the 
time of his death does not create a conflict with his intent towards the 
American Cancer Society. His stated intent towards each beneficiary 
is clear, and his stated intent regarding Ms. Soignier does not come 
into direct conflict with any other portion of the Will. Therefore, this 
Court concludes that Ms. Soignier has failed to demonstrate the Will 
contains a latent ambiguity. 
As a further proximate result of defendant Fletcher's negligence, the probate court ruled that 
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plaintiffSoignier take nothing under the will and that decedent Cowan's estate "should be given to 
the American Cancer Society". 
VIII 
As a proximate result of defendant Fletcher's negligence, he breached his duty to plaintiff 
Soignier, a named beneficiary under the will, to properly execute decedent's will so as to effectuate 
the decedent's intent as expressed in the will (Exhibit 1), all to plaintiffs damage in excess of the 
jurisdictional minimum of the District Court. 
IX 
Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of Ellis, Brown & Sheils, Chartered, to 
prosecute this action and is entitled to recover sums as and for reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
Wherefore, plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. For compensatory damages in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of the District Court; 
2. For costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees; 
3. For such other and further relief as the court and jury deem appropriate. 
Dated this 25th day of March, 2009. 
Attorney for plaintiff 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury in accordance with the provisions of Rule 38(b) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Attorney for Plaintiff . 
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delivercd to. us as 'lXUStaas, ill truSt, the p:rapert:y listecl 1n 
RmJ:13l'l A, attaehe4 tQ this 1na~Z\~. A:.ll. FOP~ .uo;.et to 
tb..is trust shall ha b..lei, administartid. anc! d.1.etrib~ in 




'I'l:'WI"C Aqreute.nt. This trust aball b4l mown as LBotCUtOA A. 0JWlJf 
'l!m1S'r 07 1.982. 
~ 07 PROnan 'rlUJISJ'DUD 
1.1 All. property t:z:'l:ulIIt'1U7:.'" into t:b.a t=.rU..t upcm t.he 
exea.tian tha:r.a~ and hald tha:reandar at'., t.l:l1.a till- ooMist.a ot the 
~r'. Mparat. prope:rt:y lU1d Ghall reta1n ita sapa:nta. praputy 
~et.r whil. Ml.c! p;a1N&Dt t.Q ~. t.r.u o~ "tl:IAa buat.. 
" 
,2'.1. ~ ~ J:eSerle" 'tl1a r1ght -to alt4J:, BuM or 
rIJVQlce tlda trust 1n wtu;.)16 or il:a part d:Urinq her lU.ti:lll.a. sueb .... 
al.t:era:t:.ion, alIfInClment or 7:1W~t1= lIhall be b'l witte ~t 
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LAWREN'C'S C'lUZEH Yhat.-ver intuest 18 held in the truat u.ta.ta 
at or by r .. ·.o1\ of i:A. 'h:u.stor.; ~ deAth in "Chat certUn 
res.idential real property located on San. AntQnio ilt:Ie.d l:Ietween 
se"enth and lU.qht.l:t stre.t./ c:armel., CA, outr19'l'1t and tr •• oJ! 




d-o.th taxes. In the event tha.t I..AW;REN'Cli c::B1ZD shall l)ot lulva 
not survi vad the "l"rWItO:l:' I tha. g:.1.rC pursuant to tlUa 
lIUb .. cti011 ... 2 (b) shall. tail. 
(c:) 'ftle 'tl:ustua shall e.st4hl1sh a trust abar., 
ct...iqna:ted 'f.1U:TS'f :r, to b~ ~de4 v~tJ:L ON!: JJ'O'!nm3D '.rBOU!W1l) I!tEI 
00/100 DOLI~ ($100,000.00) tor eac:h ~~1cia:ry .at: ~orth 1.n 
WJ)paragn;ph '.2 (c) (1), (il), and (iii) who w:vlv.. ~tor 
tor a lIs xiJnllll ot 0WiRd ~ 'l'.tiOUSUI) .um 00/1.00 'I:IOI.&LU.S . . . 
($300,000.00). ~.~.. ~al.l ho.ld, a"",1n1atar an<! 
4i.a=jJ)qt:. the .... ta o~ TlilOS'r:r as a aep&l:'a-t:. ~t: .a 
lwreinatter ~cvi4e4! 
(i) !t'he 'l'l::'U8t:.ca .. lIhal.l pay to or ~lY :to%' 'the 
'" 
b~t'it of ~ 'nS2! 80 xw:h' o:f ~ net·1nc:cae ot 
'l'lltJS~:r .... t:.h. ~i:.e_, . j.n. i:ba.1r 4iec:::r:at:1on, daua 
necessary or d •• iralll. :tor th. prOper health, .~, 
c:a..r. aDd ~o~ .uch b~:icia-ry, peovWa4 such 
pay:aen;t:a o:t inea.aa &hall. flCiI't,' ~':nVB 'l'BOOs.utD DO~ 
($5, QOO. 00) 1D any 9'iva:n ceJ.anClD%' year, 
'. . 
(:U.) ~. ~t._ IIhall pa.y to 0%' Apply tor the 
bene:t!:Lt ot LttPI J"tJ'!N'1'.2S .c) auc:::b. o:t the nat 1hcc:nae ot 
'l!ROST 'I as the 'I"rust.e., in their cUsc:rei:ion, lieea 
miJOJIIII&%'Y 0%' ci •• i.rGla tor 1:.ha proper l'laa.lth, support, . . 
, ' 
pa.yments ot incQJle shal.l not ueeed. YIV.l! mouSAND OOLLAltS 
(~~/OOO,OO) in any qiv~ cal.end&r year; 
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(~ii), Tl'l.e 'l'%'\l.Steu shall pay to or Ilppl:r 
fo%' tha })ena:U.t at lO!!t'.1 ~2 .0 lQUcm 0% tlle net il'lCQlS. 
of 'l!l1t1S'.! % u the ~ta .. , in their d.:i.8cretiOll, a ...... 
necessa..:y 0%' duira):)le fO%,' ~ :il:ropu ~ th, rauppo:r:i:, 
c;ar. 4n4 lUtini::anaJ'lc. 01! .-c.:lc::h tI.ac~1diU"/, prO'9'ide4 ,ucb. 
~y:u.nta ot irtCOlU shall nQt exce-sd. l"lVI 'mO'C1s.lHtJ DOLr.JUtS 
($5,000.00) in any given ca.J.end.&:' Y8a, 
(iv) A1'lJ' bcl.CUl~. ot 1;be net. incoIIe of OtrSr.r t . ' .. 
not. paid or appUed as h8%'.:!,;raa.JxJVe pl:'QVUad ca.ah year; 
IIh.a.l.l b-. aCC'lZZlJllla1:ed 8.l1t1 ~ad to, Prlnci»&1. "O'pc2h tha 
4&a.th o~ each o~ the ).)enc~1aiar1aS lWD8d. ~ ... thi • 
.ab .. c::tiCl1 4.2Cc}, the ~ ... IIhall t:nLna~1I% ~ -
'.t'm1Sc:r :t to 'rlWSr.r u:. (as ~:1.c1e4 in subsaction •• :2 (d) } 
ona-tb:1.rCl (1/3) 01: the v&l.ua 01: tllo l;'OM~ .... t.s in 
Tm18'!l! I (as t.hen coftStitutec1) •. 'l1he ~o., in thair 
discretion, .ha.ll c:hoo •• wh;tcb .... tII t..o ~~~. tJpon 
'. .. 
the C14atll o~ all ot t:l:I.e beaa:CicU.&:ri_ na:aecL 111 thic 
~ion ".2 (e) ~ the; asSets o~ TRttS'.r % I aJI tl:I.ell , . . . 
C~'l:1.'t:\rt:'.ad, asha.ll be ~~erre4 to 'l'aOS'! :rIo 
(d) ~. 'l:rUStaes shall tOot:al::Il..iesb II ~nc1 '1:rtl5t 
sl:uI:.I:'., 4a.ignatAcl T.RtJS'! ·I.I, to consist: ~t ~ bala.1:l.Ce o:t t:h.o 
trust estate rail j nin; a.rtar sa:tiS:t:~ctiop. ot t:be proviaions ot 
section ".1 ot thJA !n:ua~ A9X".e2IIa:t.~ =ncl ~.aetJ.ona (ct.) 
tlu:ouc,;h (c) o:t th.1. Section ".2. 'r!la '.r::r;wstaes shall hold, 




(1) In tn. WfUlt th&t the 'h'ustor'a son I 
ZAc::!!'Al\Y cotoN, shall have. su::viY.~ th. ~toZ', ~ p~icr 
to the ti:u wen. he. ,.hAll 13v. attataK the _g_ of fifty 
y04.'rU, th. "l'rUJsta •• SlUlll pal to or apply t'or, the benetit 
o~ the ~/. ~c1 san ..ve.n.'i:y pa%'Cant: (70~) o;t t:.h. 
nat income ot nuS'l'!I, ~annually or at laC:. 
~~~e:n1':; intexvala. III ac!4it1on, tlw ~ •• ahaU p.r 
to 01:' apply tor the ben.ef~t o~ ~ ~r/. &MUd. .on SO 
IlUch ot tlle principal. of ~'r 'II- (but not ~ ~C4S. ot 
aeventy perc.nt (7011 of tha pri.ucipal aa 't:l:1sn 
'" eonstlttttad) as th,_ 'J!J::"I1st ... , i.n. thaU 41.c::-ai:ion, d.:.CIIl 
naea •• a.:ry .'tor tb_ proper hAl.thr wppert:., care and - . 
lJIGintanaIlc;:AI o.t tba ·~tnr.... sa14 $Ol1. 'l'he 'r:rU8taes 
IIl:I.aJ.l pay t.o or apply 1!!a:r: tha banat'it. ot! ~ox'a ru.ac::a, 
. ~ n:t1B'D' Q.tJ.l!tR, 0: he' .~-if' aha aball not than 
_ • J 
.~. l.iVj .. DI~h ~ :pe:2:'aaa.t (30"" o.f t:h4 net: illccm.e of 
1'lW'S'l' n: quart.r-:a:mWll.ly or ~t :JIL:)re :treqa.an~ in~a .. 
.In addi:~~CD, the . ~~.. IiIhall PIlY to 01:' appl.y for the 
~~:.t.t o~ the 'l':I:"Ilstor'a aa.iA niece 80 lIU<:h ot tha 
pri.t:1e~l. of! 't'lUlST n (but not· in. axe... t:)1! ~ 
pel:Q!Q:Ot [30%] o;!- t:he principal ... than c:onat1tuta4.) as 
the 'l:':rWIta_, in t:l2A1r cU.seretion I det!!ll nec:essazy t'o:r; the 
propel: h~t.b, support, ~. ana UintanallCa of the 
~orJa ,.~id niace. 
(11) Wll.cn the ~or' CII son I 
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ta.n.1.nate, and .&venty p.rc:ant (7q4) o~ the t:uat •• ta-:'a 
ot 'l".K06'l' IJ: than on h~ aball 1::a ~fut:ad to th& 
T:rt.1at.ar'1I said Bon C'U'trilJbt IUl4 t.r;ea o~ t:;'wIt, a.nd thixty 
percent (30~) ot t:h. t.:::u.e aat:&t:. of -r: II thell on 
hand. IIhall ~ C1£.t:r1buted to ~CQ:"8 'niece, s.utmtl 
E:r.t.iDN gI.ID, Cl\1't:riQlJ.t and. era. o-.f 'trtUJ-t. ~ Tl:Wrt. .... 
shal.l bava di80nticm to c:tsoc.. the u.at:.a to ):). 
distributed to eaab. 
(ll.i.) l:D tha . .vent the 'r:t11Stor'.· Bani , 
ZAC!Q.:RY COWIK, _hall tUa pJ:'ior to atia1n1ntJ a9- of :t1:ftl' .... 
!l'fiW:'a, laving then, l1v!..'n9 iasua, the 'rrUataes 8hal.l 
dist:.:ribute t.M enti:r:e 1::raat esta":~ crt ~S'.L' IX t:b.en on 
bane .. venty pe:rt:1In'C (70') t:o th.. t:htm living' issue ot 
ZAcs::A.Rr ~, by l:'it;h1: of! r~eDt:ai::io:n, f%' .. o:t 'l!:ruat, 
and. thUrt::y pa:cent (304)1:0 t:.ba ~cn"'. ni-e., ~ 
lUTZ'IM QIJ,p; pz1:'IVide4, ~, in the aVIIllt: t:b.at tbe 
~r'. .~Cl 111.0. 1SJ:Lal.1. not :be U v1J.1q &1: t.b.a date ot 
Ilny d.i.i:.%~1>ution, ptSrsuant to tbis 
IIJ'1.l};)p.iI.l:'2lg:rapb 4.:l eel) (1.1i), har ahare o~ the Uust astau 
0% %lWS'l: .IX shaJ.l. H 4J.a't:2:'ibutad to her 't:h.n liv1Jlg .issue 
l';ty ri~.b:t: o;t rep:::l:8S811tati0J2 traa of! t:ru..st. 
(1v) 'In t:ha av-.nt -that ZliCB'ARY COWAN ,ball cUe 
prior to &1:ta1n1ng the aq. o~ tiff:!( years, without liv1ll9 
issue, the 'l"'.!:'ustees sl:!.aJ.l distl:'ibut:a the entire trust 
estate. of 'l'RtlS'l' II to S.lN'l:lU £lLUN RZI·ID tree ot trust 
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tiatrlbution, the tru.1::. ..tat. shall ~ cU.Atrihuta<1 to 
t=he than liv1ng issue Q~ SANDRl. ZlIi£1!N DUrn by right at 
repx-asentation, free o~ t:l:U.Ist. 
4.3 It, &.t the tme o~ the ~rl. cloa'th, or at any 
It.tter time be~on tull d.1..5trlhut.1an o~ the't:1:UIt ell'blt., u.~ 
COWAN', SAlItJ'.RA JaIrltJlll( QIJD 'and all o~ 1::.h.ai1" issu.* a:r:. 4.c: ... aeCl. 
and no othilr diapoaitiQn of the t~t allb.1:a ia d1rec1:.eCl, herein, 
the 't.'r\:1st .. tate, or 1:11e portion a~ 11:, 1:b;eA rcuilUn9 ( 1Ihal.l 
tl::I.erGl%pon be diS1::.l:dl:l\l'ta4 to on. or aore cha.ri.t:i. . eno.en u 1::l:I.. 
<11scn:etion of the 'l'l:Uate .. , eul:lj ect to 'tb.6 lh1:t .. tic= on ~ 
. . .~ 
ltiserat1.on that aac:h ~i1:i .. he ;.ua..l~~ie4 c::h.U'itiaa as d.efinec! ill 
. . 
Sec:t1cm 110 ot the Intun&.1. :aevem1e Ccda o~ 198'~ .- . 
, • 4 ).:Ay p:t'ov1.ioA8. of t.l:IJA ~ Aqreclll4nt:. to the 
-<;;gut:r:ary notv1 ~, isi the avast. that:. any ... a.ta of a ~t 
:be14 P~tUUlt to tha Fov:ia1oNl of thU ~. ~~t b4e0ae 
di~ebl.a to' a ~';~ici~ u:hCS.c' "the q_ ..,t tvtQ1ty-cm.e (3J.) 
Yeo..l:'CiI, ~. '.I"ru.o~ aabAJ.l rctaj"n aucl:l .. illata in .. turther t:l:'llat tor 
t:ha. ~e:fit of. auch. benetL:iary. The ~.tees shall :pay to or 
apply tor tlla :bane:fit ot such l>e.ae~icia...-y 80 lII.t:IA:h of the. net 
.i.no_, c.:n4 the pr:1..ncipl:Ll. o~ tl:I.. ~ ..eate as the '1';:'WJt.. .. , j,n 
t:l1ei= discraUon, Claar. uce •• ary. tor the ;p::t:opor bacl.i:h, QUl3Port, 
oare ma.i.n"te:nanc:a and e4uc::atio:a ot ~ch be:l4ticiuy, atter taking . . 
i:nt:o aoc:o~i::, -eo ~. u:tant; the 'l'%"Uateu d.e .. }lJ:OpU I any income or 
otha= resources ot a~ch banatieiary outside thia ~ru.t, known to 
the Trustaes. When such :Can~icia.r.l attains the a<Ie of twiUlty-one 
(21.) l"'caJ;s f the 'l'%uSUla .hAll distribute tea wc:h J:)enaticia:ry the 
10 
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tUlt:lxa trw:.t. e:at.1.1:. ~ bald tor hi. or har be.."letit, free ot 
t::ruat. If BUc::b benet1C:iary cba.ll 4:1. ~atore ncaiv~ cOlIlplet:. 
c:iistribtltion of the ~t estata .at a.ida for his ~ her ben.tit 
I , 
b.aret:lndB%', the ~ Shall cUat:ril::lute the balance ot the trust 
estat.e 1:0 such p.no" or antiti_, and em. web tez:a.a ~ 
. conditions, either outrliht or in t:rwIt, u the ~an~iciary .. hall 
d •• iCjlJ&'bI in ~i. or llar -l.ut. w111 ,,4lIitte4 to prOb«te by a court. of 
coa;Jetent. j'a:d.84ici:j,cm, ... k~nq a~t'lQ :r~~ 1:0 'th.1a powGr of 
appoitlt:lGent. In t:he ."ent '!;hat IIItlC:h .l:>eneflciuy' abAll tail. to 
e.xaroia4il aUQb po~ ot a~i:n~t:,. t::ba ~ ... shal.l 4Uri:ribut.e 
#-
t.ha bala.nc. ot the't.l:uat .. tab to tha than liy~ uaua o~ a'UCh 
l:::Ieneficiary, by' l:'ight bt l:4i~t'11:&t.ic=, O~,. in the d.~a.ul.t 
. "" 
'f:l:I.e:-eof't to thfil then liv1n9 !aa'Q. of 't:l2A parents. frau whom sUCh 
'bena:Uo!uy waa d .. c-ec4ttd, by rig'ht of ~r"1I%l1:4tion • 
• ~ P.aOV:tSl0H8 
5.l. It ~ _hare or sepue,te tl:::ust held tor any income. 
,ceno:Uciary o't IS ~ held p\u:aua.nt b.i:r:_to b.Ii., at any ta.., in 
t::lle opi:oio~ o:f 1:J:a.A ~, a. %'a1r 'lIUU:lCat val.U. so' lew, in 
relation to the coata ot! admin:1.rt::ration thcaot'_ '!:hAt c:ontinuanca . . 
Q:t the t:r:ust pt.U:"tn12U'1t to its 1:.e:Ju will d.et-at or suDst.antiaUy 
i:mpah t.h. o.Cec:iapl~t of the p~os.~ o~ the t:::uat, 
'l'rus1;eaa may, in th • .ir d..1.cl:' .. 't:if;)n,· wi: kre not nquirac1 
teninate such t-"""Wrt: end, %'aqardl ... " ot' the ~. ot such 
benetieicu:y I l1iet .. tdJ;n:.t.te 'the p+,1ncipa.l a.n4 1IJl'J aoc%:\led or 
11 
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u.n4illftril:n:tta<1 U!c:c:zme tb.a:t'.o~ to such D6llUiciary, or h.1a gtla.rdiAn, 
ccmse:r:vator, C:c' othu- fiduciary. 
5 • :a trnln. lICOna%' tel:1inat::'ld 1:ts e.ocordanee with ot.her 
prcv1sions lle.reo~ , each truat haleS hereunder shall tend.nat. 
twen1:.y-on. (21) years a.f1:o:i: the d~t:h gt the llUlt .url1v~ of the 
'l'rU$'tor I t.be 'n"1:l.8tor'. niece, SAlmIlI. EIt.ZIN XII·'l:i8:R, and tho.. o-t 
the 15sue of UCEARY C01Qlr or SJl1"DBA I~ UtJtiJ.R wo are 11v1l19 
at the 4aath o:e the 1!raa'tor. .u~ ];lri.r1aiJ:)al and u:adis:b:'ib'll'tad 
income ot any trust so ~ted sball.:Ca c:U..n1.bute4 to the tl:le:n 
i;nc:101lll :b.n.:ei~i.e of 1:b.at. 1:::J::rwiI~ in "the propol:tiONI 1n wb.i.cb ~.Y 
". ... . ,. 
are, at 'the till. o~ 1:a:l:'.Dl.inatIon, Urt.1Uad l::O rae.iva ~. ~a_ 
5.3 -rAe ~t... "1" .uthorice '1:h. \111. Q~ ~t.O~/ • ... 
reaic;1enc. l.oca.~ on San AntaniQ Roa4, ca:ael, eaJ.ifornia., alld. the 
'fll:r'l:lJ.ture. aM ~1Ib..i..:ng. thu.o~, at. aucb. tb:lee, tor eu<:& -po:'ioda, 
and on such t.a:z::ms and ~:itiona u tha '!::I:Ua"C'" may c!et.ea.1:Da, by 
-any g~ t.ha %ol.l.ow1llg; ~~ COWA!l' CUld hi. t!2IlIUy, 8.I.JmltA:m:L'lmN 
la'LID and he: ~uU.ly I BlUS: UJIRmI'c::B C'HAZ'BlI and hill tudly.' A.t. any 
tUUl ~t ~ CB'A2JD 1a. &et.1:nq as a 'lrwltatil ot this '.1'rt1St . . 
Agra.ant, be :is l1al':eDy speo1~1c::a.ll.Y ~ofi1O.4 to ratain said 
ruide.nce en4 ! ta fum! tura. all" fU:1:dahinqlil as a.Bats at the trast 
ut:ate, rlillga..rdl .... of any 10 .... the tl:ust 01:: :11:. bew.ticiariee :may 
&Utter by Virtue' o~ said retention, to occupy said residence and 
utiJ.ize :1:1::. :t\lrni't::U:;'e !!tAd j'Un.i.ab.i:ng8. :for hi. p.raonal WiI. &nd tha.~ 
of other members o~ his f~ly, and 1. ral1$vaa of the e!tact of 
Ul'j ma. Z!.l~ provuloru; at ll!W to~ic!Ct1n9' S ~t.ta :trom du.lillC;; 
with tha asseta of It. i:.J::ust e.5tate far hill Pe.J:"SoruU acc:013l'1t. ~d 
12 
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rulhint;1 a:n.";{ tte.in ot:' pX'arJ.t. trOll a1.lC.b. c:!e&l1:lq., U 5U.ch proviaior.s 
of lav l'elat. to rud ::esi4811ce. 
. . 
I 
6.1. '.I!lla .tnteraat ~ Mch balWfieilU"Y in ~ ~ IIW4 
pzoinc:ipal of Il.Dr tra.st hueS. punua.Dt bar.t.o shall 1:1. :era. t'rtnIl the 
oQn'b:ol or 1ntU':t'e2:'CCe ot any =:e4itozo o'J! amah ~fic1ary e.M 
b::'o1I the cl&.i::la.s 01' otllA!tJ::1I .1l1cl.u41ng any "P9,1lM o~ INcI.h b4U1.~iQiill:Y. 
~ inter.at. ot: -ach beMt.1c:1ary fhall hot be flUbj.at 1::Q 
Gtt.c:::1:I:&Ictt I exac:u"CJ.on" qarnilll:l:lPc't, c:l.ahul a:1si.nq !':rem ljIrocaed.J.llqs 
. '. . ~. 
in ~iCl" ar ~ at:her tCl:'ll1 o~ l.apl. or .qti.1tul.. l....-y 0:1:' 1illll1. 
'l!be interest:: o~ e.C!h ~1c.ia:ry IfbalL DCrt. be ~c.»tibJ.. -eD .,.. " 
aJltic:1JjWltion or &l.1enatiOll anI! any at:"talZl:pt to antioipate or 
'tl:'allsfer a ~ i.ll~ .ll-n. b4iI vc.14 II.D1 .il:l • ..e:t.c::s-ti.va. 
JWuma 0", =~DK 
7. 1. 'l'rU5t incam4 an4 pr1r1cipal dl.uibu1:.ahl. to ~ 
ben.tici&%y ~ " pAid. cUrac:tl.y t.o a .benef,":J.oia,ry o:r: m:a:y be a.pplied. . , 
to a: :ben4l!l~icia:ry#.. WiU. and ' ba:t1et'1t AS the ~tcu deGl 
llPPX'QPl:'.:1.at'... Ally b~t:.1ei.a.t:y who i • .i.ncei>&oit:atad 't:hrot::l9'fl. ·Ul1\ ... , 
age or ether cause lfJay have the income mel p:d .. :sc1p.u to 1lhic:b he is 
aneit::.loca appli.a. to h.is l:Ienat1t:.. Income or )tr1nc:1p.al. cu.su1l:nlta:bJ.e 
i:o a b.natioiary whic:b :may be .UbjllCt .to e:cec:ut1cn. or l.avy whan 
received by the bcn.~iciar.r may bo applied to such ~ene~iciary~1 
bane:!it.. Arr:I DUc:b. CLpp1.icauo~ ¢f inCQIIA Ol:' pril:1Oip«l .maJ.~ be mac.. 
on such occasic::m.a a..n4 in 8UcA'lImlller as thea ~t.ea deem a.dvisslJJ.e 
1.3 
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ud lUy include pa~t. t.Q " RIUle%1c1ary pers.onally or to otller 
per.on. 4eaaed appropriat. ~ the ~aas. Th_ r.o.ip~ o~ the 
be:l.tioiuy or other persons to 'Whoa cU~il:lution U 1W1a sball b. 
ill etnllplata c:1J..D<::b.c.:ge o~ ~. 'l.!rWIt ... ' nGponIIibillt1es. 
M:IlfGL:r:SG 0., ~ 
G. :I. bah 0% the 1:rt1at ah.u-u ahall be a •• ~t. t!r:ust 
tor tl:'\Ult I ac::co='t.1nq I tax 2U'1d a.l~ ,otha%' pa:i:po.... '.rl:l.o 'l':1:'Uat.eu I 
hovevel:', lDlJ.y ~l.. the pt:~ o~ th_, •• ~t. 1:::l:WIt, .... ta ~ : 
• l 
inte%'''~ in 'the lIL1.:ng'~e4 propa:t:y. ~d u:::1C:.U.vida4 .~ &Il:ut.l.l : 
, " .,. 
always l:>a eqc.iLl to 1:bat t:r:11st' S propo'.l:'tio'Da1::e oou.t:r:UnltJ.on ~o the 
m:1nq1ed assata. 
. 
, .l. '1"h1. 'b:uat 1. JIA~ 1.D eal1:torrd.a. and .b&l.l. ))4a 
q~cad, co~.a m:K1' a4lll'Jn1atu.d acc:ol:'d..i.ng, t..o C&l.1tot:n.ia laW' 
. even thc:rugh ad:ai.nlate::1tQ el.C'Wher.. 'l'he OI.l.i.tornia laws appl:1.~ 
shaU not i%1cJ.\Jdo. any p:!:inciplu Ol:' 1&11'11 l:'1tl.&1:.J.n~' 1:0 ccm.nic::t.a 02;' 
c:b.o1ca o~ 1aQ'll.' 
AC~ BY. ftOS'l'DS 
10.].. 'Wh.il.o t::he 'rl:Uator is livL"l9', the 'rrUSteu aheJ.l 
rQn4ar to TrUstor • written account or. tha trust adaini.~tion. 
suell. ~ecount GhaJ.l be made Well requ.aated. by the ~to:-. Ui:.ar 
the dAath 01: -t:h. 'rl:'USt;;o:r: , t:.ha ~ Mal-l rliUld.ar an ...nnual 





ac:c:o'Untinq trust illcolae lIUly be d.iauihutad. 
e:1~itl.d to an aecoun't1..:aq are -..i.nors, thdJ:: ~c:~ ~l ~ 
delive:ra4 to their puanu or 9"Q&l:'d.1an. 'If ben.fici~i .. eJ:lti1:la.d 
t 
to an IlCCC1.l.nt.!n9 a:z:. ~PC:1ta.te4, ~ acoounb •• ~all. 1:1. 
delivered to thai: cotui1~to:c:', 9"Q&l:'d.1an 01:' the perSon ~~ tor 
,such :benefiaiuy. ll'nl". the aCQCu:nting i. o:bj acted to in wr!t1n9 
,d,xty-~i""'. (65) cla.:rat ~-=- ...u.in-sr too t.lJ. ~.~ to vhCllll the 
accounting- 18 to be l"e:n4ue" (acept ac:<:p\llltinga :r:endere4 to the 
Truator) , the iilec:cNnt .hal.l be 4.~ ~1n-.l ~ co::I.Qltud.v. 1n 
r~t to aJ.J. ~ctd.~ cU..~o.'" in i::h. QCCO\1h~. '1"tlc . . 
• I 
i!I.~Quntinq aha;tl be bind1n~ on all. penons tJitc~ ill the't.l:'Ust, 
inclu41ntt banaficiari .. wb.o ~ l'lOt lc:noVl1 or wb.c are not yet bo:rn • . ", . 
110 bene;!'!.c:i.al::y .. ~~ co~j'~on wit:h ~ ~ 1SbaJ..1 l::LaVD 
.t,ha pova%:' t:o al~ o%' ... zsc!l tb. t::ro.at. by' ap~%OVI1t.l ot an ac::counting'. 
-.me 
l.J. • J. L1!O~ A •. COlQlf and UltlCBNCB C!1IAZ'l!:N are designated 
as tl:!Aa ~.,.. of the ~ hereun4Ser. 
-... 
1.1..2 On the. d&at:b., r .. ipa.tiol1 or 1neapaeity of 
l.rlroNAItDA J\.. COWAN, LAlilltmfar CS"AZU CIl:JAl.l serve as the sole TrUstee 
h~.'IUld.or. on the <leath~ resignation 0:' incapacity of t.AWlUDfO 
caA2lDl, ROBERr HN'OOXIN' sbal.l IIl1.:'Va a.a .. T%Ua't!. .. haraundar. on the 
d. .. 'th, r.,d9'Jl&t:!.on or ineapacj,.ty o:f! ... .1t:l;a.ar LZONI.RD1 ',A. COlfJUJ or 
:aO~. lmOOI'\XN, at a t.ble when LAWll'JDtC!l!l CHAZS is SlOT. .erving- as & 
'l'l:'tl.sta. b.a:ra:uM.er, the WBLIS ll'uao BANlt, N • A _ slull aarve aa a 
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11.3 70r p~o.~ of the into:p.etAtlQn Qt this ~, 
the inee.pacl.ty ot the 'rZ\lIrtor, 0:;' ot .. 'l'rUaUa to ae:rve U SUc:4 
'l'r\lStec, ahall be oonc:lu.s!vely •• t.abli.lhed by the writ.tan 
. 
. cerlif!ea.t1c:m ot tvo (2) phYllilc1JmB II.tte:u:Ul'19' suc:a 'l':r:'LUI't;or or 
1'ruatee tha:t auc:A 'rrua't.ol: or Tr\Uit. .. i. unable to manage hie c:nm 
a..tt&.1l:'s or tho .. ot th4 truat. 
11... ... '.t"r:'wItee -":I reaip 'l:!Y. 91"rillg- v:'1 tten not1c. ot 
r .. i~tion eo ul of ~ c:ur.t'CAt. ill~ bcat1c:.iui.. OX' their 
9"lU<1iau 0:;' by t.111l1g t.l:1e apprgprlat;e pat1t1a:t1 vith' tu court 
b.a.v1nc;;; j\U:iac5..ic::t1on over t:.I1e. tl:'I.:Z.8"t. In: the .vent ot ru1pat.1on, 
• 
the re&l.gn!.nq. t'rU.st.ee sbe.ll convey the ~ u'tata to the 
daaignatad. ~ces.or 'n1ataaa. 
11.5 No :bolX! .ba.11.' 1:28 required ot ey 'l:J:'WI'e.. na.Ded. 
11.6 ]1'0 IJUC:cesaor 'rt'1:1Stee ahall be.' obligated to ODmi ne 
C)~ •• vi." t:Aa oocto;ant:a " ..oQ:rI1a Q~ .. ~ gt:. ~ p:.v1QQ8 ".r:z::t1.-1:!84. 
A ~ shall be ;rupoca1b~. onlY' tor his ow a.ct&I Ol:' omi •• ions 
-which ~. cp;o8aly negligetlt 04 lIUlda .in }'a4 taith.. , .. 
U.7 lfo ~ 4e4l.!»st nth tb.e ~ ~ 1.nqu.ire 
c:cnoern.iDq the V.l1dity at any act1aJl8 ot auc;:h '1"l;1;&8t .... 
11.8 'l!ha 'rrU.ate •• may raceiva rauonal)la compensation and 
.r.ilabUl:'.~t t02:' e¥pCll::s.a. ~~ C:::Olll~UOD ~ ::e:Lml:n~rsement 
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lIOWllRS OF T.lt8 TJP.tra'rlllS:!. 
12 • 1 The 'rl"US'C8.5 slmll hav., vi tb. l:'U})act to all 
pX'o~ I whatl:uar %"aIll 01: p~, 'W2Uc:h hY at a:rt'J tilIe be held 
I 
ha:r .. Utld-.r, incl~ iUly property hal.d roX' a Jnor, Whether 
conatituting principa.l or acc:aaUlo.1:e4 income, t:h. totlovin9 pov.." 
lU'J.I:l rights, which m.a.Y,be exercised in the 'l'r1:I:8taea' d1scntion at 
any 'Cu. ana 1'r=1I 't:l.lM. to ~ dta:r1ng' ~. cont1.l1wLnc. 0% any tl:USt 
beratUlc1ar c:n4 until. ac:tuAl diatr1b~tlon o~ all property: 
IE 18 T 3!;)\;;fd 
Ca) 'l'O ratain any pa:zt 9t t:ll.e 't::'wrt pr~ coldllCJ 
1Ilto tbe.1r po ..... .1.on, tor ~c:2b' l.~ o~ 1:1JiuI as t:J1ey aay 
.,. 
deem a~l •. and without d1veralt~C&tlon. 
(b) 'to vot., a:n4. ~ gi '9'8 pZ'aXi- to vote, any .' . . 
s*cu:r1'C.1u havJ.ll9 voti.tw;J ripta, 1:.0 pay any u.UDfUlt.leviad. 
upcm. atcclt alld to ~ flAY right o.t' option to 
~c::ipt.ion# CODVarlliO'l1 or othal:wi .. Which aay 4t any t.iJI.e 
cttach, l::I4tlO4l9 or· boo gJ.V8D to t:l:l- !:lol.d.c. ot rury .~, 
bona.# sacari1:iu, or ether 12lst:z;WILeJit~ O'f any natura therGOf 
tonwig put ot the truat estate. 
(Q) ~o joi.n 1.u any pl.CLl'l Q~ loliSC:it., ~rtq~9'8, 
eonso11c!4t.ion, cOlJll:linatioll, l:"aQ:z:va,rUza:Uon, cUs8clution, 
tor.cloo.ura, ~qa ot eapit...li~a1:1on, or o~ar Cb.l.lUJ_ CIt 
.1::'Uc~ ot a:ny cOl;pO:t'a.t!on, ·trg:st, or organi2u:ation, or the. . 
property cr a.set. tllu.of; to aepQai t. bonda I Reeks, Q1: ot.h8l:' 
seCUl:'ities held. by thea vith any prct.ectiva or s1mila..r 
~omm.it::.t •• , ~ too ~ c::n4 bo~d t:/.:Q.y .tlcat:r.it.1.. l.aU8<t :J.n 
conn.c:ticft therewith i!M to pay Uly ...... IQ!UU1U th4rlJUnder. 
17 
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(d) Ifo en:toZ'Ce a11y mort.t;.c;e or d •• d o"l b:'u.:&'t or 
plec1ge held hU'e'QllC1er a.nQ t.o purcb.uo at: any Ala ta..aun4ar 
uy property s\1hj tct t.herato. 
(e) To purebase .~iU .. OJ:' at:hel:" ~~ t.ram., 
and to m.alaa loa:oa aJ:d a~, •• ~e4 er lUUIaC2\U'ed, to I 
the G:lCe<:I'lltol:' or other :rap¥'eSCJta.tive of the ~r'8 e.at&ta. 
(~) 'l!o -"n-9'&, ~t.;r;Ql, .Gl.l. Gt pu.bllc. ~ pr;iV1S.~ I 
ea.l. ~O1:' ~ OJ:' on c::z'e4i:t., d~ ~~ or v;l:t:.hput netic., to 
convay I eXdJa.nga, part.1t1on~ d:1.'lfide, ..wxuv1d.., mortgaq., 
. . 
ple<!qe, i:lll:;nrC'V'a, ~ repe.i.:., ;:0 ~-t: opt:J.onel tQ le.cuse. ~c;;a;' 
. . . . . . ..... 
t..::z:a.. v!~ or. ~~' beyond the ~ti~ ot any tl:'l1a't:, 
~o: al$Y pU:cpc.J., inel.'a.dbw ~cn:~.:t:1C1n tot:'·cmd. z-4IlI&CI'V1!Ll. o~ -.1.1 ... 
c;tIls or oil, alld to cn.t..l::' ift'to any eovenanu oZ' &F8-e.ment.;, 
:!:'ala-t.1.ng to Foper\:y eo 1 ... e4 01:' any llIprova.eat. wtUc.b )lAY 
then or ther ... ~ b.a ~ thereCD. . 
(9') '1'0 ~., ~t t:D a.Z'b:Li::r.atd .. c:m, ral. ..... 
with or without consi~tJ.ol'1, ar otl:w:Vi •• e.4jlUlt elZliJd b 
favor OX' a.~t any t:zust, to .inatitut:., co=p:r:cm:i •• , and. 
d..tend &ct:i0llJl a.nd p%O<:aedim;a. 
ell) ":0. car.r:y fJUCll. iluiUJ:1l.%1Ce ZUI the 'r~ lDZ:Ly 
d.eeJll &dv~@l. u an a:lI:pC1Sa o~ the trastr· to PAY' pZ'uai'IDS and 
other asse.ssments on any lite. 1..nsl:1ra.n4!ri COl1tra.c::i: WhiM ... y at 
a:#'.i t1:z.M 1:1. bald hUIIlu:ndQ'. 
(i) To illve$t. anc1 ninv&st any property b.al.d. 
111 
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in 8ud::l property # real or p.~lIonal, US 'tl1o' '.rrtlst... shall dea 
tit. and proper. 
(j) ':0 bort:OV aone.y troa 4llY penon I tm, or 
\ t 
co~nt1on .. incl~ t:h. '1':1::uat;aas b~ .. ,tor eJl'i trwst 
p'ltl:'pC •• , tlpOn atlCh t.er.u cd <:oMitic:::ne aa t.h. 'l':!::"Wf'b .... ~ 
~ propu, and. to Cbl1p1:a the traat ~o: r~~J to 
~C1XDIber any of! ~ ~ F0perty by wOJ:"'t:9a9'e, de.a. ot t:ra.a1::., 
pledq., or oth.rwi ••• 
(]c) 'l'o hole! cy prcpert:y i~ thei: rwa.. as 
1'rust~, or :.tn th. ~t.Q' own DB""', or in the noaa o~ 
. # 
the 'l!rast:.~, nowine., or tU'lreqisterecl in. auoh eOft.Cli-':I,o" tl:u:I.t 
1:1 tle shall P4A1a by ~~very. 
(1) 'l"O usp10y co~eJ. and. co:JOpOrate OJ:' o'the:r aqanta 
and to pay tl:tel:a'1I reaao:nal:tl.. CCIIlpGl'lIAtiQJl1 to act on adv1c:e of 
., 
C0'W'1fI4Il. II.ll4 1.naur no 1 1a:bU 1 ty !o: IIJ1l' llC'tion takall or 
.. . . 
t'e%n..1nec! :b;'caI. po.rswu:lt t:o oud:l actvia.. 
<m> . Subjeet·to tha c~tiQ11 tl141:'t:b.e conso.1ida-e1ol; 
.ahU]' .llOt: de8-eroy the sepan.t. i~t.ity of the. trusts, to 
cOlUSol.i<1ate, ~or purpo.. •• o~ &~.1.at.rat1ol:1 anCl inv •• tment, 
the property o~ t.ba aavenl t::rwI1:s' ~t&d: h4lU"aby ana 1;.0 
oJ.J:OQ~l1:. 'Un4.i:~:1.ded int8J:'QU 1n .u.d:l c:::m.oliCla.te4 tund to tb.a 
(n) To bUy I 15elJ. r:.nd trade in lIacw::'it.1. of any 
DAtur., 1nc~udin9 options, aAort aLles, on ~i~, 2D4 :o~ 
such pu.:rpoa •• to main.t:a!:n a.xtd operata. lIal:'9in account. with 
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brokers, and. to plec!S- o:ny aec::u:r1t1as held or ~clluaa by 
them with such brckua u •• c:u:rity tor lOaAa ~4 e4'Vanc: ••• 
(0) To do all .~ch acta, taka ul. suah prooMClinqa 
tmd exsrei .. a.U &Ncb rlg'hu and privilav"., although nai't:.b.Qr 
apecitical.ly her&.!.nhU'are lIUIntdone4 nor eo~U":I'ad. ~ tl).a. 1:11 
la'il with relation eo sUCh property u it the a::bsol.ute ownsn 
. 
t:.harao~ UICl .i.n conaact.1on t:.h~th t.o en1:el:' into any 
covenants OJ;' ~emeuta l:l~ndi~ the ~ aRato. .' , 
1.2.3 :t:t, atter COlUIUlutJ.'oJ,l with 'Ql1a 'anoth" , the 
'rrusteq are u:n&bl.o t.o &9%e. v.1tb ona e.nothar ~i.rlq any lA'Cter . . ' . ~ 
IIt'tectinq the ,adIJ'njatrat1on ar c!1at:rll:n.lt:lon o~ 1:.be t.l:"wIt estate; 
the. c1ec:1si~n ot UOta:R:DA .a.. c::oWu, Whil. ItbAa ia ~in9 _s 'b:a.at:ee I ,-
aball gQVarn.. %JIO~ A. .. CI:1Ii1tJI1' shall adVi •• the !i!ruatee Mning' 
'her, 1.:n. writi.ru;, ot bar 4ec:ia.:J.on, lU1C! such ~ .:tt.a:J,l. c:olIlpl.y 
Wl.'th 1:l:le dec:1.a:1on' ot LltODRnl. A. C01Qlf. lEowevar, wcl:l '!'J:1.1.ate. 
sha.l.l not. be .l.iabl. eo" 4mY pu:'Won %= 'the action o'i! L20lfAl'U::1A. A. 
COlt\N a.s 'rrQ.S't:... purst:mnt to sucb. decUion. 
lfotvithatancUllS' thi. Secri:ion 12..2, the t:tr.at .bal.l. be 
bound to third part:.iu :by t:b~ iScttOns ot any '.L"l:UIIt •• ot Il trust 
heJ.d pt.U1twmt 1:0 1:.h.i.- '!rust lIql:1laaent. Any aobi-en ~cn by IS. 
Tl:U.Stae aball be binding U'pOD the t:r:ust ..ut. ~ JIlly be nlieci 
upon Py th..U'd, parti_ deal.i:1g wit:b. tl18 tnat. Without 1im.1.tin9 1::ha 
genarali.ty of t.lJ.e fo:reqoi:ng,. the' 'll:'u.st... are ·~~itie&lly 
aU't:hor1zed to d.e.poait and withc:b:e.w tu:Rds troa :bank, HVing'S and 




purchUe a.Sate of the t..l::U5t estata, upon t:he aut:horizaeio~ o! tthy 
one Trua~ •• ~o~. 
, U. 3 On any diViaiob ot th. trust uute or partial or 
ti.nal distribution o~ the tl::'wrt aatate, ~. 1':I:WIteJ acy al.J.OQ&t.e 
• 
thea tl:ust. uta.ea :in undivi4ad intarub 0'1:' in ldJ::u!,' or partly in 
lIonal" and pa:rt1y in khl4 a.1:. valua.tiou naaOl'labll' cla'ta%'lll:1nad. by the 
raq:uire4 to ~ a pron:t::. 4.1l1tz:ibutiol1 ot, the t:J::Ust eatata out may 
, .. .:. 
~ a non-pronta ~locaUon pr~id.ec1 ~. u .. ~. aJ.lo,*ta4 to a.tah ! 
b.ne:e1c::ia::r:y have ~~'InLlUlt o. proporltorsa .... ~u •• 
, 
12.4- All .... tun ~ dete:l:1lLf.nationa ot, alloo.tiona 
to an4 cb.a..rVu age1nat! ~inci})al and inc::cme during the lifetime o't 
, .. 
the. 'rl;ust,Qr 1Iha.l1. be govern..ct -~ 1::b..- Prinoipal. aM. l:t\~ AI;t o;t! 
'the S1:&t. o~ C:&l..1~onrl.. ~ -.:e~ect. at. t.b4i :t:ila.e 0: eacb aueh 
det.e.ni.nat:ion inaotar lUI IJ\lCh- A.c::t: iii appUc::ebla. All. JlAt:t.era 
r~ Cle~tioxUa o:f!, .. 11.oeaid.~. t:.o aU oh.a:I:vo .. ~t: 
principal aM 1.nccmsO :follotr.l.Dg the 'trWItor~ .. .dA&1:h 8llal1. be 
·90..,~d l:Jy ~. P'J:'inoipa.l a=! ~ Act: o~ the sta"te Of. Cali.torn:La 
in e:ftect: at t:h. aate ot her d .. 1:11, imler&%' as aueh 1t.c:t i.w 
applie.a.b1 •• 
l2.S Any'!'rUSt.e,. by tiling vritt~ notic:e in the records 
o't the trust a.nd gj,;ving notice to &11 cu:::rrant be.ne:eieil!'l:i •• o:e 1:l;I.-
truat. may surr~ I d1ad.&i:m. or ralus. any r1t;hti' powers or 
d.1sc:re'tion ~teQ to said 'l'J:U5tees o~ this trust. suc:h action 
shaJ.l be i~oc:aJ)llil as to auc:h Tl:ustaQQ. 
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12.6 '!'he "l"lN.atau are authori%a4 to ~lQQ\t. uy port!on 
ot th. 'l':t'Uato::-'. Generation-Skipping 'r:ralUI:fe: Tax (GSft) J:xe:2lp'tiM .. 
at:. :pre:sent. C!.u"tl:lo::-1r:ec1 ):)y Seat10n 2631 at' the Intarnal i.evanue, Coda, 
which reJDains unaJ.lccatad at'! th. t:!:a. .~ th. 't'rWI't'!or'. d.ea.i:b. 
U. 7 ~. 'rl:'Ustee. are authorizaa to <livid. any t:::.:rl.:I4t. 
Cl:' •• ta4 he:raund.r .into aepu-a,u t:a:usts o~ prgpert:;y U8lIpt trOll t:b.e 
GS~ and property aubj act to anw.J!. Tb- 'tnS't8aII ahall have 
dUoret1on ta PlY or app1.1 inc:c:aaa or pr1:lo~ of any t:I:t.1st so . . . 
P.l.YXZN'! OF T'lXBS 
:1.3 .. 1. All inJ:ulX'itaxu::se', estat. or ot..b.er death taxes, a:E1d ,.. 
any g~t.ion-fIld.pp~ t:z:uua:t.:2!' t= • .x._, ~t 11&41', by raa.ao:n ot the 
'Cloth of' 't:r:1Uator I k att:t"il:n1t.a.ble to t:h. Tl:Ustor' _ proba,te estat., 
o:zr any p;iJ~.1.o:c. ci~ 1 t I or to lUly F~.I' be1.d P\l::'$WUlt ~ or 
})ec~ sUbj ac;t to the' ter.u of' t:hi. ~ AtJr~ a.t tee ta. 
or as .. Clonoeqaaace o~ 1:hta ~ol:" a de.a.t:ll, aha 1 J ba p.tUc! by the 
~ruatao. froa tJ::u: USClUI ot tbe trust .. tat. al.loeat04 to '1'RU5f! U. 
J:>ElI'llfr.t'IONS' ute m:JLl!:S 07 CONS"l'lW'cnON 
l!'o. purposu ot t.l:U.. 1M1:.l:"tcIlant, da.t'1nitiona oi! 'ClElrtll.J.n 
terms Uld ~.. o1! conSt.ruc:t.:1I;1t1 ara prO'Y'id..d-
l4.1. R.~erences to lIissuen ma~ la.wlUl aescendJmts in the 
fi%"$lt, il.co~4 or any other <:1~ •• ot tho al1ea$tor d.esignated... 
14 • Z A laqal.ly ad.opted child 1Ith.o vas l2.-e th. c1ata ot' 
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child's lawtul descendan:b by blO<Xl Q% ~opt.ion al:l.zlll 1>1 cona1.dencl 
as la'W'ftll c1 •• ean4anta of the adopting pa:r:en:tII rmd ot c:nycme who 1a 
by 1)1004 or adoption an ancestor ot the a4optin~ pUena. 
I 1.4 • ~ b:l:.:.renoca to "&Share" or • port ion" ua.n a 
beneticia..r:y'_ p:oportio~ iftu%'lUrt ... d.etU"ftlit:le4 by' the 1::.arJII.s anc! 
conditions ot this 1ruf~. 
1."." :a.~e:rcnc::c:s tQ "a.xecutor" 0:;' -executors" mean an 
executor , exec:ut.rix~ ad:IaiDut:z:&tor, .aCini.at:J:a.t::d.x, porao:al: 
repl:8senta't.ive or other per •. oll or persons cbarg'ed nth the 
reacpo=..:U:d.J.it:'T 1!ax; the a~t.ion o~ the 'l.':I::"I:lst~'. pr~at • 
. ~ 
e.ta.te.. 
1.4 • 5 llo:f~c.. to _ "eO.\lC&Uon· Jlball. :aeen •• oon4a:r::y , 
0011.89'8, ~u o.n4 poot-grad'Wlta s~ at pl.1bl1c: or p:rivate 
'1na1:itutlona-. 
14.' Unl.... 1:.he context:. clearly requires anothe% 
t:Ol:ust'rClotJ.on, t:hc maocul.ln., ram:f t:I' ne ana neuter g.m4Bl:11 alUllJ. each 
includit the others, ancl the aingular and plural Dtimbe:z:'s aha11 
il'lc::.1Ud.e the other. 
14 .. 7 l:~ lIU:ly 'ProY'j,eioXl or prov:1.Sior;.s o! thJ.s inRrmi.r1t ia 
invalid or unantoroeable, the remai.ninq p:oviaiona .hal.l. COl'ltiml.. 
~o be ~ly operative. a 
'I ce:a:t:i:ty th.cLt :t turve read. t:h. 1.992 ~R.Ute:sut.nt of the 




- .... -.. -_.--
w:s I IJ!:OKAltDA.1.. C09QlI BA4 ~CB C'fti Zl1:H I tlle 'l"1"tlSteaa 
of the T::uat Ag'raCIJant of Laona.r4a. A. cawa.."1, bavinQ' reviawed. th. 
ta:J1S . o'f the t¥'UIIt, .. c:ou'bli.ne4 in 1:h& :rirlrt .... e-ad:Dc.t a:ll4 . . 
:a..-t:ataaa:nt therao1!, b8%'~ ace.pb a=cl .. ~.. to " b01m4 l:Jy ~ 




· - -.. -.----- . , . 
w:t~s l1ti!I 'll.aJ3d alJ4 c~fic1al seal..· 
(J,;Z;i:.e.t=,:4e ~, 






All ua.ta IlQW hel'" in t:l:1.e MM or tiEOnIU:lA. A. coW'.Ur, 

















Cl T : c; T C.CH)7 ,,- T ,.".~ 
L:EONAltDA. A COWAN and. LAWKENCE'CB:A:Z;2N. as Tm..cu:e:s of the Trust ~ 
dcscr.ibed ~ b.ereby ac.knowiqe and accept tbt fi:rrcsoing F"ll'St Amendmeat. 
DIted: $'1*?-7\Ii:;:i 2'l, 1997 ~ ~C' ~ 
LeozIItd& A. COWU\. 
STAlE OF CALlP'0llNrA) 
)45. 
COUN'IY. OE ~ON'I'E1USY) 
') 
},u. 




FIRST AM:ENOMENT OF Tm 
1991 lU!S'TAn!MENT OP 1'EB nUST AGR.EEME:NT 
OJ' 
LBONAJU)AA COWAN 
Pursumt to tba appticable provisioas oftfut 1m lli:rMrmcmi of the 'trost Aareement of 
LeonardI. A. Cawu, executed OD. Oc:tob« ~ 1992.. wbioh restat!d in its t.adruy the LEONA.'BDA 
A COWAN 11WST oll982, IUd merdnI.couarda A. CowJn r&'.Sa'Wd ~ ~ to alter, amend 
or revclat flu! trust in wlJoLJ or m. put" lAcuud A.. Cowm ~ pt:rtiany ~ laid Trwst 
.Agrecrneat as 1blIowr. ' 
~, the ~ o!~04 43(0) ~hceby dd.o'c:e4 tu thtlt eurUetYt 
SECOND. JiDc;e mUST I was d;..,;....te4 br~:F.Il\BT haciP, tiIA ptoviaioll of 
S=tion. 4.1(d) Ire beteby cIari!ed to ~o t&it 1lWST 1I ia ~ oaI.r i:NIIt ~ to be 
O8tabliabed UDd« the 1luIt ~mel Its tcDa .. her'eby ~ awl confirnwl; and 
, , 
I.ASI. in the .teCO!¥l' cut third a~ ofScetioA 11.2.. ltOmalT MNOOICIN is benby 
Rplaced by H!NllY 'WINE'IUY. . 
]A t.I1 otbc ~ tho pto"iiaOD.t of ~ Twa Apa:mam. are llc:n:by I'I!:inocl ami 
coaf1mFd. ' 
I ceni:fY tball. bavc l'Qd tbG fi:qoi:Da Ftnt 'A~ 10 ,tho 1m lU5tlltot:D.ot of'The 
Trust ~ ofl.cozwda A. Cowan. &114 that it c:atro.;t1y Itatef the cbaDscI I wiIb. to malee. I 
apptOYD s:Ud.Fnt ~ iD.1ll p~ us4 ~ tb.IIt thO T.ru.:stcca ~ it. 
Signed. at ~ ~ thiI~'ltb ~ of ~rh:dltl("" 1991. 
/).. /"-







.. ___ .1 _____ . ..... 
........... .. ; 
J' 
LEONA1U)A A. COWAN TRUST OF 1982 
Witla&X I. 1.2ti.IQ IlECAMit1i& 31.12~2 
(See~' CompildOSlRaport) 
AsslSlll ON' HAND ON PBc;:PNIQ'1 t m 
Am$ I 
&.. ~on I Arpoum 
1 Cub bcld in BUlle: of Amaic& 
IICC:Q\lUt aumbcr 00332-18110 ill.l50..52 
2 Cub. helci hi -Smith ~ 
Invecrmeat ~ acc:oaut uamber 635-63186-1j 1.0&9.43 
14 - RJ:ceivabJo from,Scnk ol_~e ._. '. .. 33~8S4.n 
3 ~ ir1 Ptess Publishina Llqujdstin, T~ 1#,000.00 
4 UDcllvidcrl ~" ~ i.:D m.cdiUJI ~ .aod.loi: 
6:29 H.amptm:tlload, Alameda. CA _ alS325.135 
racrtaa&o 11;) Ba12k of 0U:laDd Sl,l64.60 
S Utdividad SO% imaat in 554 &c:tU 
6215 :De:ar ValIc:r Road, ~ CA 331~.OO 
6 Crlmdoo,. W"lSCOnsin Main U.s. po$t office 194.460.00 
7 Wmior, AJabvna Mail:! U.s. post o1!lce 431,000.00 
8 Truma.u, Mim:2aota Main U.s. post o:tBce 162.700.00 
9 Lew:istoD., MiuJ:M:sota Main U.s. poGt omc:o 167.QOO.00 
10 L~ pan:acahip ~ i:I1l'lIdr: CrnkAssodaP$ 9.650.00 
11 LiJ.rrirr4 partIlc.nhip ~ m Calcab 19&:2. 23.749.00 
12 Limited~ imc::zarirl r~CI' R.Ii1:I= ~ 20,000.00 
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f EXHIBIT ,"A" , I 
I 
LAST WILL & TESTAMENT 
OF 
ZACHARY A. COWAN 
I, ZACHARY A. COWAN, of Declo, Cassia County, Idaho, publish and declare 
this to be my Last Will and Testament revoking all other and former wills and codicils that may 
have been made by me. 
CLAUSE 1 
DECLARATIONS 
I am single. I have no children. 
All of my property is my separate property. It is my intention by this Will to 
dispose of all property which I am entitled to ~o~e of by will, community and separate, real. 
personal and mixed, which I may own or lwve any interest in whatever at the time of my death. 
CLAUSE 2 
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTAINE 
I nominate and aDI)Olllt 
., 
estate. In the event Stephen D. Westfall should Dre:d:ec;~em~ fot any reason to act as my 
Personal Representative, then, in such event, I appoint Mary Killings, Heyburn, Idaho, as the 
Personal Representative of my estate. I direct that the Personal Representative and alternate 











POWERS OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
My Personal Representative is authorized and empowered to exercise all powers 
in the management of my estate that any reasonable and prudent individual would exercise in the 
management of similar property owned in my Personal Representative's own right, upon such 
terms and conditions as may seem hestto my Personal Representative, and to execute" and deliver 
any and all instruments and to do any and all acts which my Personal Representative may deem 
necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this Will. 
CLAUSE 4 
DIRECTIONS TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I direct that my body be cremated with no services. I direct that my mend, Bob 
Soninger, shall be responsible for the ashes. My ashes shall be spread over Carson City, Nevada 
brothels. 
CLAUSES 
DlsposmON OF CERTAIN PERSONAL PROPERTY BY SEPARATE WRITING 
according to a written list of items and intended ~ecipients thereof prepared either in my 
handwriting or signed by me, if such a list is in existence at the time of my death. 
CLAUSE 6 
RESIDUE 
Ail of the rest, residue and remainder of my property which I own or have any 
Initia1s~ , _2_000048 
./ • 
( 
interest in whatever at the time of my death, other than beneficial interests in trusts, I give, 
bequeath, and devise to the American Cancer Society. All beneficial interests that I have in any 
trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary Killings. I exercise any power of appointment that I 
might hold and appoint Mary Killings. If for any reason Mary Killings predeceases me, her 
interest and the power of appointment shall pass to Stephen D. Westfall. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, lbave hereunto set Illy hand and seal this ~ +~ 
day of ft'ktJj ,2005. 
-
The foregoing instnnnent, consisting of four (4) pages, including the page signed 
by the undersigned witnesses, was, on the date thereof signed, published and declared by the 
above-named Zachary A. Cowan, to bebis LastWill and Testament, in the presence of us, who, 
at his request and his presence and in the presence of each other, and on the same date, have 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Cassia ) 
We, ZAq-IARY A. COWAN, the Testator, and _---:::..Bo:;,.;;na;;.:;:.......;.Ra...;.e~D __ a_vi_s __ _ 
____ a_nd_Ka_l_l_i_Hi_· t_t __________ -->, the witnesses, respectively, whose 
-3- 000049 
names are signed to the attached or foregoing instrument, being first duly sworn, do hereby 
declare to the undersigned authority that the Testator signed and executed the instrument as his 
Last Will and Testament and that be bad signed willingly, and that he executed it as his free and 
voluntary act for the pwposes therein expressed; and that each of the witnesses, in the presence 
and hearing of the Testator. signed the Will as witnesses and that to the best ofills knowledge the 




Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by Zachary A. Cowan, the 
Testator, ~d Bona Rae Davis and Kalli Hitt 
" . 
thewitne.S~~' this;? i day of_LL..+~,L--___ --> 
'It 
sf ATE OF IDAHO 
Residing at Burley, Idaho 
My Commission expires /CJ -0 --/0 
NOT ARY --- PUBLIC 
-4-000050 
,ONALD J. WILPEP. 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAR 2 5 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. RANDAll 
OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 












Case No. 'ti 0 C 090 5 7 B 5 
SUMMONS 
v. 
W. Kent Fletcher, 
Defendant. 
TO: W. Kent Fletcher 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED That in order to defend this lawsuit an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above-designated court within 20 days after service ofthis Summons 
on you. If you fail to so respond, the court may enter judgment against you as demanded by the 
plaintiff in the complaint. 
A copy of the complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice or 
SUMMONS -1 
000051. 
representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written response, 
if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule lO(a)( 1), and other Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an answer to the complaint, it must contain admissions or denials 
of the separate allegations of the complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3. Your signature, mailing address, and telephone number, or the signature, mailing 
address, and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiffs attorney, as 
designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the clerk of 
the above-named court. 
WITNESS My hand and the seal of the clerk of this court this J5' day of March, 2009. 
SUMMONS -2 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 





ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at -Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
L/?J7 
2009 
j DAVID . 
L 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 











Case No.CV OC 0905785 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE 
That I am the attorney for the above named defendant in the above-entitled action. That on 
I ~h 
the ~ day of April, 2009, I received copies of both Summons and Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial in the above.entitlj 'i:t:n and that I hereby ackn~w~edge said se/5e. 
DATED This _(.f?_ day of April, 2009/~ J. I 
) 
Craig Meadows 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE - I 
000053 
) 
____ .......... ...,v.\.}u .l:""'M Crystal Severson 
ALLEN BELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHElLS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 Xotth 8th Street 
PO. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No 1626 
Attorneys fot Plaintiff 
Hawley Troxell 
APR 0 1 2009 
J DAVID NAVARRO, 
By PATRICIA A DWONCH 
IN TIIE DIS IruCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff; 












Case NoCV OC 0905785 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE 
Page 3 
That I am the attorney for the above named defendant in the above-entitled action. That on 
I ~11 
the ~ day of Apr iI, 2009, r received copies of both Summons and Complaint and Demand fOI Jury 
T rial in the above-entitlj "6~n and that [hereby ac~~:~",;edge said s~e 
DATED This _f.t?_ day of April, 2009. / ~ J: I 
Craig Meadows 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE - 1 
000054 
Craig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MARY KILLTNS SOIGNIER, 












ANSWER TO COMPLATNT, AND 
DEMAND FOR JlJR Y TRIAL 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
Defendant. 
---------------------------) 
Fee Category: I.l.a. 
Filing Fee: $58.00 
COMES NOW Defendant W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and by way of answer to the Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial ("Complaint') filed by Plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier, admits, denies and alleges as 
follows: 
1. Defendant denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs I and II of the Complaint. 
000055 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JUR Y TRIAL - 1 
041880070.1485305.1 
3. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph III of the Complaint on the 
basis that the referenced document speaks for itself, and further, that the allegations set forth 
conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
4. With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph IV of the Complaint, 
Defendant admits that he drafted Exhibit 2 of the Complaint at the request of Zachary A. Cowan, 
but denies the remaining allegations on the basis that the referenced document speaks for itself. 
5. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs V and VI of the 
Complaint. 
6. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph VIl of the Complaint on 
the basis that the referenced and purported "ruling" from the probate court speaks for itself and 
specifically denies that said court found that Defendant was negligent. 
7. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs VIII and IX of the 
Complaint. 
8. In response to Plaintiff's demand for relief and judgment, Defendant denies 
Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested. 
AFFIRMA TIVE DEFENSES 
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation 
of Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and 
all of Plaintiff's claims for relief. In addition, Defendant, in asserting the following defenses, 
does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is 
upon Defendant but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of denials and/or by reason of relevant 
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses 
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is 
000056 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
04188.007014853051 
upon Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility 
or liability of Defendant but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of 
responsibility and liability in the Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the 
applicable statute of limitation. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant by reason of 
compromise and settlement of the claims upon which the action is based. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Plaintiff's 
injuries, if any, were proximately caused, in whole or in part, by the conduct of parties other than 
Defendant, who are not parties to this action. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the statute 
of frauds. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because evidence of 
any oral agreement upon which this action is based is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
PlaintiiJ is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Defendant's 
acts were justified. 
000057 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRlAL - 3 
04188007014853051 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant in Ada County, as the 
only appropriate venue for any dispute is Cassia County. 
RULE 11 STATEMENT 
Defendant has considered and believes that he may have additional defenses, but does not 
have enough information at this time to assert such additional defenses under Rule I I of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants does not intend to waive any such defenses and 
specifically asserts his intention to amend this Answer if, pending research and after discovery, 
facts come to light giving rise to such additional defenses. 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant has been required to retain the services of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
LLP to defend him in this litigation and should be awarded his reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 and § I 2-121, Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54, and other applicable law. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury as to all issues so triable and will not stipulate 
to a jury of less than twelve (12) jurors. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendant W. Kent Fletcher prays for entry of judgment as follows: 
l. That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiff take nothing thereby; 
2. That Defendant be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily 
incurred in defending this action; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
000058 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
0418800701485305.1 
DATED THIS ~y of April, 2009. 
000059 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5 
041880070.14853051 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~f April, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL by the 
method indicated below. and addressed to each of the following: 
Allen B. Ellis /u.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED Hand Delivered 
707 North 8th Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 388 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 __ Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
000060 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRlAL - 6 
041880070.1485305.1 
) 
Craig L. Meadows, ISS No.1 081 
Michelle R. Points, ISS No. 6224 
"10 __ , 
AM_~, __ _ 
J J)tWID NAVAHRO. C'er\<. 
~l! A GAH!~~~' 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1 000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendant 
APR J 3 200J 
J. DAVIa NAVAAAQ c. 
Oy AJO f&IOH. 
QMm 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MARY KILL INS SOIGNIER, 












STIPULA TION FOR CHANGE OF 
VENUE; ORDER THEREON 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
Defendant. 
----------------------------) 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, by and through their respective 
counsel of record, and pursuant to this Stipulation seek this Court's Order changing venue of this 
action to Cassia County, Idaho. Ada County is not the proper venue for this case as the subjects 
of this litigation took place in Cassia County, and the Defendant resides in Cassia County. 
000061. 
STIPULATION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE; ORDER THEREON - I 
0418800701483134.1 
: 
___ •• _ ••• w .... ..17 J:&A J4:>!l564 
4~6/2009 2:17:56 PM ~Crystal Severson xell 
DATED IllS 4- day of April. 2009. 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
DATED IHIS .9/!;:;Of April, 2009. 
ORDER TO CHANGE VENUE 
THIS MAIlER having come before the Cowt upon stipulation oftbe parties, and good 
cause showing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action should be transferred pursuant to I.RC.P. 
40(e)(2) to the DistIict Cowt of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, in and for the 




DATED TIDS ,.:) day of ApIiI, 2009. 
~002/002 
Page 4 
04183 0070 14831341 
) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
APR 1 3 2~o.s 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on OilS _ (jay of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing STIPULA nON FOR CHANGE OF VENUE; ORDER THEREON by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Craig L. Meadows 
Michelle R. Points 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
[Attorneys for Defendant] 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.954.5238 
000063 
STIPULATION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE; ORDER THEREON - 3 
0418800701483134.1 
Date: 4/13/2009 
Time: 11 :52 AM 
Page 1 of 1 
Judicial District Court - Ada C 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-05785 Current Judge: Ronald J. Wilper 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 







































New Case Filed - Other Claims 
Complaint Filed 
Summons Filed 
Acknowledgment Of Service (4-6-09) 
Acknowledgment Of Service (04/06/09) 
Application For Entry of Default Judgment 
Affidavit Of Stephen C Brown in Support of 
Application for Entry of Default 
Application For Entry of Default 
Affidavit Of Stephen C Brown in Support of 
Application for Entry of Default Judgment and of 
Non-Military Service 
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
(POints for W Kent) 
Stipulation for Change of Venue: Order Thereon 
(Stipulation Only) 
Change Of Venue to Cassia County 
Request Sent to the Supreme Court Via 
Interdepartmental Mail 04/13/09 
Civil Disposition entered for: Fletcher, W Kent, 
Defendant; Soignier, Mary Killins, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 4/13/2009 




Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wi/per 
Ronald J. Wilper 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 





An Order was entered in the District Court wherein venue was transferred from Ada County, 
Fourth Judicial District to Cassia County, Fifth Judicial District in the case listed below: 
Mary Killins Soignier v. W. Kent Fletcher 
Ada County Case No. CV OC 0905785 
Therefore, after due consideration and good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that venue for all further proceedings in this case be, and they 
hereby are, transferred from Ada County, Fourth Judicial District to Cassia County, Fifth Judicial 
District. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Administrative District Judge R. Barry Wood shall be 
assigned this case for further reassignment within the Fifth Judicial District for the purpose of the 
detennination and disposition of all matters, including trial. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk for Ada County shall file and 
serve this order upon the parties or their counsel and take any action necessary to transfer venue of 
this case to Cassia County. 
DATED this I 1- day of May 2009. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
ATTEST: 
cc: Administrative District Judge Darla S. WiJIiamson 
Administrative District Judge R. Barry Wood 
Trial Court Administrator Larry D. Reiner 
Trial Court Administrator Linda Wright 
District Court Clerk J. David Navarro, Ada County 
District Court Clerk Larry Mickelsen, Cassia County 
Craig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 l'vfain Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
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Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 




COMES NOW Defendant W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and by way of answer to the Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial ("Complaint') filed by Plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier, admits, denies and alleges as 
follows: 
1. Defendant denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs I and II of the Compiaint. 
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3. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph III of the Complaint on the 
basis that the referenced document speaks for itself~ and further, that the allegations set forth 
conclusions of law to which no response is required. 
4. With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph IV of the Complaint, 
Defendant admits that he drafted Exhibit 2 of the Complaint at the request of Zachary A. Cowan, 
but denies the remaining allegations on the basis that the referenced document speaks for itself. 
5. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs V and VI of the 
Complaint. 
6. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph VII of the Complaint on 
the basis that the referenced and purported "ruling" from the probate court speaks for itself and 
specifically denies that said court found that Defendant was negligent. 
7. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs VIII and IX of the 
Complaint. 
8. In response to Plaintiff s demand for relief and judgment, Defendant denies 
Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation 
of Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and 
all of Plaintiff s claims for relief. In addition, Defendant, in asserting the following defenses, 
does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is 
upon Defendant but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of denials and/or by reason of relevant 
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses 
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is 
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upon Plaintiff. Moreover. Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility 
or liability of Defendant but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of 
responsibility and liability in the Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
PlaintitT is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the 
applicable statute of limitation, I.C. § 5-219(4). 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
PlaintitIis barred from maintaining this action against Defendant by reason of 
compromise and settlement of the claims upon which the action is based. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Plaintiff's 
injuries, if any, were proximately caused, in whole or in part, by the conduct of parties other than 
Defendant, who are not parties to this action. 
FOURTH AFFIRl\fA TIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the statute 
of frauds. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because evidence of 
any oral agreement upon which this action is based is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Defendant's 
acts were justified. 
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SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant in Ada County, as the 
only appropriate venue for any dispute is Cassia County. 
RULE 11 STATEMENT 
Defendant has considered and believes that he may have additional defenses, but does not 
have enough information at this time to assert such additional defenses under Rule II of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants does not intend to waive any such defenses and 
specifically asserts his intention to amend this Answer if, pending research and after discovery, 
facts come to light giving rise to such additional defenses. 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant has been required to retain the services of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
LLP to defend him in this litigation and should be awarded his reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 and § 12-121, Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54, and other applicable law. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury as to all issues so triable and will not stipulate 
to ajury ofless than twelve (12) jurors. 
PRA YER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendant W. Kent Fletcher prays for entry of judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiff take nothing thereby; 
2. That Defendant be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily 
incurred in defending this action; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
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DATED THIS /If-!lJ;;-Of April, 2009. 
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ay of April. 2009, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Allen B. Ellis ~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED Hand Delivered 
707 North 8th Street __ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 388 E-mail 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 __ Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
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Craig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HA WLEY TROXELL E1'.l'NIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. 




COMES NOW W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell 
Ennis & Hawley LLP, and respectfully submits this Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an 
order from this Court dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. 
This Motion is brought under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c). 
The basis of this Motion is that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitation and under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and because Defendant did not breach any 
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duty to Plaintiff, thus Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim of professional negligence against Mr. 
Fletcher .. 
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the Affidavit of . Kent Fletcher, both filed concurrently herewith. 
DA TED THIS +--L-
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
oints, ISB No. 622 
. Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi/~une, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
AJlen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BRO\VN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, 10 83701-0388 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff} 
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Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
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· . 
Craig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
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Case No. CV 2009-517 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant W. Kent Fletcher ("Fletcher"), by and through his counsel of record, Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this Memorandum in support of his Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Through this motion, Fletcher seeks an order dismissing Plaintiff s 
Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. 
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Zachary A. Cowan was a client of Fletcher's trom approximately 2000 through 2006. 
Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher ("Fletcher AtT."), ~ 2. Fletcher did some estate planning for Mr. 
Cowan, which included the drafting of his Last Will and Testament ("Will"). !d., Exh. A. 
Mr. Cowan executed his Will on May 24, 2005. 
During his lifetime, Mr. Cowan was the beneficiary of a trust created by his mother, 
Leonarda A. Cowan, of Riverside, Calitornia, known as The Leonarda A. Cowan Trust. fd., ~ 3. 
Clause 6 of the Will directed the residue and remainder of the Mr. Cowan's estate, other 
than beneficial interests in trusts, be given to the American Cancer Society, and that all 
beneficial interests that he had in any trusts be given to "Mary Killings", the Plaintiff in this case 
fd., ~ 4. 
Prior to finalizing the Will, Fletcher asked Mr. Cowan about his interests in any trusts, 
including his mother's trust and Mr. Cowan informed Fletcher that he had received the 
disbursements from his mother's trust. fd., ~ 5. Fletcher then asked Mr. Cowan ifhe wanted to 
keep the language in Clause 6 regarding the Plaintiff in the Will in light of the fact that he had 
received disbursements from his mother's trust. Mr. Cowan told Fletcher that he was uncertain 
as to whether or not all of that property had been disbursed, and that he wanted to leave the 
language in the Will. fd. 
The Will was duly witnessed and attested to by the required number of witnesses. 
Fletcher Aff, ~ 6. The Will is a validly executed testamentary instrument, and Mr. Cowan was 
competent at the time he executed his Will. fd. No party has presented a challenge to the 
validity of the Will. !d. 
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Mr. Cowan died on the October 20,2006. /d., ~ 7. 
Mr. Cowan's Will was admitted to infonnal probate on November 3,2006 in the District 
Court (Magistrate Division) for the Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County, Case No. CV 2006 
1234 ("Probate Adion"). /d., ~ 8. 
Pursuant to the tenns of the Will, Stephen D. Westfall was nominated and duly appointed 
to be the Personal Representative of the Estate of Mr. Cowan. /d., ~ 9. 
The Personal Representative filed an Inventory of the estate on January 23, 2007. /d., ~ 
10. 
In his Will, Mr. Cowan directed that all of his personal property be distributed according 
to a written list of items and intended recipients, if such a list was in existence at the time of this 
death. ld., ~ 11. A written list of items and intended beneficiaries could not be found and it was 
concluded that a written list did not exist. Id. 
At the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any interest in any trusts. ld., 
~ 12. The testator's Personal Representative determined that the residue of the testator's estate 
should be given to the American Cancer Society. ld. 
Plaintiff contested the Personal Representative's interpretation of the Will in the Probate 
Action, claiming that she was entitled to certain monies derived from the Leonarda A. Cowan 
Trust, and that Clause 6 of Mr. Cowan's Will was ambiguous, thus, Plaintiff claims that the 
Magistrate Court should allow and/or consider parole evidence to aid it in detennining the intent 
of the testator Mr. Cowan. Id., ~ 13. Plaintiff submitted a number of affidavits in the Probate 
Action which said, in effect, that Mr. Cowan had made representations that Plaintiff would 
receive a substantial portion of his estate upon his death. Id. 
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The Magistrate Court in the Probate Action found that there was no latent or patent 
ambiguity concerning the Mr. Cowan's Will, that Mr. Cowan's intent was clear and 
unambiguous on the face of the Will document, and that Plaintiff's challenge to the Will was 
without merit. /d., ~ 14. 
Based on the Magistrate Court's decision, the residue of Mr. Cowan's estate was to be 
paid American Cancer Society. Id., ~ IS. Plaintiff tiled an appeal of the Magistrate Court 
decision in the Probate Action. /d. 
On or about September 9,2008, the parties of the Probate Action entered into a 
"Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for 
Construction of the Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter 
"Stipulation for Settlement"). Fletcher Aff., Exh. B. That Stipulation was signed by Fletcher 
and Plaintiff, among others. !d., ~ 16. 
In consideration for Plaintiff signing the StipUlation for Settlement, she dismissed her 
appeal and received payment from the American Cancer Society in the amount of $100,000. /d., 
~ 17. 
II. 
LAW APPLICABLE TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment is only proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter oflaw." FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 
106 S. C1. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 
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The moving party has the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of material 
fact. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). To meet 
his burden, the moving party must challenge in its motion and establish through evidence that no 
issue of material facts exists for an element of the nonmoving party's case. Smith v. J\-/eridian 
Joint Sch Dis!. No.2, 128 Idaho 714,719,918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). The nonmoving party 
"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
y"sponse, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
.nat there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.c.P. 56(e). 
If the moving party initially establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the 
bL;,rden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact. Smith, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588. When presenting 
affidavits, they "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." I.R.C.P.56(e). The nonmoving party must submit more than just 
conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. Coghlan v. 
Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300,313 (1999). "[A] mere scintilla of 
eviuence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
for purposes of summary judgment." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz. Inc., 
Idaho 84,87,996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). 
III. 
LAW APPLICABLE TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM 
The elements of a legal malpractice action arising from a civil action are: (l) the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; 
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(3) the failure to perform that duty; and (4) the failure to perform the duty must be a proximate 
cause of the injuries sutTered by the client. Lamb v. J;fanweiler, 129 Idaho 269,272,923 P.2d 
976. 979 (1996); lHarias v. Alarano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 P.2d 350, 352 (1991). In such an 
action, the plaintiff has the burden of proving negligence on the part of the attorney as well as 
proving that the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss of a right to recovery in the 
underlying case. Samuel v. Hepworth lVungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88-89, 996 P.2d 
303,307-08 (2000); Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224, 227, 796 P.2d 101,101 (1990). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred By The Applicable Statute of Limitations. 
Plaintiff s claims are barred by Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (2009) because Plaintiff was 
damaged at the time of drafting the Will in 2005, or, at the latest, upon the death of Cowen in 
2006, making the complaint filed in March of 2009 untimely. The statute of limitations on a 
professional malpractice claim is set forth in Idaho Code § 5-219(4). That section provides that 
with regard to a malpractice claim, "the statute oflimitations ... expire[ s] two years following 
occurrence, act or omission complained of, barring fraudulent or knowing concealment of the 
injury, and will not be extended due to any continuing consequences, resulting damages, or 
continuing professional relationship." Rice v. LUster, 132 Idaho 897, 899, 980 P.2d 561, 563 
(1999) (emphasis added), see also Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 
(2002) ("An action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced within 
two years after the cause of action has accrued."). 
Although the statutes purport to create strict "occurrence" rule for accrual of such an 
action, the Idaho courts have interpreted the statute to allow for a cause of action to accrue once 
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the PlaintifT has suffered "some damage." Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 178, 706 P.2d 63, 67 
(1985). 
This rule, known as the "some damage" rule, was further clarified in Chicoine v. Bignal!, 
122 Idaho 487, 835 P.2d 1299 (1992). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court found that a cause 
of action accrues when there is objective proof that would support the existence of some actual 
damage. However, there is no requirement that PlaintifT has knowledge of the damage but that 
the existence of records showing alleged damage suffered by Plaintiff was sufficient to constitute 
accrual of the action. Lamphan v. Stewart, supra. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has uniformly held that "some damage" is not a potential or 
theoretical injury, but rather, has to somehow equate to an objective or actual harm to a plaintiff. 
Although Idaho courts have held that until some damage occurs, a cause of action for 
professional malpractice does not accrue, this does not mean that the damage must be objectively 
ascertainable to the injured party, as this would simply reinstate a discovery rule, which the 
legislature has rejected. Lapham, 137 Idaho at 585, 51 P.3d at 399 (citing Hawley v. Green, 
117 Idaho 498, 788 P.2d 1321 (1990». 
Most recently, in the case of City of}v1cCall v. Buxton, et ai, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 
(2009), the Idaho Supreme Court reiturated that the statute of limitations for professional 
malpractice begins to run when the plaintiff has a cause of action against the professional. In 
Buxton, the City of McCall sued their attorneys in part, for allegedly negligently advising the 
City of McCall to release its lien against 1-U-B Engineering. The Idaho Supreme Court held that 
the date on which the City of McCall released its lien was the date on which the damage 
occurred, because that was the date on which the City of McCall lost its opportunity to recover 
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against J-U-B Engineering. Id at 663,51 P.3d at 636. The date on which the party loses its right 
to recovery is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to accrue. Id. 
In this case, even in the unlikely event the Court were to find that Fletcher negligently 
advised Mr. Cowan in the preparation of his Will, Plaintiff would have incurred "some damage" 
at the time of the preparation of the Will in May of 2005 because there was objectively 
ascertainable evidence that the Mr. Cowan did not have any interests in any trusts at that time; 
thus, Plaintiffs action for legal malpractice brought in 2009 would be barred by the two year 
statute oflimitations set forth in Idaho Code § 5-219(4). 
Alternatively, if there is some question as to whether Plaintiff sufTered "some damage" 
when the Will was drafted in May of2005, there is no question that some damage occurred at the 
time ofMr. Cowan's death in October of2006, as any other opportunities to amend the Will 
would be impossible. 
The Complaint in this case was not filed until March 25,2009, nearly a year and a half 
after the applicable statute of limitations passed. The Court should rule as a matter of law that 
Plaintiffs complaint is barred by the statute of limitations and dismiss this litigation. 
B. Fletcher Did Not Breach Any Duty Owed To Plaintiff, Therefore, Plaintiff Has No 
Cause Of Action Against Fletcher. 
For a plaintiff to have standing to sue based on attorney malpractice, the claim must 
include (l) the existence of an attorney client relationship, (2) a duty owed by the attorney to the 
plaintiff, (3) a breach of that duty and (4) a demonstration that the negligence of the attorney is 
the proximate came of the plaintiffs damages. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136,90 
P.3d 884, 886 (2004). 
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Plainti ff was not a client of Fletcher. Generally, an attorney will be held liable tor 
negligence only to his or her client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an 
attorney client relationship. Wick v. Eismann, 122 Idaho 698, 838 P.2d 301 (1992). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has carved out from the general rule requiring the existence of 
a direct attorney-client relationship, a narrow exception where "[a]n attorney preparing 
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identlfled therein to prepare 
such instruments ... so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary 
instruments." Id at 139,90 P.3d at 889 (emphasis added). 
Where such a duty exists, the attorney may be liable to the beneficiary if "the testator's 
intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part and the 
beneficiary's interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, or unrealized .... " Id. Ifthere is no 
error made by the attorney that frustrates the testator's intent in the document itself, there is no 
breach of duty. 
Attorneys are not subject to lawsuits by person who simply did not received what the 
believe they should have, or did not receive what the understood the testator indicated they 
would receive. /d. 
Even where a duty is owed to a third party beneficiary, it is limited because "[t]he 
attorney's duty to his or her client must remain paramount." /d. at 138-139,90 P.3d at 888-889. 
Thus, an attorney has no duty to inform, notify, or consult beneficiaries when a testator changes 
or amends the distribution of his estate. Id. at 139, 90 P.3d at 889. Moreover, an attorney may 
not attempt to "dissuade the testator from eliminating or reducing their share of his or her estate." 
Jd 
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For example, in Estate o.lBecker v. Callahan, the Idaho Supreme Court refused to extend 
an attorney's duty in preparing a will to surviving spouses except to extent an existing duty is 
owed to a client to draft the documents according to the testator's intent. 140 Idaho 522, 96 P.3d 
623 (2004). In Estate a/Becker, an attorney drafted a will for Ms. Becker who was dying of 
cancer. Id. at 524,96 P.3d at 625. The initial draft was approved by Ms. Becker's sister and 
Ms. Becker's husband, and at the first meeting with the client the attorney asked about the 
disposition of the farm to which Ms. Becker responded with her daughter's name. Id. Thus, 
Mr. Becker received something akin to a life estate and brought suit against the attorney alleging 
a direct duty was owed to him as the surviving spouse of the testator. Id. at 525, 96 P.3d at 626. 
The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed stating the attorney "fulfilled any duty to the beneficiaries in 
giving effect to Ms. Becker's intent as expressed in the will. He owed no further duty to 
Mr. Becker." Id. at 526, 96 P.3d at 627. Even where an individual is named in a testamentary 
document, so long as the attorney drafts the document according to the testator's intent and does 
not negligently make and error or otherwise frustrate that intent, the attorney has fulfilled any 
duty owed to named beneficiaries. ld. 
Like Harrigfeld, a duty may be owed to a named beneficiary of a Will, such as the 
Plaintiff, to draft a testamentary document according to the testator's intent. Clause 6 of Mr. 
Cowan's Last Will and Testament fulfills any duty owed to Plaintiff because it devises to 
Plaintiff "[a]ll beneficial interests that I have in any trusts beneficial interest" to PlaintifT. Had 
Cowan died with any beneficial trust interests, PlaintifT would have received exactly what 
Cowan had intended. The fact that Mr. Cowan had no interest in any trust at the time of the Will 
is not relevant to the adequacy of Fletcher's drafting according to Mr. Cowan's intent. 
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Because Fletcher satisfied any duty owed to Plaintiff as a named beneticiary by 
accurately drafting Mr. Cowan's Will according to his intent, Plaintiff's claim fails to 
demonstrate a breach of duty. The Court can make this finding as a matter of law. 
C. Plaintirrs Claims Are Barred By The Doctrine Of Judicial Estoppel. 
Plaintiff settled all claims she had related to Mr. Cowan's Will by executing the 
Stipulation for Settlement in the Probate Action and is therefore judicially estopped from 
pursuing this malpractice action against Fletcher. 
Specifically, the Stipulation for Settlement provides that the parties, inclusive of W. Kent 
Fletcher, and Mary Killins Soignier and her attorneys, stipulated and agreed to the following: 
"[ a Jll claims of Mary Killins Soignier under the Last Will and testament of Zachary A. Cowan, 
as heir, devisee, or holder of power of appointment ... are settled for the sum of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000)." Fletcher Aff., Exh. C. 
The Stipulation for Settlement further provides that, with "the exception of the payment 
made to Mary Killins Soignier pursuant to the Settlement described above, the personal 
representative's petition for construction of the Will of Zachary Cowan and for the approval of 
the personal representative's plan of distribution of the estate shall be granted by the Court." 
Fletcher Aff., Exh. C. 
Through the StipUlation for Settlement, Plaintiff agreed to settle all claims related to her 
claim as heir or devisee to Mr. Cowan's estate, as well as to approve of the personal 
representative's plan for distribution of Mr. Cowan's estate. 
In McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,937 P.2d 1222 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that a party who is taking an inconsistent position to a position taken in an underlying action, is 
estopped from bringing a legal malpractice claim against an attorney who represented them in an 
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underlying action, "when the party maintaining an inconsistent position either did have, or was 
chargeable with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position." Id. 
at 155,937 P.2d at 1229. Although Fletcher did not represent Plaintiff in the underlying action, 
that application of the doctrine is analogous. 
In lvfcKay, the plaintiff, Ms. McKay, brought a legal malpractice action against her 
attorney and the guardian ad litem appointed to represent her child in an underlying medical 
malpractice action. Ms. McKay argued that the settlement was made without her consent and 
that the settlement amount was insufficient. Notwithstanding Ms. McKay's representation in the 
attorney malpractice case, in the medical malpractice action, the claim was settled, and all parties 
agreed to the terms of settlement, and the Court approved the settlement. Id. at 149,937 P.2d at 
1223. Ms. McKay later stated in the attorney malpractice action that she was never satisfied with 
the settlement and that she never really agreed to the settlement. !d. at 150,937 P.2d 1224. 
The original attorneys filed motions for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel. The 
District Court granted the respective motions for summary judgment and also ordered 
Ms. McKay'S counsel to pay attorney fees and computer research costs as a sanction under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision to 
grant the motions for summary judgment based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The 
Supreme Court, in surveying decisions from appellate courts from other states, held that judicial 
estoppel is applicable in the context oflegal malpractice claims. Id. at 153,937 P.2d at 1277. 
In McKay, the Supreme Court, consistent with the District Court, found that because 
Ms. McKay, as the litigant, stated in court that she agreed to the settlement, she was judicially 
estopped from taking an inconsistent position in the attorney malpractice litigation. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12 
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Similar to the facts of this case, Plaintiff agreed to the settlement of all her claims related 
to any claim she had to Mr. Cowan's estate in the Probate Action, and obtained an advantage as a 
result of the settlement. Plaintiff cannot "repudiate" her earlier agreement, and by way of her 
inconsistent position, obtain recovery from another party, arising out of the same transactions." 
See e.g., AfcKay, 130 Idaho at 155,937 P.2d 1229. 
Plaintiffs claim against Fletcher is barred under the doctrine of judicial estoppel and the 
Court can make such a finding as a matter of law. 
D. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred Under The Doctrines Of Waiver And Quasi-Estoppel. 
In the event the Court finds the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not applicable in this case, 
Plaintiff's claims are nevertheless barred under the doctrines of waiver and quasi-estoppel. 
Waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. 
Record Steel & Construction, Inc. v. Martel Construction. Inc. 129 Idaho 288, 923 P.2d 995 
( 1996) (citations omitted). Similarly, quasi-estoppel applies when a person asserts a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken, with knowledge of the facts and his or her rights, to 
the detriment of the person applying the doctrine. Id. Put another way, the doctrine is designed 
to prevent one party from gaining an unconscionable advantage by changing positions. Id., 
(citing Mitchell v. Zilog. Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994) (other citations 
omitted). 
Plaintiff is asserting a "right" through this litigation for attorney malpractice inconsistent 
with the position she took in executing the Stipulation for Settlement, to the detriment of 
Fletcher. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 13 
000087 04188.00701554566.1 
Plaintiff should be prevented from gaining an unconscionable advantage in this case, 
when she already settled all claims related to Mr. Cowan estate (or all claims she had as an heir 
or devisee of the estate), which by definition must include her claim of attorney malpractice. 
The Court can find as a matter of law that Plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrines 
of waiver and quasi-estoppel. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no issue of material fact and this Court can find as a matter of law, that 
Plaintiff s complaint against Fletcher is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, or 
alternatively under the doctrines of judicial estoppel, waiver or quasi-estoppel. Moreover, 
Plaintiff has no standing to bring a malpractice action against Fletcher on the basis that Fletcher 
drafted Mr. Cowan's Will based on his intent, and made no error in drafting the Will. 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED THJS~JUne, 2009, 
EY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thil. Clay of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
V/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - IS 
000089 04188.0070.15545661 
Craig L. Meadows, ISS No. 1081 
MichelJe R. Points, [SS No. 6224 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Sox 1617 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 





) AFFIDA VIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER 
vs. 









W. KENT FLETCHER, being flTst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as foHows: 
I. I am the Defendant in the above-entitled action. I have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and can testify as to the truth ofthe matters contained 
herein jf called upon as a witness at the trial of this action. 
2. Zachary A. Cowan was my client from approximately 1998 through 2006. 
During that time, r did some estate planning for Mr. C.owan, which included the drafting of his 
AFFIDA VIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER - 1 
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Last Will and Testament ("Will"). Mr. Cowan executed his last Will on May 24, 2005. A true 
and correct copy of the Will is attached as Exhibit A. 
3. During his lifetime, Mr. Cowan was the beneficiary of a trust created by 
his mother, Leonarda A. Cowan, of Riverside, California, known as The Leonarda A. Cowan 
Trust. 
4. Clause 6 ofthe Will directed the residue and remainder of the testator's 
estate, other than beneficial interests in trusts, be given to the American Cancer Society, and that 
all beneficial interests that he had in any trusts be given to "Mary Killings", the Plaintiff. 
5. Prior to finalizing the Will I asked Mr. Cowan about his interests in any 
trusts, including his mother's trust, and he informed me that he had received disbursements from 
his mother's trust. I asked him ifhe wanted to keep the language in Clause 6 regarding the 
Plaintiff in the Will in light of the fact that he had received disbursements from his mother's 
trust. Mr. Cowan told me that he was uncertain as to whether all ofthe trust property had been 
disbursed, and he wanted to leave the language in the Will. 
6. The Will was duly witnessed and attested to by the required number of 
witnesses. The Will is a validly executed testamentary instrument, and Mr. Cowan was 
competent at the time he executed his Will. No one presented a challenge to the validity ofthe 
Will. 
7. Mr. Cowan died on the October 20, 2006. 
8. Mr. Cowan's Will was admitted to informal probate on November 3, 2006 
in the District Court (Magistrate Division) for the Fifth judicial District, Cassia County, Case 
No. CV 2006-1234 ("Probate Action"). 
AFFIDA VIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER - 2 1-
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9. Pursuant to the tenns of the Will, Stephen D. Westfall was nominated and 
duly appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Mr. Cowan. 
10. The Personal Representative filed an Inventory of the estate on 
January 23, 2007. 
11. In his Will, Cowan directed that all his personal property be distributed 
according to a written list of items and intended recipients, if such a list was in existence at the 
time of his death. A written list of items and intended beneficiaries could not be fuund and it 
was concluded that a written list does not exist. 
12. I have been unable to locate any beneficial interest or powers of 
appointment in any trust held or possessed by Mr. Cowen at the time of his death. The Personal 
Representative detennined that the residue of the testator's estate should be given to the 
American Cancer Society. 
13. Plaintiff contested the Personal Representative's interpretation of the Will 
in the Probate Action, claiming that she was entitled to certain monies derived from the Leonarda 
A. Cowan Trust, and that Clause 6 ofMr. Cowan's Wi]] was ambiguous, thus, Plaintiffclaimed 
that the Magistrate Court should allow parole evidence to aid it in determining the intent of the 
testator, Mr. Cowan. Plainti ff submitted a number of affidavits in the Probate Action which said, 
in effect, that Mr. Cowan had made representations that Plaintiff would receive a substantial 
portion of his estate upon his death. 
14. The Magistrate Court in the Probate Action found that there was no latent 
or patent ambiguity concerning Mr. Cowan's Will, that Mr. Cowan's intent was clear and 
unambiguous on the face of the Will document and that Plaintiffs challenge to the Will was 
w itho ut merit. 
AFFIDAVIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER - 3 
000092 04188.0070.1554550.1 
15. Based on the Magistrate Court's decision, the residue of Mr. Cowan's 
estate should be distributed to the American Cancer Society, Plainti iT tiled an appeal of the 
Magistrate Court decision in the Probate Action. 
16. On or about September 9,2008, the parties of the Probate Action entered 
into a "Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary KiJlins Soignier, Approval of Petition for 
Construction ofthe Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter 
"Stipulation fur Settlement"). A true and correct copy of the Stipulation for Settlement is 
attached as Exhibit B. That StipuJation was signed by myself and Plaintiff, among others. 
17. In consideration of Plaintiff signing the Stipulation for Settlement, she 
dismissed her appeal and received payment from the American Cancer Society in the amount of 
$100,000. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
~ 





SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this L day of June, 2009. 
AFFIDAVIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER - 4 
&L~ 
Name:-15.~ 1tu.. !auf:; ----
Notary Public for; dah 
Residing at --.5;~~~'¥::----7r~-h.--;:-rr-I~­
My commission expires +-if-----!u..::~:::..:.=-..!...J._--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi/~une, 2009, I causod to be servod a true 
copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each ofthe foJlowing: 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701 ~0388 
(Attorneys for Pfaintifi] 
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_' _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
04188.0070.1554550.1 
LAST WILL & TESTAMENT 
OF 
ZACHARY A. COWAN 
I, ZACHARY A COWAN, of Declo, Cassia County, Idaho, publish and declare 
this to be my Last 'Will and Testament revoking all other and former 'Ivills and coclicils that may 
have been made by me. 
CLAUSE 1 
DECLARATIONS 
I am single. I have no children. 
All of my property is my separate property. It is my intention by this Vlill to 
dispose Dfall property which I am entitled to dispose of by vvill, community and separate, real, 
personal and mixed, which I may own or have any interest in whatever at the time of my death. 
CLAUSE 2 
APPOJNTM:E1\TT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I nominate and appoint Stephen D. Westfall as the Personal Representative of my 
estate. In the event Stephen D. Westfall should predecease me, or fail for any reason to act as my 
Personal Representative, then, in such event, I appoint Mary Killings, Heyburn, Idaho, as the 
Personal Representative of my estate. I direct that the Personal Representative and alternate 






PUWERS OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
My Personal Representative is authorized and empowered to exercise all powers 
in the management of my estate that any reasonable and pnIdent individual would exercise in the 
management of sL,'uilar property owned in my Persona1 Representative's own right, upon such 
terms and conditions as may seem best to my Personal Representative, and to execute and deliver 
any and all instruments and to do any and all acts which my Personal Representative may deem 
necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this Will. 
CLAUSE 4 
DIRECTIONS TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I direct that my body be cremated vvith no services, I direct that my friend, Bob 
Soninger, shall be responsible for the ashes, My ashes shall be spread oyer Carson City, Nevada 
brothels. 
CLAUSE 5 
DISPOSITION OF CERTAm PERSONAL PROPERTY BY SEP.ARATE \t.!RITWG 
I order and direct that certain items of my personal property shall be distributed 
according to a written list of items and intended recipients thereof prepared either in my 
handwriting or signed by me, if such a list is in existence at the time of my death. 
CLAUSE 6 
RESIDUE 
All of the rest, residue and remainder of my property which I own or have any 
Initials~ -2 -
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interest in \vbatever at the time of my death, other than beneficial interests in trusts, I gi ve, 
bequeath, and devise to the }unericCln Cancer Society. .AJJ beneficial interests that 1 have in any 
trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary Killings. I exercise any power of appointment that 1 
might bold and appoint Mary Killings. If for any reason Mary KJJliugs predeceases me, her 
interest and the power of appointment shall pass to Stepben D. Westfall. 
IN WITNES S 'WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and sea] this .?::-f + A 
• 2005. 
The foregoing instrument, consisting offou! (4) pages, including the page signed 
by the undersigned witnesses, was, on the date thereof signed, publisbed and declared by the 
above-named Zachary A. Cowan, to be his Last Will and Testament, in the presence of us, who, 
at his request and his presence and in the presence of each oilier, and on the same date, bave 
Residing at 
---- --
STATE OF IDARO ) 
) S8 
County of Cassia ) 
We, ZACHARY A COWAN, the Testator, and __ Bo_TI_a_Ra_e_D_a_v"l_' s ___ _ 
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Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 
PlaintifT, 
vs. 











Case No. CV 2009-517 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
· , 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendant W. Kent Fletcher will call his Motion for 
Summary Judgment for hearing before the above-entitled Court, Burley, Idaho, on the loth day of 
August, 2009, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, before the Honorable 
Michael R, Crabtree. , YJ-!J_ ~ 
DATED THIS J2~~ of June, 2009. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
0001-00 
04188.0070.15699371 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this@.~ne. 2009, I caused (0 be served a true 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
0001.0 1. 
/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
0418800701569937.1 
flI003/004 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
ZOOq JUN 2<1 P 2: 5E 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
L Y A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 












Case No.CV 2009-517 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
WITHOUT CAUSE Rule 40(d)(l) 
Comes now the plaintiff, through her attorney of record, and moves the Court for 
disqualification without cause of the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree pursuant to Rule 40( d)( I ) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 29th day of June, 2009. 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE - 1 
0001.02 
~004/0Ot 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 29th day of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Allen B. Ellis 




__ Overnight Mail 
-X- Telecopy (FAX) 
954-5238 
j , ,~ ) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
W KENT FLETCHER, 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2009-0000517 0 
) 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 





NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above entitled matter is set for 
hearing on Monday, July 20, 2009, at 10:00 AM. in the District Courtroom of the 
above-entitled court. 
DATED this 1st day of July, 2009. 
0001.04 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 1 st day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
1. Allen BEllis 
Ellis, Brown & Sheils 
P.O. Box 388 
707 North 8th Street 
Boise, 10 83701 
2. Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, ENnis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
Boise, 10 83701-1617 
0001.05 
__ U.S. Mail 
__ ~_/ U.S. Mail 
· ... .___ ., •• v c AA .P':)!I:) I) 4 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 












Case No.CV 2009-517 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
WITHOUT CAUSE 
Comes now the plaintiff, through her attorney of record, and withdraws her Motion for 
disqualification without cause of the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree 
DA TED this 1 sl day of July, 2009. 
Allen B. EllIS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 1 sf day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Allen B. Ellis 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
--X... Telecopy (FAX) 
954-5238 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE - 2 
000107 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COCRT OF THE FIFTH JUDIClAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 












Case No.CV 2009-517 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Nature of case: In this legal malpractice case, plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier alleges that, as 
a proximate result of the negligence of the defendant attorney, she has been denied her testamentary 
entitlement as a named beneficiary in the decedent's Will. The Will, which was drafted by defendant 
attorney Fletcher for the testator Zachary Cowan, provided, inter alia: "All beneficial interests that 
I have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and deviS{: to Mary KilEngs (sic). I exercise any power of 
appointment that I might hold and appoint Mary Killings (sic)." See Exhibit A to Fletcher affidavit. 




The trust referenced in the Will is the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust, a copy of which is attached 
to the affidavit of Allen B. Ellis as Exhibit 1. There are two notable provisions in the trust. First, 
the trust does not extend a power of appointment to the decedent Zachary Cowan; rather, in the event 
he does not survive the trustor Leonarda Cowan and leaves no issue, the trust assets go to Ms. 
Cowan's niece, Sandra Eileen Keller. See Trust, paragraph 4.2 (d)(i). The second notable feature 
of the Trust is that when Zachary Covlan reaches the age offiJty years, the Trust will terminate and 
the assets are to be distributed to Mr. Cowan "outright and free of trust". See Trust, paragraph 
4.2(d)(ii). It is undisputed that at the time attorney Fletcher drafted the 2005 Will Mr. Cowan was 
past his fiftieth birthday and the trust had terminated, i.e., MI. Cowan turned fifty in November, 
2003. 
Defend~t' s alleged negli~: At the time the Will was drafted, defendant attorney 
negligently failed to review the Trust document or, if revie',ved, did so in a cursory, negligent 
fashion. This faiIllIe to review is undisputed because the Will references a power of appointment 
in the Trust, which, in fact, did not exist.. Had Mr. Fletcher reviewed the Trust, he would have 
ascertained that the Trust would terminate or had terminated upon Mr. Cowan's fiftieth birthday by 
the express language of the Trust document. Given the inevitable termination of the Trust, attorney 
Fletcher was on inquiry notice respe:cting the following issue: whether Mr. Cowan had reached fifty 
years, and, if so, his intention as to those assets which had previously been held in the Trust. 
The Will provision, as drafted by attorney Fletcher in 2005, purported to dispose of Mr. 
Cowan's "beneficial interests" in trusts. This win provision i3 without force and effect because the 
testator's beneficial interest terminated on his birthday in 2003 and, from that time [om-ard, he 
owned the trust property "outright". See Trust instrument (Exhibit 1, pp. 5,8,9). 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
0001.09 
wtI004/019 
As is noted below five years earlier, attorney Fletcher had drafted a will with an identical 
fonnat for the decedent Cowan (with a different beneficiary). which sought to bequee:th the same 
assets held in the Trust. At that time the Trust was in existence, and the bequest of "beneficial 
interests that I have in any trusts" was a valid bequest. See Exhibit 2 to Ellis affidavit. :n using this 
superseded will as a cookie cutter for the Will naming plaintiff Soignier-Killins a beneficiary, 
defendant attorney inadvertently re ferenced the testator's beneficial interests in a trust which did not 
exist. 
Proximate causation: Following Mr. Cowan's death, the Will was placed into probate and 
plaintiff here claimed an interest in those assets which had been held in trust. The residuary 
beneficiary, American Cancer Society, argued that, because no trusts existed in which the decedent 
had a beneficial interest, plaintiff, although a named beneficiary, should receive nothing. The 
magistrate judge accepted this argument by summary judgmerlt filed September 17,2007. That is, 
because decedent had no beneficial interest in a trust, there is nG ambiguity, reasoned the magistrate, 
and "the testator's intent is clear and unambiguous on the face of the Will document", i.e., plaintiff 
Soignier, although a named beneficiary, should take nothing. <Exhibit 3 to Ellis affidavit, p.12). 
As reflected in Exhibit B to the Fletcher affidavit, plaintiffKillins Soignier settled her claim 
against the estate for $100,000, substantially less than the value of the trust property given to the 
decedent Cowan outright at the time he turned fifty years of age. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMIIA TIONS a.C. 5-219(4)) 
Summary of argument: Where the existence, or not, of any aBeged negligence depends on 
the outcome of litigation, there is no objective proof of actual damage until the litigation is 
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concluded. City o/l\;/cCallv. Buxton. 146 Idaho._, 201 P.3d 629, 636 (2009). In the case at bench, 
until the magistrate ruled on September 17,2007 (Exhibit 3) that plaintiff should take nothing under 
the Will, any claim against attorney Fletcher for malpractice would be: specu:ative. The complaint 
herein, filed on March 19,2009, within two years of the magistrate's decision, is timely under Idaho 
Code § 5-219(4). Even negligence which increases the risk :hat a client will be hanned does not 
trigger the running of the statute of limitations until harm actually occurs. Parsons Packing v. 
Massingill. 140 Idaho 480, 482, 95 PJd 631 (2004). To hold otherwise "would foment future 
litigation initiated on sheer sunnisi~ of potential damages in order to avoid the likely consequence 
of seeing actions barred by the statute of limitatjons". City a/McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho at 201 
PJd at 636, citing Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 3, 12, 720 P.2d 191, 195 (1986), 
Thus, attorney Fletcher's foorly drawn Will did not ereate the inevitability that plaintiff 
would be damaged; and the fact that the Will increased the likelihood of fina.:'1cia! loss :Ioes not, in 
and of itself, trigger the limitations period. 
The Idaho Supreme Court 11as consistentlx held that in order for a claim for professional 
malpractice to accrue, there must be "obiective proo:that would support the existence of !lome actuaJ 
damage". Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho at 487. Defendant argues that the statute of limitations 
was triggered either (1) in 2005, at the time the Will was drafted, or (2) upon death oftest.:1tor in 
2006 (Defendant's Brief, p. 8). Had suit been brought on either ofL'1ose occasions, i.t would be 
subject to dismissal given the absence of any objective damage. 
As observed by the Supreme Court, it would be "nonsensical to hold that a cause of action 
is barred by the statute of limitations before that cause of action [for professional malpractice] even 
accrues". City of McCall v. Buxton, 201 P.3d at 634 (bracketed material explanatory), In most 
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instances, such accrual cannot occur until the underlying litigation has been resolved. 
In Fairway Development Co. v. Peterson, Moss, 124 Idaho 866, 865 P.2d 957 (1993), the 
client retained an attorney to chalknge the assessment of its property. The district COlUt denied the 
client's motion for partial summary judgment, and the client sought an interlocutory appeal which 
the Supreme Court initially granted; but the appeal was subsequently dismissed as having been 
improvidently granted. 
The case was remanded to the district court. The district court dismissed the client's 
challenge to the assessments, and the client appealed again. The Supreme Court reversed the 
dismissal and remanded the case to the district court. On remand, the district court dismissed the 
client's claims on November 3, 1988, based upon the failure to exhaust its administrative remedies 
years earlier. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. 
On December 12, 1991, the dient sued its attorney for professional negligence. The case was 
dismissed based upon the statute of limitations, i.e., Idaho Code section 5-2]9(4). The Supreme 
Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the malpractice claim accmed on the date of dismissal of 
the underlying claim, November 3, ~ 988: "Accordingly we hold there is objective proof that Fairway 
Development [the client] suffered some actual damage when the district court dismissed Fainvay 
Development's claim on November 3, 1988". Id 124 Idaho at 869,865 P2d. at 960. 
Likewise here. Plaintiff's claim for professional negligence accrued when the magistrate 
dismissed her claim that she was beneficiary under the Will. Until that point, any claim against 
attorney Fletcher would have been premature, i.e., there was no "objective proof that would support 
the existence of some actual damage". Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482,487, 835 P.2d 1293, 
1298 (1993). 
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In Chicoine, an attorney rep resented the die nt in a suit li)f damages, resulting ina j ur;: verdict 
of damages against the client in 1983. The client's attorney Iiled a timely motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict G .n.o. v.) and later filed a motion for new trial. The district court granted 
the motion for j.n.o.v. which was reversed by the Supreme Court. 0 'Neil v. Schuckardt, 1 J21daho 
472, 733 P.2d 693 (1986). On remand, the district court granted the motion for new trial which, on 
a second appeal, the Supreme Court on July II, 1989, reversed on the grounds that the new trial 
motion was not timely filed. O'Neil v. Schuckhardt, 116 Idaho 507, 777 P.2d 729 (1989) (O'Neil 
II). 
In December 1989, the client brought a malpractice action against the attorney based upon the 
dilatory motion for new trial. The district court dismissed the suit as not timely. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that "there was no objective proof of somea.ctual d.:image to Chicoine until this 
Court reversed the order granting a new trial in 0 WeilII on .1uly 11, t 989. 122 Idahc· at 487, 835 
P.2d at 1298. 
That is, in Chicoine, the mere allegations by the client's adversary that a motion for new trial 
was dilatory did not trigger the statutory period. Tn the case at bench, the al1egations by the American 
Cancer Society that plaintiff was not an entitled beneficiary under the Will did not trigger the statute 
oflimitations. Until those allegations were adjudicated agaimt the plaintiff, the limitations period 
did not commence to run. That adj udication occurred on September 17, 2007; plaintiffs complaint 
was filed March 25,2009, clearly within the two year limitation period of Idaho Code section 5-
219(4). 
In Mack Financial v. Smith, III Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986), the clients allt~ged that an 
accounting firm was negligent with respect to audits performed on a prospective borrower in 1978 
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through 1980. In reliance upon the audits, the client extended credit. Subsequently, the borrower 
went into bankruptcy, and on April 23, 1984, the client filed a malpractice action against the 
accountants. The district court ruled that the claim for malpractice was time barred. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that it was not until 1983, as a result of a bankruptcy ruling, that the claim 
for malpractice accrued. It was not until the bankruptcy ruling that "it then became apparent that 
Mack Financial [the client] would not be able to fully recompense from the bankruptcy estate the 
amount which it had loaned to Sho-ernaker [the debtor]". Id.lll Idaho at 11 (explanatory material in 
brackets). 
Again, only upon a clarifying adjudication iII the underlying bankruptcy action did there emerge 
"objective proof that would support the existence of some actlJaI damage". Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 
Idaho at 487. 
The most recent analysis of Idaho Code § 5-219(4) in the professional malpractice context is 
City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho_, 201 P.3d 629 (2009). The City of McCall had entered into 
a contract with St. Clair Contractor's Inc. ("St. Clair") for the construction of a storage lagoon to hold 
treated effluent. The City was represented by the defendant attorneys throughout the construction 
project. St. Clair encountered various delays, and the City, UIJon the alleged advice of its attorneys, 
terminated the contract in February, 2001. The bonding company for St. Clair hired a replacement 
contract to complete the project. The City concluded that tr.e replacement contractor's work was 
deficient. On the alleged advice of defendant attorneys, the City withheld payments to the bonding 
company for its replacement contractor. 
In December 2001, the bonding company filed suit against the City :or wrongfully demanding 
payment on its performance bond and withholding payments. The defendant attorneys represented the 
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City and in January 2002, the City began incun:ing defense costs in the litigation. On May 4, 2004, 
the jury awarded $4,955,096 in breach of contract damages against the City. On May 3, 2006, the City 
filed a malpractice action against the attorneys, alleging Legligenc,e in recommending the City 
terminate S1. Clair and withhold payments from ':he bonding company. TI1e attorneys l::loved for 
summary judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that the complaint was barred by the statute of 
limitations. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. On appeal the Supreme 
Court reversed. In explaining its dicta in Chicoine that "the existence of the damage did not depend 
on the outcome of lawsuits", the Court opined: 
Although we stateo in Chicoine that "[t]he existence of the damage did 
not depend on the outcome of the lawsuits, sinl;e only 'some damage' 
is necessary for the action to accrue lUlder LC. § 5-219(4)," in that case 
the existence of some damage actually did depend upon the outcome of 
the lawsuit. We held, "Chicoine asserts that the action against Bignall 
did not accrue pursuant to I.C. § 5-219(4) until July 1989, when this 
Court reversed the nial court's granting of a new trial. We agree." 122 
Idaho at 487,835 P.2d at 1298. The negligence: of Chicoine's attorney 
had occurred years earlier, but there was not objective proof of the 
damage until this Court later reversed the grant of a new trial, 
terminating the lawsuit. 
Id 201 P.3d at 635. 
Likewise in the case at bench. Whether attorney Fletcher's will drafting impacted the plaintiff, 
a named beneficiary in the Will, could not be ascertained until the magistrate judge had ruled on her 
entitlement as a beneficiary. That i3, as in Chicoine, the effec'~ of any alleged negJigen<:e "depended 
on the outcome of the litigation", as it did in City of McCall: 
Under the circumstences of this case, the existence or effect of any 
alleged negligence on the part of the City's Attorneys regarding their 
legal advice and strategy depended upon the outcome of the litigation 
against the City by \Vausau and st. Clair. There would not be objective 
proof of actual damage until that occurred. (Citations omitted) To hold 
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otherwise in this case "would [onent future litigation initiated on sheer 
surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely consequencl:! 
of seeing actions barred by limitations (Citation omitted). Clients 
involved in lengthy litigation woad have to file protective lawsuits 
against their attorneys when following their advice and strategy, 
without yet having any objective proof of actual damage or being able 
to prove a cause of action for professional malpractice. 
[d. 201 PJd at 636 
To summarize the above holdings as well as a decision not referenced above, Treasure Valley 
Bank v. Killen & Pittenger, 112 1e11ho 357, 723 P.2d 326 (1987): 
Mack Financial v. Smith 
III Idaho at 8 
Killen v. Pittenger 
112 Idaho at 357 
Chicoine v. Bignall 
122 Idaho at 482 
Fairway Development 
124 Idaho at 866 
City of McCall v. Buxton 




Appeal re grant ofmotion 
for new trial 
Appeal to district court 
re administrative ruling 
Suit vs. City for 
breach of contract 
SJ)L Accrual poim 
Bankruptcy ruling re 
payout to creditors 
Judicial confinnation of Ch. 13 
plan without award of post-
confirmation interest 
Reversal of grant of new 
trial by Supreme Court 
Dismissal of suit 
by district court 
Verdict on contract breach 
In each of the above cases, a judicial decision triggered the statute oflimitation!l. Until each 
such decision, whether the plaintiff had been "damaged" was speculation. Likewise here. Until the 
probate court ruled in September Jf 2007, fmding that plain.tiff was not an entitled beneficiary, 
plaintiffs legal injuries remained speculative. The herein suit, which filed in March of this year, is 
timely. 
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PreliminarY note: Defendant appears to argue that (I) he owed no duty to plaintiffbecause she 
was not a client, and (2) even ifplaintiffwas an "identified beneficiary" who was owed a duty under 
Harrigfe/d v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), attorney Fletcher has "fulfilled" that duty. 
(Defendant's brief, pp. 9, 10). However, defendant has not proffered any evidence to support the 
conclusion that his conduct conforned to the applicable stancard of care for Idaho attorneys. Out of 
an abundance of caution, plaintiff has filed the affidavit of attorney John F. Magnuson who opines that 
certain conduct of attorney Fletcher did fall be1cw the applica~le standard. Thus, there is no basis to 
impose summary judgment on the grounds that attorney Fletcher has "fulfilled any duty owed to named 
beneficiaries" (Defendant's brief, p. 10). 
Inherent defect in Will: Defendant Fletcher authored a will which contained a provision, 
purportedly for the benefit of an identified beneficiary (plaintiff Killins Soignier), erroneously 
describing the property devised to plaintiff Killins Soignier as held within a trust and erroneously 
attributing to testator Cowan a power of appointment as to that property. It would be cynical (and 
speculative) to conclude that testator Cowan intended to include a provision in his Will that purported 
to given beneficiary Killins Soignier a bequest but which bequest, in actuality, gave her nothing. 
On the face of it, a reasonable conclusion is that attorney Fletcher failed to read the trust or, 
if he read it, failed to remember the provisions at the time h(! drafted the will. This eonclU3ion is 
confirmed by reference in the Will to a power of appointment which the trust instrument does not have 
(Exhibit 1). As a result of his failu;e to informjimself as to '1 key testamentary document prior to 
drafting the Will, defendant attorney did not recognize that the testator's trust interests temlinared at 
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age fifty years and the testator owned the trust assets outrig.'fIt at the time the Will was drafted. 
The only other conclusion:s that the testator Cowan, intended to name plaintiff as a beneficiary 
but, for whatever twisted reason, intended that :;he take nothilg under the Will. 
Applicability of Harrigfefd: The reference in the Will to a non-existence power of 
appointment in the trust is evidence that attorney Fletcher failed to read the trust. That failure resulted 
in his ignorance as to the relevance aftestator Cowan's age as it related to his devisable assets and how 
those assets should be described. TIIis breakdow1 0:1 ~1r. Fletcher's part resulted in bene.5ciary Killins 
Soignier taking nothing under the Will. This is precisely the scenario contemplated by Harrigfefd v. 
Hancock wherein a duty is owed by the attorney to the named beneficiary: 
Considering those factors, we hold that an attorney preparing 
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or 
identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the 
testator to have them properly executed, so as to effectuate the testator's 
intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments. If, as a proximate 
result of the attorney's professional negligence, the testator's intent as 
expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in 
part and the beneficiary's interest in the estate is dther lost, diminished, 
or unrealized, the attorney would be liable to the beneficiary harmed. 
Id. 140 Idaho at 138. 
Because the "testamentary instrument", i.e., the Will, rethenced testator's "beneficial interests" 
in trusts which no longer existed (because he then owned the property outright), the magistrate was 
guided by the plain language of the Will and concluded that plaintiff should take nothing. That is, the 
"beneficial interests" devised to her did not exist. This ci:'cumstance is precisely the scenario 
addressed by Harrigfeld wherein a duty resides in the attorney to a named beneficiary. 
/ 
/ 
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Defendant argues that the plaintiff's claims are judicially estopped by virtue of her having 
executed a stipulation for settlement with respect to the probatf;! action. Defendant's analysis involves 
a profound misunderstanding andlor a misapplication of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The doctrine 
is intended to prevent a party from playing "fast and loose" WIth courts. Plaintiff's settlement in the 
underlying probate matter is not inconsistent with her malpra.::tice claim here. 
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general 
considerations of the orderly administrations of justice and regard for 
the dignity of judicial proceedings ... Judicial estoppel is intended to 
protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts . . 
McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148., 152, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997) quoting Rissetto v. Plumber and 
Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,601 (9th Cir. ] 996). 
The most recent pronouncement of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is contained in Heinze v. 
Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597 (2008). That case involved an action against an attorney by his 
client arising from a di vorce. The di vorce action was primarily concerned with the division of property 
and the custody arrangement pertaining to the couple's child. Following the commencement of the 
divorce trial, the magistrate broughT. the counsel for the parties in their chambers for an off the record 
meeting concerning the parties claims. The parties began discussions concerning a possib::e settlement. 
Following those discussions, the settlement was pres.ented to the court with some, but not all, the terms 
of the settlement discussed by the magistrate. The magistrate then placed the parties under oath and 
Heinze acknowledged that he agreed with the tenns of the settkment ar.:d would abide by them. Two 
days after the settlement, Heinze sent Bauer, his attorney, an email expressing misgivings about the 
settlement. Bauer thereafter filed a motion to set aside the settlement and the magistrate denied the 
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motion. Heinze then brought suit alleging damages for alleged negligent representation of him in the 
divorce proceedings. The court began its discussion by noting that judicial estoppel applies when a 
party makes statements in open court: 
Stated another way, the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account 
not only what a Pa.Jty states under o{lth in open ;;ourt, but also what that 
party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position was 
adopted. 
145 Idaho at 235-236, citing McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997) (emphasis 
added). 
The court noted that Heinze made his st3tements in oren court while he was under oath: 
In the settlement, Heinze received a fmaldivorce, secured joint custody 
of his child, and a division of the community estate, by which he was 
able to retain the marital home to preserve a sense of continuity for his 
child. This advantage was obtained through sworn statements. Under 
oath, Heinze was asked ifhe was in agreement with the settlement, to 
which he replied: "1 am." 
ld. 145 Idaho at 24] 
In reaching its decision, the court discus3ed the elements ofjudiciaJ estoppel: 
Judicial estoppel is applied when a litigant obtains a judgment, 
advantage, or consideration from one party, through means of sworn 
statements, and subsequently adopts inconsistent and contrary 
allegations or testimony to obtain a recovery Of a right against another 
party, arising out ofthe same transal::tion or sul:gect matter. 
ld. 145 Idaho at 240. 
The court also discussed the considerations to be alleged in determining the application of 
judicial estoppel: 
First, a party's later position must be 'clearly inconsistent' with its 
earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has 
succeeded in persuading a court to acce,Pt that party's earlier position, 
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so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later 
proceeding would create 'the perception that either the first or the 
second court was misled.' ... A third consideration is whether the party 
seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair 
advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not 
estopped. 
Id 145 Idaho at241, quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742,750, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 1815,149 
L.Ed. 968, 978 (2001) (emphasis added). 
It is clear from an examination of the decision in Heinze that judicial estoppel has no 
application to the facts of this case. There has be,~n no represen:ation in open court; nor has there been 
any "sworn statement" by plaintiff; nor has there ',een any inconsistent positions taken. The settlement 
agreement signed by her only provides that she is resolving all daims as against the estate of Zachary 
A. Cowan. Defendant does not appear as a party to that action but simply as an attorney for the estate. 
Affidavit ofW. Kent Fletcher, Exhibit D, p. 2. Far from making any statement in open court, plaintiff 
simply resolved her claims against the estate. P1.aintiffhas not obtained any advantage vis-a-vis Mr. 
Fletcher, nor has Mr. Fletcher been disadvantaged. Rather, defendant is attempting to obtain 
consideration which was not bargained for and concerning a transaction to which he was not a party, 
i. e., a dismissal of any claims against him personal1y for his legal malpractice. 
Plaintiff also cites McKay v. Owens, supra. Like Heinze, this case involved stat<~ments made 
in open court concerning settlement. Plaintiff was a mother of a child who had been born with severe 
birth defects. She hired Houst and Owens as her attor:1eys with Howard Manweiler being a.ppointed 
guardian ad litem for the child. Plaintiff McKay argued that she was forced to accept tile settlement 
on her own behalf as well as minor's compromise on behalf of her son due to the alleged malpractice 
of attorneys Owens and Manweiler. Prior to the minor's compromise hearing, McKay tiled objections 
to the proposed compromise, ManweiIer's appointment as guardian and other matters. However, she 
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agreed in open court to the settlement at the minor's comprom2se hearing based upon the ac vice from 
her attorney. Following the acceptance of the settlement, McKay brought an action against Owens and 
Manweiler alleging negligence in settling the case without her consent and on the basis that the 
settlement amount was insufficient. In rejecting McKay':; argument, the court noted that the 
statements made in open court were to be afforded substantial credibility; 
The sanctity of court proceedings is something that cannot be trifled 
\\'ith, nor will we permit a party to play fast and loose with the courts. 
To allow McKay's argument that Owens' ard Manweiler's alleged 
malpractice "forced" her to lie in court, desecrates the sanctity of court 
proceedings, and impedes the administration of justice. 11 order to 
properly carry out its duties in approving a minor's compromise, a court 
must be fully infomled of the nature and status of the agreements. To 
mislead the court by stating that one agrees to a settlement when one 
does not, adversely affects the court's ability to discharge its duties, and 
impedes the admini3tration of justice. 
Id Idaho 130 at 154 
The court held that McKay was judicially estopped fran alleging malpractice in the settlement 
because of these statements: 
In contrast, McKay's legal malpractice claim goes to the heart of the 
settlement itself: that Owen and Manweiler settled the case without her 
consent, and that the settlement arnOlmt is insur:icient. The case would 
not be "settled," as a matter of:aw, without ':he compromise of the 
minor's claim being approved by the court. A:: discussed previously, 
McKay assented to the settlement without reservation or objection, and 
now is complaining about the very conduct she clearly approved at the 
minor's compromise hearing. 
Id 130 Idall0 at ] 55 
In the instant case, we have no representations in open court, nor do we have any 
representations that are at all inconsistent. Defendant is not a party to the settlement; he appears only 
as attorney for the estate. Plaintiff is not judicially (~stopped from bringing an action against him for 
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his own personal malpractice in drafting the last wiU and testament and the estate planning for Cowan. 
See Middlekaufv. Lake o/Cascade, 110 Idaho 909, 719 P.2d 1169 (1991) (party to be estopped must 
have obtained a judgment, advantage or consideration from another party in order for estoppel to 
apply). 
Finally and of equal importance to the above points, the plaintiffs in McKay and Heinze, were 
challenging a prior in-court settlt~ment which they themselves had approved. Plaintiff here is 
challenging the adequacy of the settlement with ~.he Cowan Estate. Had plaintiff refused to settle with 
the Estate, defendant would likely argue that plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages. 
It is clear from review of Idaho case law that judicial estoppel is not implicated in this case. 
Plaintiff has not received any advantage from Mr. Fletcher ir. his individual capacity. Plaintiffhas 
made no representation or sworn statement concerning Fletcher. The doctrine of judicial estoppel is 
inapposite and has no application to the facts in this case. 
NEITHER THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER NOR THE DOCTRINE OF 
QUASI ESTOPPEL BARS THIS ACTION 
Defendant states that if the court finds the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not applicable, 
that plaintiffs claims are barred on the doctrines of-w-aiver and quasi estoppel. Defendant cites 
Record Steel and Construction, Inc. v. Martel Construction, 129 ldaho288, 923 P.2d 995 (1996). 
Quasi estoppel is a doctrine designed to prevent one party from gaining an unconscionable 
advantage over another by changing positions. Under the facts in the instant case, there is no 
evidence of a change in "position" with respect to Fletcher. He was not a party to the ~ettlement 
and there are no representations in the settlement which have nny bearing upon his conduct. 
With respect to waiver, the court in Record Steel stated that waiver will not be inferred. 
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Instead, the intent to waive must 1~learly appear. Id 129 Idaho at 292. TIle court also stated that 
the party asserting waiver must show that he acted reasonably in reliance upon it and that he has 
altered his position to his detriment. There is no evidence in :his case of any fact that would 
clearly indicate to plaintiff that, by releasing her claims against the estate, she was also releasing 
her claims against Fletcher. Moreover, Fletcher has offered s.ny evidence showing that he reHed to 
his detriment on any alleged representation by plaintiff. The monies paid to plaintiff i :1cident to the 
settlement from the assets of the estate, not Fletcher himself. Fletcher Affidavit, Exhibit B, p. 1. 
The doctrine of quasi estoppel and waiver !:ave no app lication to the tacts of the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the grounds asserted by defendant merit entry of summary judgment in defendant's 
favor: 
t. Statute ofIimitations: Until the probate court ruled upon plaintiff's claimed entitlement as 
an heirto the Cowan Estate, plaintiff's malpractice claim was speculative. The requisite "damage" 
was not incurred and the statute oflimitations was not trigger;:d until the September 2007 rilling by 
the magistrate judge. The herein suit, filed in March 2009, is within the two year limitation ofldaho 
Code section 5-219(4). 
2. Defendant's dun:: As a named beneficiary in the te:;tator's will, defendant owed a duty to 
plaintiff to effectuate the testator's intent expres8ed in the Will, i.e., that plaintiffi'beneficiary receive 
that property which had been held in trust. 
3. Judicial estoppel: The doctrine of judicial estoppel has no application to these proceedings: 
(I) plaintiff's position in the probate proceedings is not inconsistent with her claims against defendant 
here, i.e., she is not playing "fast and loose with the courts"; and (2) plaintiffmade no sworn statement 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17 
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in open court or by affidavit that is inconsistent with her posi tion in this litigation. 
4. Quasi estoppel/waiver: Plaintiffs settlement in the underlying probate matter and the 
alleged malpractice of defendant attorney are tnmsactions separate and apart from one another. That 
is, there is no detrimental reliance by the defendant nor are t:tere statements or conduct by plaintiff 
which can be construed as a waiver. 
Dated this 27th day of July, 2009. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
:2ERTIFICATE OF SERV!~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 27th day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, E1lllis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 8370 I - I 617 




X TeJecopy (FAX) 
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ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
fl/005/009 
707 North 8th Street \ i 11 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F1FTH JUDICV\L DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. Kent Fletcher, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 











Case No, CV 2009-517 
AFFIDA VIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON 
I, John F. Magnuson, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. r make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge and anI competent to testify 
to the matters contained herein. 
2. I am an attorney at law with offices for private practice located in Coeur d'Alene, 
AFFIDA VIr OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON - J 
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Idaho. I was admitted to the Washington State Bar in 1987 and worked in Seattle, Washington for 
the firm of Lesourd and Patten UIr:iI June of 1991. In 1991 I returned to [daho and took e'le Idaho 
State Bar and was admitted to the practice oflaw In fdaho in 1991. 
3. Since 199 J I have been a sole proprietor in the practice of law. 
4. I have a general civil practice with ':he exception that I do not practice i:l the area of 
domestic relations, bankruptcy, or criminal law. A portion of my practice has involved probate 
matters, both litigation and non-litigation .. 
5. I have been retained by the attorneys for the plaintiff to act as an expert witness on 
plaintiff's behalf In that connection I have reviewed the foHo'n'1ng documents: 
Document 
Petition for Informal Probate of Will & Informal AppL Of PR 
Claim of Mary Killins Soignier 
Inventory 
Petition for Construction of Will and Approval for PI:::n 
Order Setting Hearing and Establishing Method of Service 
Opposition to Petition for Construction of WiJI 
& Approval for Plan of Distribution of Estate 
Memorandum in Support of Mtn. For Summary Judgment 
Affidavit (Steven Dalton) 
Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen D. Westfall 
Proposed Findings of Facts & Conclusions of Law 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
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Opinion Regarding Summary Judgrnem 
Order Dismissing Appeal without Prejudice 
Motion to Withdraw Judgment on 
Petition for Construction of Will 
Letter to Sam Cowan from 7~c Cowan 
Letter to Zac Cowan & Frederick Mack from Idaho Trust 
Message to Zac Cowans Kent F[etcher 
Letter to Zac Cowan from Kent Fletcher 
Letter to lac Cowan from Kent Fletcher 
Letter to Kent FletcherfMkhael Saenz} 
Stephen Westfall from William Whitehead 
Letter to William Whitehead from Kent Fletcher 
Letter to Kent Fletcher from William Whitehead 














Letter to F. Mack/Stephen Westfall from Fomander (Idaho Trust) 03/29/07 
6. In my opinion, which I hold with a reasonable degree oflega! certainty, the conduct 
of attorney W. Kent Fletcher in the preparation of the 2005 will for testator Zachary Co'.van fell 
below the applicable standard of care for attorneys practicing in the state of Idaho in 2005. J hold 
this opinion for the following reasons: 
a. The will drafted by Mr. Fletcher refers ta a power of attorney held by testator 
Cowan which power of attorney is not granted by the trust. This discrepancy tens me that Mr. 
Fletcher either did not read the trust, or did so in a hasty fashion, missing the fact that no power of 
attorney was created in Mr. Cowan's favor. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON - 3 
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b. Had Mr. Fletcher review.ed the trust or llad he done so in a careful fashion he 
would have learned that upon attaining the age of SO years the trust property would revert to Mr. 
Cowan and he would become the outright ovmer oftbe property. 
c. At the time of the preparation of the 2c{)S Will. Mr. Fletcher had a duty to 
inquire of Mr. Cowan whether he had attained the age of fifty years and to modifY the langu;age of 
the Will and reference the subject property as property owned ou1right by the testator which had 
previously been heJd in trust 
d. The fact that the Will references "all beneficial interests that r m.ve in any 
trusts" indicates that Mr. FIetoher failed to inquire of Mr. Cowan how he wanted the property, 
previously held in trust,. devised. 
e. The portion of the Will which refers to "all beneficial interests that r have in 
any trusts" is of no force and effect given the ab.sence of such trust or trusts. 
7. Under these circumstances. drafting Ii wiJI, a portion ofwhicb has no force IU1d effect 
and which fails to effectuate the intention of the testator, constitutes a deviation from the standard 
of care and falls below the standard of care of attorneys practicing in Idaho in 2005. 
'({¢_4~. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 8-+ni1ay of July, 2009. 
KRYSTI CLIft 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
AFFIDA VlT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON· 4 
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Not1lY Public for :Idaho 
Residing at '~IU..L\ d I ~~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r HEREBY CERTIFY That on this q day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addT<!ssed to the 
follo\\1ng: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig 1. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
-1L TeIecopy (FAX) 
954-5238 
AlleD",~ 
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Allen B. Ellis, ISB No. 1626 
ELLIS, BRO\VN & SHEILS 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
Telephone: (208) 345-7832 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLIKS SOIGNIER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Cassia ) 
Mary Killins Soignier, being first sworn, states: 
Ca~:e No. CV 2009-517 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER 
f4jVVj/ VVlI 
She is the plaintiff to this action and makes the following statements from personal 
knowledge. 
When she entered into the s.ettlement of her claims against the estate, she had no notice that 
anyone was asserting that, by releaslng her claims against the estate, she would also be releasing her 
claims against defendant Kent Fletcher in this action. No document that she signed purported to 
release Fletcher in any capacity. 
AFFIDA VlT OF MARY KIlLINS SOIGNIER - 1 
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Affiant made no statement in court, sworn or otherwise, to the etrect that she intended to 
release Fletcher by dismissing her claims against the estate. 
Affiant has received no r,onsideration from Kent Fletcher for any release of claims against 
him. She nev« told Fletcher t.llst, by releasing he.r claims against the estate, she intended to release 
her claims against Fletcher himself 
DATED this -l-+~y of July) 2009. 
'-hi . ~U.l~ -~~~ 
Mazy ~llins Soignier 
SUBSCRn3ED AND SWORN to me on this z.q-rn day of July, 2009. 
~~i<M~® 
Residing at: oca;te"(A.D I~O 
Commis;sion expires: q .""::\--we 
CERTlFICAIE OF S2RV1(;;E 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1-:\day of July, 2009, I caused a true and com:ct copy of 
the foregoing docwnent to be served upon the foUowingindividu.al(s) by the method indicated below 
and ad~ as follows: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley. Troxell, Bn:nis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main St.~ Ste. 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
AFFIDA VIT OF MARY KIUINS SOIONIBR w 2 
[] U.S. Mail, po!;tage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Deliyered 


























ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for PlaintitT 
:.. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. Kent Fletcher, 
Defendant. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 











Case No.CV 2009-517 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN B. ELLIS 
I, Allen B. Ellis, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
I. I am the attorney for the plaintiff in the herein matter and make this affidavit upon 
my own personal knowledge and am competent to testify to the matters contained herein. 
2. That attached hereto as exhibits are true and correct copies of the following 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN B. ELLIS - I 
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documents: 
DOCUMENT EXHIBIT NO. 
Leonarda A. Cowan Trust 
Zachery Cowan Will dated 2000 . .. . .... .. ... . .................. 2 
Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment dated September 18, 2007, 
Cassia County Probate Case No. CV 2006-1234 . .... . ..... . ... . ... 3 
/ 
Alleni~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 27th day of July, 2009. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise 
Commission Expires: 1/5/12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 27th day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
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---"' ~"~~~=:::~ ,m"~t1&~~1i 
Ott July 1.9, 1.982 ~ A. C~~ u ~tcr rm4 
Truat.ee, exacut.ed. tha 'r%'ust Aqreaant ~f Le'oncda A. Cavan. 
Pu;r$WlJlt to Article r.r o~ Aid Agreeaent,' the ~ %asel:"V'8d to 
hal:.al.f the right. 1:.0 a'IMnd t:b.a ~ AgreeJlL8nt, by II written . 
ilwt.l:'a:iumt tiled with ~ ~... 'l'he!L'rUst ~euent waa .b4'l1d..cl 
Dl\d, :aestated 0%1 July 13, 1988, and the ~..t&t.d .lgre.ant. vas 
u-=nded on JUly ZO, 1.989 and ~.U1 GJIlendoc1 on septeaber 1.2, 1991 • 
. 'l.ba ~ herebY. eua.cnd.s tho batata4 ~ of IAonarda A. 
COW'OUl, IUld r .. tatee .llid Agreacnt in its .ent:J,ret:y, to read u 





L'£01QlmA. A. cow.a.N 
He, LZOHAlU)A A. COWAlI' and ~ cuamnf, .us T'tUStaes, 
4eole.ra tlult. LEONARDA A. COWAlt, eJiJ ~.tor, hu t;:re.nsfu-rad IUld 
. ' . 
c!alivarcd to. 'Wi as 'll'UStaQ6, in , truSt, the property listed in 
EXlnBn A, attaeha4 to th.i. 1.nAtraDoZ\t. Al.l. prope..rey .,-a])jeet to 
thi& trust shall ba itald, edDfnister&d and diatrib~ :ill 
2!.ccordlance wi1:.b. the provisions ot t.h.ia 1992 RestatezQ%It ot the 
2 
0001.36 
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· , 
'fiW5't: AqreelDe.nt. This trust shall be mown as LEotQ.lU)A A. 0JmJJ 
'rlmST 01 1982. 
CEAlW:'l'BR 07 PROPERTY '1'1U..RSP'ElUlED 
1..1. AJ.l propca.rty trDl:1Iit'a.n-a4 ato t:.h8 t.ru.t upon the 
creation. tharao~ and held thereandar lit, t.l:d.a till. coruliat.a ot thG 
~'" IHlpa%'llt. property and Bhal.~ re.tain its separat& prap.rty 
chnl:lCt.a:r while h4t1.c! ~JI'Q&n't: to the ter.aua O~ the a-uat. 
, 
,2" • .1. ~ ~ :reserve~ 1:ha r!ght >to alter, e1Ml'\d or 
rG'VOke t:hi.a trust in vbo14 or in part dUrillg her l~lil't;;i:ma. Such 
"... 
alteration, ZUMnd¥eat: or '%'av~tian whall be 'by \nPitteta i.nsi:rulaent 
'II igneCl ~ the T':I:WIi:.or :md. deli vera4 to Ule TrUstees. 
-' ) .2. 2 ~ ~tor ~ .. tha right: t.o vit:hdrav prC?~ 
trans:ferred to the trust astate. l"ol~otdn9 asuc:b vithc:h1lWZll., the 
w1thdrawn proparty ~l. ~nu. tQ retaa 1:.ho ebaraeter that it 
had ~ its tran..~er into the t:nlat. 
2.3 Upon the c5eath ot tha Trwstor I th..iJI trust aba.ll be 
irre.vocablA Illld duLl.~ n~i: ~ aubject to Itltaration ' or BlDe ndMl1t. 
2." The 'l"rUg.'r!or ruervea the ri~t to traIuiter property 
to the t%'U$e utate at z.ny 1:m by '!:i:J.1. or otherwise. Such 







DIS'l'JUBl1l'IOlI OORIl(G 'l'RD'STOR'S LIl'B 
3.J. While the TrUstoX' is l..ivin9, the '1"rU&5tces 1Ib.al.l pay 
to or ~pply 'for the benefit ot the 'lru.t:or the net incoma ot the 
~t 8$QtG, qua.rter-ennual.J.y I or at more frequent intervals. In 
additicn, the -'l'rUat.aas shall pay ~o Ol;" apply' ror the benetlt of the 
, , . . 
TrUstor au lIUch oj! the principal. ot t.b.e trust estate IUJ the '1'rCat 
~, r"rom thM to tille, direct in vr:j:t:iJ1g_ U the 'lrWItaoa 
determine that strch d.is'tributiona ar~ 1msU!ficie.nt tor the 
'l'rtlstor's proper hQltll, support, ~e. ~ .a!nta%U!!l'lC8, tho 
'%'ru5:ta~ shal.l pay: to or apply for the RfUlefit ot the 'rrWJtQr so 
; 
2IIucb ot the trust eata.t. u the TrWIt ... de .. llacessaxy t.o so 
provi.da -r.oi: the 'l!:1.ls'tor. 
. .. 
DIV:[Sron 01' ~ '%.'Ht7:F.1' JtS"J.!&TB 
4.1. ~ ,the 4eath ot t:l1e 'r;t'Ua'tcri the ~. 1Ia.Y pay 
~ 4e;bb gv.4 'by 't:hU ~, or. J:¥y the !l"raatoJ:, at the a.ate ot, or ' . . 
as a conseqwmaa ot her death, (other tban , pX'Ollisco%y DOtes, 
~aY1lant 0% ~ic:h art s~ by mortgages, de6<38 of 1:2::uat., or 
~~eGlM:llta or sale ~ raa.1 propart:y), inclt141llg eXpelUS4l8 
. o~ last iJ lness, ~al experua •• , and tb.e- coots of e.cta i nistret.1011 
of T:rUstor'. probata Il5tat:.e end ot this t~st. Paymant: ot tha 
:UacwEt-ap'lcU.t1ad 'debts \lh.1c:h are obliqation. ot tlla T%'\l.atOr/ .. 
probate G8tata ahal.l b_ lDiILd. in tho .ole 4.i~t1on ot the Trustaes 
in th. event th6t: the UMta ox TrUstor' G probata astate ara 
aClsquAUs to ~y .-qcb obU9'lli:lona I and a~ beOCJll8 &%l oDl;i.tJation ot 
the trust astat.e only in the GVIIU11: end to the extant that tha 
0001.38 
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'1& .. <. ?,..uy_t4f~~l':Y$··fk~·~ 
l.U5sets or 'l'rUstor'a probata e.ste.ta are insutticiellt to d.1scllal:'qa 
~ch oDliqationa. 
4.2 Upon the °death of the 'rl;Ustor I tha lr'rUsteu .hall. 
4l.1ocata and/or distr1J:)ute the tx"WIt estate rJ.ma.ininC; atte4:" 
satis~aetion ot ~. p~i • .io~ 01: sect:.on •• 1 of thi5 TrU.6t 
AqreeJllent as toll ow. : 
fa) In the ovent that the 'l.':rUator'. eon, ~y 
CODll, shal.l. have Duxvive4 tl1e !t'rU!Itor I the 'h"wIteas ahall . . . . . 
distribute to t:ha 'rru.5tor'a said IJqn 1lhatavu- in1:e~t i. h~ld . 
in the trust 8.tate at or by :rea-.on ooi' tho TrUstor's duth in . . . ; 
that: CI!rt~ real. property CCARDOlllY known as 3 stev°ena eourt, 
'the Sprb9'~ Country Club, ttancho lUraqD, CA, outrl.-;rht and free 
0% t.:rust end trea ~ aU t:ranaJt.r, i:nb.er1tanc:a, aaU1:e or 
ot:hor daat:h t.ax.a. %A th. avant ~t 'the 'l'rustor'. -del .on 
ahe.l.l not haTe survivecl the Tl:WItcr. V1.thcut reqard to his 
~ssu., the qi~t pursuant to thi. aub.aCtion ~.2(a) aball be 
4iatr;1l)ut~ to S»mR1 ll'l'X:aJf "ttLn .u 5l1a 8hal.J: not have 
Iilirvived. the 'J!rwIt:ar the 
lSub~ection 4.2(a) Abell tail. 
this 
(b) l"n. 'the v-voni: tba.t IaAJflUmCB c::H.AZEH &ball bava 
&tU:Y'ived. the T~tor. tho TrU.ste... shall distribute to 
LAWRENCE onzmf vbat*VOX' interest 1. held in the trwst *stilt. 
at or by rea.on ot i:.h. 'l'2;-wst.O<t'o'lS deatll 1n that cart:.aita 
:residential. real property located. on ~e.n Antonio Road ))etween 
Seventh and ~iqhth stroot., carmel, CA, outr1C;ht and trae of 




.. " - '"" -'~ ,..~... "" 
.. __ .... _ $2 1 
·~ .. 1$tT*_: 
dea.t.i1 taxes. In the Gvent that J..A11ImEN'c:2 c::RlZ'D shall not he.VQ 
not crurvl ve<1 the '1'rUato-x- I th.. q.1.n purawmt to th.1. 
lI'\lb$ectiOtJ. ".2 ('b) ahall:- ~ail. 
(0) !he Txuste6a shal.l e.stab11sh a trust ahara; 
daaignatad nuTS'!' I, to b~ tl:!"4de4 v1.t.h ONE smttmED 'J!BOO'S.Ul) Jm) 
00/100 DOI,IoARS ($1.00,000.00) tor eac:h beneticiuy.at ~orth in 
SUl)paragraph ~.2(c::) (1), (11), an4 (iii) wbo 1N%:V1va. trustol;' 
tor a "axi)qDI ot 'l'ERD: ~ TJiOl/SABD llU) 00/100 00I,t·1lt$ 
($300,000.00). 
~1:%:Lbuta t:h ... saU o~ TmJ'ST I lUI a aepara:t:. tJ:wrt sa 
herainaftar provided! 
(i, ~~ .. abal.l pay to or applY ~or 'the ... 
b~:rlt of ~ 'rl.S2! so muc::h' cd the nat· inc:o:IIe of 
'l'lUJST X .... t:h. ~.a, . in i:.heJ.r 41acrat1on, d.aa:III 
nacesHZY or d •• irable ~or tha prOper health, ~, 
c:a.r& alMS ~o~ .uch l:um.~i.cia.ry, prooridac! .1ldl 
pa~ ot inccZa AhaU nO't. 'ax~ 'n:vB ~00SUI1) DOLLiES 
C~5, QQQ. 00) in Any qivan QIl.IlnC1Al: YMr; ' . . 
(11) 7!ho ~i: ... IIball pay to or Apply t.or the 
bena:!it ot LOPE ~ .0 auc:b at" the ne-e Ulcome of 
~T 1: as the 'l'rUSt.8S, in their diaoret:ion, d~ 
~saa.ry or lI.sUable tor tha proper haal.th, suppo:r'C, . . 
. . 
paym811ts ot incaac shul not exceed PIVlS TROU8U1D DOLI.:ARS 
(~~/OOO.OO) in ~y given o~ender yOQr; 
000140 
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(~ii)· The T.rustee:: shall pay to or apply 
of !t!lmST I ~ the '.lrIu&taaa, in t:he.ir dUoret.1on, dea. 
nec::2ssuy or duizahla for' ~ ~roper ~ th, &upport, 
care and mtint-.enaJ'2ee at! lNob be.nc~1c1ar.f, prov1de4 Cluch 
payments o~ inCODl4 £hall not exee~ l"IVB'mOUSAJ1'D DOLLARS 
($5,000.00) in any givon calendar y.ar, 
(iv) Ally bcll.1Ul~. of t;be net illcOlle of mlSf!' t . .. ' 
not paid or appUed as he:re;S.uabove prov14ad each year i 
sh.al.~ h. accc::uma.1ated and aMid to. Principal.. tJ'pot1 the 
dUth o~ each o~ the );)e.nc1!1a1ar1aa 11Q8d ~ •• thi. 
oal::u .. ct.icn ".2 {c:l I the 'h'Wlt... abal.~ tx'anafe:r troa 
TRt1S~ :r to TRUS'.r IX (as prov14e4 in sUbsection ,.:z (d) ) 
<me-third (V3) D~ th. val.u. a~ tlao X"OU~ a.a.ts ill 
'r.RUB'.r r (all then coft;8tituteQ} ... 'l1he TrU.ReOIlJ, in their 
cUacretion, .bal.l choose whic:b a.s_ta to tnna~c. Upon 
. . . 
the death o~ all of i:l:I.e b~:1c:J.a.ri .. na:aeCl in thiJs 
~ion 4.2(<:) ~ tho IlII.sets o~ ,TORt1S'r X, as tbI!ul 
~'t:1tutad, aba.1l be t:rancaf'erred to 1'l«JST II. 
(d) Th. TrUsta6S shal.l ~l..il!Sh A ~4 'U'WSt 
share, ca.ignat:ed TImS'! ·XX, to eonsii;t qt ~ ba.lUICe ot' the 
truat 6lItilte roz=; nin9 arte.r &atiS~actiop ot t:ha provisions of 
s.ction ".1. ot thie ~~ A9X" .. e=a:::a~ ~.a ..ul;IaectJ.ona (a) 
throuqh (e) ot thi. Section 4.:2. T!le 'l'rusi:ae:s shall hold, 
~dmi.nister a.ncl diatr1buta the a8sats of 'rRUS1' II ISS a 8I1pU'a:t:e 
trust:. as herai.na.~'i:ar p2:'OVidod. 
7 
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( 1) III thea went ~ t the 'l'rUstor I 8 50%1, 
ZA~ COWllt I ahe.ll have survi vee!. tn4 TrU.:IItoX', end prier 
to the the lIben he .hall have att.aJned the age of fitty 
y~, tb. TrU.staes Shall pal to or apply ror. the benetlt 
o't t:ha ~/. A.id _on C4I'9'en'ty percQhi: (70",' o~ the 
nat income ot TRUST U, qa.ut.u-e.nnually or at aon 
~::~e.nt intarvala. III addition, the '1'rWrtae • .maU pay 
to or apply tor the benefit of t:he ~r/. ad.c1 lion 80 . . 
much ot tho principal of ~'r n' (but not ill ~l!IS o~ 
aevonty puocent [70%] o't, tha pr~ipal as them 
~ 
constituted) as th._ '1.'J::'I1st: ... , in theh 4i.c:::ei;~on, d.,e:a 
necliIsaaxy .'for the proper heal.th~ INPpcrt, oar. and 
lDoClintanzmc:e o~ the 'T;Uato.-' s said .on. The T:;'1latees 
~l p&y t.o or appl~ far the bentd.it:. of! '.f2:'Wl1!.ox'e niec:e, 
. ~ BUiRD ntJ.ft, or he' .~ '1~ aha shall not than 
"be :living', th..!.rty pel:O.nt (30'"> of th4 n.t inCCll.e of 
. . 
TlWST n quaxt.r-:armWtlly or ~ m.ore 'traquant 1ntorvUs. 
III addij:ion, th • . ~~.. ahal.l. P2lY to or apply for the 
llanar.1t ot the 'rrUstor'. ~ niec. 80 lIIUCh ot th.a 
pr1l1c1pal. of TRUST Xl: (but not· in exee.. o~ ~ 
percant [30%] ot· the principal. ... than c;:o~tuta4) as 
~. '1'rWst.ea, in their cUsoreticn, deeqa necessary for the 
proper haUth, support, cu. end ~intan&llCa ot the 
Txustor's .a.id niece. 
(J..1) When tho 'rrwitcr's son, ZlClUltt COW1N, 
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taJ:1d:o.ate, and saventy percent (7~') o~ the tru.5t 4iSt2:~1l 
o~ TR06T :II than on hlU'lC! anal1 be disU'il:utad to t.ha 
Trustor's !laid lSon autriqbt ~ ~. of t+ust, and thil:ty 
percent (30~) at th. trust estat:.. ot TmlsT II thel1 on 
hand 5ha11 })e distributed to TrUstor's 'niac:8, SJU1'DRA 
EII..E:lm gT.XU, oatr1Q!1.t and trta* of trua1: _ ':h.e TrUateea 
shal.l. hava discr.tiOll to c:hoose the as.at. to be 
distribut4d to ea.dl. 
(ill) Xn t:ha ,avant th. T:tU.stor'. · son, . 
ZACB1RY COUlt, Ilball 4ia p:J:'ior to atta.1n.1ng' lige Q~ t1~ 
, ... 
yu.ra, l.aving then. livillg iasua, 1:ha 'frust .. s IiIhal.l 
distributo tho entire traat 8Sta-=~ 9~ TWST IX the:l on 
band Mvenq pe:rcant (70') to th. t:han living issue of 
ZAamRY 00WAlI;, by right of reprasent:at:.iOll, tr ... ot Trust, 
and tbirt:::y percent (30') to t:be ~or'lI n1ac:., B.UDRA 
JUT.lQ'N UI.Tui providad, :turt:he.r, in tlw oVct that. the 
TrUS"COr l • 8~ n1ece ehAl-1. not be living at: 'the date ot 
~.nr di.i:.r~b.ution . pursuant to this 
IiUbparagrapb 4 ~:l Cd) (iii), her shere o~ the trust esta'ta 
0% ~3'r XX .h&l.1 bQ d1str1l:1a.tad to her the l.1v1ng J.ssue 
.by riqht o:t r.p:a:'8Selltat.ion tne of trust, 
(i-v) :In t:ha ave.nt that ZA~T COWA!T ahall die 
prier to a~taUdnl:t the ago. ot' fifty years, w1tllout 11v1.llg 
issue, the Trustees sllall d.istx-ibut:e tha entire trust 
e:rt~te of '!'RUST IJ: to SANDItl eUiUN lQ:LLER tree of trust 




dizstr1l:lution, tba ~ ...tate shal.l be distributed to 
t=be then l.iv1ng 1asu. ot SI.N1lR1. flT,gm Ut1i,RR by right ot 
rep%'G$GJ\ution, tree 01: trust. 
4.3 It, .. t the tilae ot the ~r/. dee.tb, or at e.ny 
It.t.ter the betora ~l dilitributicn of the't1"WIt elSblta, r:ACHARY 
COWAN', ~ JUl,lUUI QLl.zR 'and a11 of' t:.hair i.au. ara 4ec.acseQ, 
and IlQ o~ diGpos1tlon of the trust Qstate i. directed henin, 
t.h.e 1:rUst 6$1tate, or the portion o~ 11; t.b:cn re.lUin.f..n9, 1Ihal1 
thereupon ~ dist.%:-:ibata4 to on. or IlOre cba.rit:i._ chosen. i.n the 
discretion of the 'l'rUst:ees, eulTjact to th6 lbdt .. tion on .ueh 
. . .... 
dJ.sc:retj.on that 1I1lc:h c:haritiaa be qua11 fi.a c:hAritiu as clafined ill 
. . 
Seeticm 1.10 01: the Xnt:una+ Revenue Ccx!a ot. 1986 • 
.- . 
, • , ~ provi.ion.. of' tJ:U.. 'rr118t Ag'r~t to the 
"contz;ary notwj.~, in the .vra:rt that any a. •• ta of .. ~t 
he14 pu:nsu.a.nt to the ~%"oviIS10IUl ' of! thi.ll '%rWrt ~t b6e0ae ... ~ . 
di...trll:ra:t:abl.a to ' .. bcD';t'iciUy Uhder ~ 11'9'- of' tvfU'1ty-otlAl (23.) 
y~, ~e:r:ruotow. IIlu:ll.l r.ta1.n aud:l ... at. in a further t:rwrt:. tor 
t:ha. ~etit of. auch beneficiary. The TrUatees sh4l1 pay to or 
apply to'%; th.a :bane:fit of' IJU~ benefieia..-y .0 lJl1lCh of the Jlat 
.i.nCC>CoA, ~ th. pri.nc.1)jJD.J. o~ the trust. ..ut. as the 'J.':rWIt.e .. , j.n 
t:lleir diacrat.!on, 4Ml1l ~ •• ary. %0:;' the :;>ropor l:l~tb. aupporr., 
oare .lU.i:ltenanc:a a%ld education of ~c::h ~~iciary, litter taking 
int!o e.cc::oun'C, -t:.o th. ext.ut the TrUat. .. daa proper, ~ inc:oz.e or 
other re5curce. or aqch baneticiary outside thi& t!rust, known to 
the TrUstaes. When such bene:t'iciary at.ains the aile ot twenty-one 
(2J.) yc.a.rs, the Tru.st.ee .hAll distribute to such :benefioiuy the 
10 
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enthe ~t c:atato than held for his or her ~e."e:tit, trsQ 0'1 
tl:"lat. If 81lcb beneticiary shall die before r-caivlnq cOllpl~e 
c1istrihtltiOll ot the ~t: estate Bet aa1da tor his br bel: beneti t 
I 
I 
hereunder, the rru.steas ShaJ.l distribute the balance of the trust 
estate to tnlch peraons or antities. aJ'ld em. .ncb t::eJ::UI ~ 
,cQlldltions, either outrl.;ht. or in ttust, u the ban~iciary lithall 
cl •• iCjDA"bs ill hi. or her ·l.ut Will aait:te4 to prob«te by a court ot 
competent: juri84ict:.ion, lMJrjnq e~rlc %'P.:t~ce t:o 'th.!a power of 
appoirit:laent. :In t:be avent 1;hat S"QC:h. beneficiary' shAll ;tail to 
.xarci:s~ aucb pow.%' or appointlaent:, the 'J!X'uBi:.etas sJ1al.l dUctribute 
, . . ,.. 
the ~lanc. o~ t:he ' t:ruBt .. tata 1:0 the than l.iyi.nq uuswa o~ 8llCh 
l:I-eDGfic!ary, by' right; bt re~nta"on, or,. in tlw de~e.ul.t . ,.. 
~:f, to the then liv1n9 ra.tae of' th.$ p~t5. trail whom such 
'benefioia%)" wa.a d .. ce:aded, by right o~ :opr .. e.nta.t.ion • 
• w:m::RAL ::Pf(OVJ:Sl:OBS 
5.1 It tb.e ahare or .~te tl::ust bUd f.or any ihoOllle 
, be.nOficiu:y of. a ~ bela pW:auant h.ix:.to bAa, at any ~, in 
the OPinio~ o:f 1:hA ~, Ii %a1r lIIIlrbt val.Uti GO ' low, in 
raJ.ation to the ooets or a~.-t:rD.tion 't:hereo:t=, 'thAt continuance 
ot the t::tust pursttzmt to its ttmu 'trill ct.teat or subGtahtially 
ilIIpai.r th,& o.CeOaapl.~t ot the purpo5e~ ot' the t.:rust, the 
~lite .. uy, in their d.i.cratiQn,· but ar. not nquirad to, 
tQl:1ll.inate such t-~ ~, reqZlrd1us o~ the ~e o:t! such 




.~ ... ~_'fr.N~;",:J,p",";-'~iif:';:''::;'·-;'''''':~ 
J~ __ ~ ... ~, ... ~ .. _____ ... _-,, __ -,<{>/,.J."""_'<.o.-~ C mr~if_~ 
unc1iotributa4 income theraor to suob be.llU1cilS.I')", or his qua.:!'dian, 
ccmeerv:ator, ox other ti®c::iary. 
s . 2 l1nJ.ea. IIOOne:r' tel:ldnabtd ill eccord.nce with other 
prov1sions hereot' I each truat bald h~.Ull4er ahall t:end.nat., 
twenty-ohc (2l.) years a.fto±' the d~t:.h of the la.tlt wrvivor of the 
TrUstor I the 'rrwstor'. niece, SANDRA BIIZEN or,l,a, and tholie 01! 
the 1&sue. ot UCIi7Ua' COKAK or SUllRI.. 1$lL'!l!:H, DtrIrD who an 11v1.n9 
at: t:ha 4aatb o~ the 'trust.or. ll). ;p.rinci.))al and. andi.tributad 
, " 
income ot any tru.t 110 t.arminabad sb.aJ.1. be c11at::1.butad to the then 
i:nCl~ bC1.~i~i •• of tha~ ~ in the ~~~OM in vhic:b they 
'a.re, at the tiDe or tem1na tJ:oO: • .mt:.1tlad 1:.0 rae.1ve the ~a. 
5.3 ~e ~t:._ :aay authoriEe'the usa or ~tor' • ... 
reaic1euC1t 1oca.1:.ad on £an AntcidQ Road, CUllel, eal.1torr:Lia, and the 
' fUl:'uitw:e an4 ~1Ihing. the.r.o~, at. such tila.ee, 1!or .uoh peri0d2s, 
( "') and on lIuch te%'RS and ~itiODtl OIl the ~_ may c!etanine, by 
~ 
any oj! t.ba 1!allow1.ng: ~c:HAU COWMr alJd hi& ~lDIUy, SAlmBA xtIaDN' 
JaLLER and ~ ~Ulily, aM' ~t:2 CRlLZ1CH and. h:b taaily.' At. any 
tille ~t LQll(DtCZ CBA.ZD ia . ACt.1n9 as a ~%'U.JItaQ a1: tb.!. Traat 
, , 
A9rSaent, be is harahy epeo.1~1caJ..1y a..ut.bof1ted to r-eta1n _aid 
residence a.nd it. ~itura. a:n<l fW:n1abfn9'1I as asse.ta of tha tru:st 
~tat.e, ragardl ... of any 10 ..... t.b. trwat OJ:' it. b.met'iciariea 1IIaY 
SU1:rer ?:I'f v1rtue ' or said retention, to occ::upy said ru:1dence and 
utilize 11:e 'furniture end hJ:'n1ah.in9D, -ror hi. p.raonal. WI. a.nd t.ha.t 
of other Ile:m.bars ot his tully, e.nd is :rel1evad of the effect of 
e.ny Imel a1.1. provl..81oru; ot ll:.w t01'n1d41ng' !l 'rrUatee :lro2ll diU!.l1llS' 
with the assets of I!. t.:rust estate tar 11is Pel:"8cn!!l acco\mt and 
12 
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r~l hing any iUn or px-ot'1t UQDl aUCh deal1:lgll, a.es suCh prov1sior~ 
of law ~al~ta to said residanee. 
, 
6.1 ~. int:ereR o-f a.ch bellaticiary in ~ :tnoo.. alld 
principal o-t any trust held purwant bareto shall bo :rree 't'rc1IIl the 
central or 1nt~e.ranc::. ot any creditor at' suah ben.ficiny eM 
:tr01Il the cle.ills ot othe.rB including any .~ o~ &:\lcrh benG~ioia;q. 
The interest. ot aacb benat.iciery ~l not be subj ect to 
Clttcch-.nt, axacutiOD.1 qarniamaent., cl.aw ci_inc.; rrom proeecd.ilJqs 
. '. ' .. I· 
in barlla:upiey or any other torm o~ l.aqal. or eqti!.tu1a 1...". gr lien. 
'l!he illtcrest. c~ each ~icia.ry Ilhal.l. not. bo IJU.5ceptible to ... " 
lalt:lc:J.lNltion or al.lenation ancs any attalapt 1:0 anticipate or 
't:raIu;f«r a t.niJt ihterut .hal..l. be voict a%Id iJ:l.~t.ot.i.va. 
JO.immt e'V M~,* 
7. ]. TrU:st i.ncolM aD4 principal. cUlri::rilmtah1. to .. 
ben.t.1ciaxy -:ri " paid directly to Ii .benetioia%y or ~ be appli.d 
t:.o a: l;I.nCl~ic 11U:l'" e uau aM 'bAlnat1t. as the TrUatcq d84'll 
app:r;opriat.. Any beneticiDl:y who 1. ince.paoitated thl:0U9'h -ill.n ... , 
age Or other ~ may ha~ the income an4 principal. to ~ch be is 
Q1'l~it:.lod applied to biB l)enat1t. IncOIIle or ~inc!p41 cUstribut@l.. 
t.o a b.naf1eiary wbich 1Ill!!y be .ubj.ct .to a!Cecuticn or ~avy when 
reQeived by the beneficiary ~y bo app1.1ed to such benc~ici~~5 
bane:t.1t:;. :ury ouch Clppl.ice.tion ~ inCOJII4 or principal Ab.I.l.l be made 
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e..nd lIlay include pa~t to Il ~~f1c1~ pe.rs.onally or to other 
persons dGGGd appropri!lta by the Tl:'UIrtee5. '!'he :r • .,.J.p~ o~ the 
be.ne~ieiary or other persons to wexa distribution is udQ shall be 
a. cOJllt'l.at4 ~. 0% tb. b:uat_.' Z1IapoIWibUities. 
MIlfGI.:I::W OJ' 1SSJr.l'S 
r .... 
e • 1. Ea..ch 0% tho truat IIhu'e8 8hal.1. be a .epal:1lt. t:ust 
~or tl!"\l.St, IldOoa.n1:ing' , tax and al.1 .ot:hlll:' pai:pocurs. Tho TrUlteea, 
however, lDZLy Jdnqle th. property o~ the .•• pe.uto 1:z'wIt, uaet8 aJ1I! : 
• I 
interallt:ai in ·th. lIl1l1q~ed pro~. said 'C:ldivided .i:.nteres1: ahall. : 
. ' .. 
always ~ equal to that t%Ust'. proporticma.t::e contr:U:nlUou ~o the 
1I1inc;l.ec1 asaata. 
9 .1. 'l'h.i. t:rwJt 1- .. de 111 cal i%oXTlia. and .hA.l1 be 
qcwarnod~ ooncb:1l~ and" ~ acc:ordinc;l. 'to c.l1~orna lay 
" even though adJIiniate::.d el • ..m.n. The oaJ.U'orn.:ta ~II applied 
_hall not illcl.udo. any priftoipl .. OX' 1.". ~at.iJ:1ct" to ccmn.i~ or 
choice o~ l.a~ _ . 
ACCO'tDl'rlNC BY 1'lm'S-:raS 
10.1. "Wh.i.l.e the 'nUator is" livi=1c.iJ, the Tl:'Uatau shul 
J:'Qndsr to TrUstor a writtan account o~ tha trust adain1atration. 
Such e.CCQtmt GhL!.l be _de Well requ.t!5ted by the Tl:Uator. Uter 
1:11e daai:h o~ ~e TrUStor, tlle '.r:I:'UsttHaa shal.l J:'andar 1m ~uAl 







aeeOllI1tinq trust income le.Y be di.t:ri.hutad. It b.ne"fioie.ri .... 
entitled t.o em account:..inq are llinorlS, their ~c:count:!og Clhail b4I 
delivered t.o their pue2lU or gaa.rdian. :r~ benefic:itriea entj:tlad , 
to an account.ing' ~re ~pac1ta.taCl, th.oh aCOOUJlb., shall ~ 
de1btQ:rad to t:.heir COD8~tOX', ~an Ol:' t:h. perSon c.ar~ tor 
.suc:h beneficiary. trnlua the acoountinq i. objectad to in writing 
aixty-:f.i..,. (65) da.yw ~~ aa.U.ill9" to tb. ~ .. ~ to vhaDl the 
ac:oounting- is to b. rendered (except ~ccpunthlgv rendered to the 
Trwstor), the aecount sh4l.1 be d~ t:ina.l and CC:locluai.". in 
~ to a11 ~c:t::.i~ cU.o10.e.4 in t:h. t.\C:X~CJun~. 'J."be 
. . . , 
ac::eount1.n9 ma~l be. bindintJ on a.U. per1Ions 1l:!t~ in the 't.ru..t, 
incl~in.g banafieiarl .. ~o are not Jc::nown or ..me are not y_t born • .... . " 
)1"0 bene~.ici.ary ~ ~ eonj\USc::1:1.Ol1 v.i1:h 'the ~ 1tbal.1 havo 
"the power to alt:ar Ol:' QIe:1~ tb .. ~ by ap~rovor.l. ot an aQCQUntiDg. 
/' " 
'1!Ri:7~ 
U.1 LZO~ A. " C01IAJf a.nd U1GCSNCl:1 CIi:AZEN are designated 
AS th& ~e~ o~ the trIl:ri: hereun4o.r • .. . . 
1.1.2 On the duth, r .. igl1at ion or inoap&eity O~ 
L:!ONA:.aDA A. COWAN I IAWll!l!fCZ CRBIJ5Elf obal.l lServ. CUJ the aole TrUstee 
he.raun4or. On tlle 4eatll, resignation or inca.pacity ot taAWlUDtO 
<:::UAZmr, ROBERt' lDTOOlOll ah.al.l sarva a. a. Tru.8t:. .. h&raundar. on the 
death, :r •• iqn.ation or incapacity ot. ·.1other LEOKI.RDl. "A.. COV..lJ or 
ltOBlmT. MNOOnN, at ~ tiJle when LAWltl!:Rc:s CHAZ!!1f is not. .erving a.s e 
Trtlst •• heratmdar, the WBLLS PlUlCO B.J.N:lt, N.1-. ahLll s.a:rve as Il 
Trustee I or e.s the 501e Tl:U6tee baretmd er • 
000149 




1.1. J 70r P\Ul'OGo:a of the int6::prctation 01: this t.rust, 
the incapacity ot the TzUrtor, or of & '1'rU!Itae to lSel:'Ve a.a suci1 
TrIlstee, ahall be ocmel:asIvely .stablished by the vri~te.n 
. 
,certification ot two (2) phYD1cians attend'nC] SUell TrWJtor or 
'l'ruatoe that such 'rrU.ata.r or Tl'\l.Iitaa i. unable 'to 1I1Ul8qe his own 
~taira or tho .. ot the trust. 
1.1.4 .A. Trwst;ee 7f4I'-.y raai9l'l rr.t, 9iving'" written notice ot 
resignation to all ot ~ carrct. inCOlZl4 beneficiaries or their 
" 
~ans or by ~111nq the approPriat;a pet1t!on vith the court 
b.aviDq ju:r.illdJ.c:t1on aver tha 1:l:Us1:.. :rn'the avent ot r .. icanatioft, 
• 
the resigninc;· 'trwst:.ee shall convey the t:.rua1:. estate to the 
daaiqn..ted ~.or Truat:a.es. 
11. $ Bo :bond .bAl.l.' be req:a.1red ot any ~.. name4 
"herein. 
11.6 lto IlJUCcesaor'rr11stee ahall be' obligated t:.o 41%,,1I1ne 
O~ ravi." t:ha ~,' .-.corda or ac;ta g;e ~.Y pz:wv1oaa -rru.'te6. 
A Trwrtee shall be re.ponaJ.b~e onlY' tor his ow aet&l or omi •• ions 
which a:re ~.li neqliqent or JI.Ilde .in bad faith. . ' . 
u- 7 Jro ana c:t.&l.i»g with ~e ~ ~ inquire 
concerning the nlidity or any act1cn8 ot IIU.Oh 1'rUtItSO$. 
11.8 The T'rUstees JUly receive rauonable c:ol!lpeJlS4t.ion ~ 
r.i:lllbUl:fS~t: tOl:' tI¥pCn:se8. ~cI:l ~~UOD ~ reulI):nu:-aement 




'L t 39'\.1d C":lI .... T----· -
) 
12.1 The TrUstee& shall hav., with raBpec:t. to all 
property I \lhatbar ~l or personal, \lh1ch uy at any time be held 
I 
,hertJUllde.r t includ..ing iU'fY property hel.d ror a Jnor, Whether 
constituting principal. or a~u1o.t:4K! inOCZ18, the toilovin9 povoru 
and riqht.5, Wfch may.be exerciacd in the 'rrtbrtau' discretion at 
any 'CilIle an4 %'rclI 'C:i.lM to tilDe dur1.nq the contJ..nua.nc:. o~ any truat 
he:reUllder ~ until. Il<:tual dUtr1b~ion o;t al.l property: 
:t81 39Vd 
C-) TO retain Illy part 9t the trwrt property comincI 
1nt.o the1.r po •• e.81.on, tor ~=' l.~ or t:1JIua ... ~y .ay 
dee:m a~l. •. and without d1varait;Cl!.tion. 
(b) To vote, aM.to Cliv8 praxi- to ~ota, any ,.. , . . 
secur1Uu having votiDq ripta, to pay any U.UIlDCl't..ltrliad 
upcn stoolt and to ~ any right O~ option to 
lJ'W:)8c::ript1.on, convarc1on or otherwise Which Jl&y at any t.ilae 
Qttach, belopg or' ~ g1Y11n to the ho1dtarll D~ any .toclCa, 
bonds, sec:arl1:iu, or other iJlst:t:Wll.eJi't~ ~ any natura theraOf 
toX':lll.1lig put of th. truat estate. 
(0) 'ro join .1n Dny pl.cn or 1.liSC.ae, lDOrtqcga. 
consol.i.d.ation, eOlDl:lination, reo~zation, dilS801tttion, 
torecl.oaur., cb«:AC;8 ot capituiza1:ion, or other chang-A of 
~~~ ot anTCQr,po~~tiont 'trust, or orqaniz~tion, or th$ . 
property or o.lnse.ta thereof; to depocsi t. 'banda I lft.ooka, or at:her 
se.C1ll:'ities he.ld by them vith any pl:'Otectiva or siJDil.ar 
oo=mJ. t.too, ~ t.o t.a.M CJ'W. ho~d ally •• c;u:ri t..10. J."Duad .in 









(d) ~ enforce ally 1II.Orlqas-e or deed 01: b.-ust or 
pledge beld h~e.r and. t.o purchase at e:ny .ala taenunde.r 
any pzoperty subject thereto. 
(e) To p\U:e.base .~it.i&8 or o1:h@ pr~ ~rom, 
and ~o JU3aa loana azd adnJ'lC91llent., •• c:ure4 or unsaau.ra4, to, 
1:.he mc.autor ' or other rapresentative of the '1"rU5tor'e estI:.ta. 
C~) 'l!o ~9&, OOJl;t;,:':Ql, 50U at p@1ic. OX' pr;1Vll~ 
eue for ~ OJ:' on c:redit., aj~ w1~ or w1th?Ut notic., to 
convay, eXdJ a nga , partition; cU~ide, asabdivid., lI1OX'tg'aqe, 
~e&:tQ. i.zprov., aM ~pah, ~o '~t opt.!.au.; to l.eaae ~ar 
. . . . .~. 
te'7:ID.IJ· v:{th.1.n 07; , .xtendi~' beyond the ~ti~ ot any trust, 
~or ~y p\h:pca., :tncl.udhg' exPl.or.:t:1Q~ to~ 'cmd raacva.l. o~ ~ 
~ 
c;tas or oil, alld to .nt..r into a.ny covan&n-e. ox- ecp-ae:mant:s 
r.l.~ to ~ 80 l ... ed or any i21tp~y_eut. Wich .ay 
then or thare&~ be IInoted thereon. ' 
(g) To ~., .w:...tt. to a,rblt:raUon, ral.. • .aa. 
wit:.b er vithout OOMid~tion, or ot.l1enri •• adj'Ut clailda in 
favor ox ~t any t:.rwst, to inzrt:itut., eo=prollti •• , Ilhd 
d.~and actiolul arxl ~B .. 
(11) 'ro, carry SUCh :l.naura.nee as the 'l'%"\USt.eaa lIU'!ly 
deem adVUeble u am u:pensa o~ tbAa t:J:wIt:." to pa.y prai'lmS and 
other assusments on ally l!:!e ins'1lran~& COlltrad wb.iab JLe.Y' at 
a:ny time ~. held b~.uuder. 
(i) '!Io invest ~d reinvliSt. any property hal"-






in IIUc:ll property, r61U or pc;arGlo~l, us the- TrUst~s shall deQ 
tit e.nd proper. 
(j) To borrow aoney fro. any FersOJl , finl, or 
~o~:rut1on, :illcl~ the 'l'ra.taas h~ert 'tor e.ny trust 
purpose, tIpoJl auc:h t.erJu Gc! cotldi tic:n8 a. th. ~t~ 2Il.e.,Y 
~ proper, and to 0bl1tlilte the truat ~or r8.p4~J to 
~c:umbar any of! the t:.rtt.t property by .ortgag., ~ ot traai:, 
pledge, or otherwi ••• 
(k) ~ hold cy property in their naJl.s as 
1'l:Ustat!S, or in i:l:l. ~.:J' own 1llSJDQJI, or in th. JlAlI,I!I..S at 
. ; 
the 'l!ra:ri:.~1 no-i'llce, or ~1ste.red in such eOlUli~io~ t:bAt 
t1 tle shall pua by del.ive:ry. 
, .-
(1) '1'0 .-ploy CO~8l. and co1:pOrate or other a941lI1ts 
and to pay the:zIa. II ~0XUlhl. compensatiQTll to act on adv1~ of' .. 
CO\.1.nfItal. and. 1nc:ur no l1abili ty ~Ol: tU1Y a.ction taken or 
I • • 
~ra.ined b:am. pa%'1J11ant t:o eut:h a~ic.. 
- (a) . ~ect:·to tbll c~tion that'the consol.1C!a1:.10n 
,.sludI. .nat deil'troy tha separa~. id,entity o~ the trusts, to 
consolidate, ~or purpoces ae aami.IlJ.atration and. iJlveotmant, 
tb. property o~ the &avera.l truat.s ~~ad hereby and to 
a.1l:~~e ul'ldj:~1ded interests in auc:ll eon.ol.i4at.ed rund to the 
several txu.ta. 
(n) 'fa bUy, GeU. e.nd trade in Dacurii:1ea of any 
n~tur., 1nc~uding opt1onG, short sales, on uarqin, ~ for 
such purpos •• to DllLi1'lt:ain IUld operata. lIar9in accounts with 
0001.53 





bl:'okers. and to plec1g. c:ny securities held or ~cJ:ued by 
them with such b~e U .ecurity t'or lOanA ~d e.c1¥anc:es. 
(0) To ~o eUl such acta, take all wah proceedintJ. 
end exsrei .. all sucb rights and privil8C1ca, although neither 
specifically herainbet'ora man1:iotwd. nor con.t~4 upon them by 
121tl ~th relation to sUCh property ... it the absolute oYn4n 
tharaof aM in connection th8l:'eVith t.o ente;t" into any 
<=OVGllants or ac.;re~a bind1 -qq the ~ eCltato. .' , 
1.2.2 l:~, ~er c:onsul.tat.1'o~ with "one "anotbu, the 
Trusteea are u:nabJ.o to agree with one a.not:har regarding any aattar 
, " . . ~ 
a.:r~eotinq tlw '.1l4ldniat:n.t1on ar diat:rlbutioD o~ the trust esn:at.e'-
the. decision or LEOtQlUlA A.. cowAN, While ISba lIS servin9 as ~.a, . .- . 
• ball. qc::rvarn.. LB~ A. CCWA!T ahaJ.l a.4Vl •• the ~ruatee ArVing 
'her, in wri.t~, o:r bar 4ec:ia.:t.otl,. &ld such !rru.8teo .h&11 c:c2Ipl.y 
v1.th the dec:1Jdon ot LEOlQ~ A. C01QlI. Eowevar,.uc:h !raatee 
15ha.1.l %lOt be .l..iabl.. t:o'; ony ~on ro: the action o:r L20J0.ltt1A. A. 
C019AH as Trustee pursuant to :such decision. 
~ot.vi1:hata.nd1 11'1 t:h.ia Secti.on 12..;i, the trust Gbal.J. b6 
bound to third parti.. by tb~ a.c:t!ons of any 'l"rulltco ot Ii trust 
held ~t to 1:.h.i.- !rrust lIql:aeme.nt. AnY aob;i.on 'Ul.keu by eo 
r.rwstee aball be binding upon the t:..l:'wat estate and DAY ~ relied 
upon by t:llird part.ies ~ing' with the tl:nIIt. WithoUt limiting tJ1a 
q&ne.rality of the t'oreqoiDg r the" 'lXUste.. are . ~c1fiee.lly 
authorized t:.o deposit and witbdn.tt tlmds troa bank, RVin9"s and 
~oan ~ other .... cooun-t:. -....inta..inec1 by the t.:rwJt, e.nd to ae11 o. 
20 
c-:Jt ...... ~--- -
) 
, . 
purcha.Se assets ot the tl:U5t estate, upon the authorization Q~ lUll" 
one Truatee ~o~. 
• 12.3 On any div.t.iolJ ot the b:wrt &81:ate or partial or 
.final. dist::r:ihution of' the tl:'wIt aatate, ~. 'rrUStcJ JUly a.1l.OC&te 
• 
the trust. ~ta in undivi4adintereat:. OT' in kind,' a.r partJ.y ill 
lIloney and partly in kind a.t. ~lua.tiC)NJ naaonably d.etandned by the 
required to JI8.ke a pront. c!i~ibu~ol1 ot" the trust 6Sta.ta bat lIIay 
~ a non-pronta ~loc:aticn p~idoc1 ~o' ~ •• 't. aJ.l.odata4 to ~oh I , . . 
, 
12.4- AllllLlltt.ere ~ deterJainaticne ot I allocations 
t:cS and c:::barqaa ac;ainst:. principal IIl'Id inc:cze dUring the lUet.ime of 
, .. 
the. '.r:r:U8tcr ~1 ba gmrarn4W:i ' ~ 'tb4 »r:1nc:lipal. uw! D1c::ome Act Q~ 
'thea State of ca.lit'onrla. i:A -.~~~ at t:lM ~ of Neb auch 
det.erllination inaotar u IJUch- Act i.8 appUc::a])le.. All lIIAtters 
r~ de1::el:'Jllinat~ Q~, al.loea:t:!ol\c i:.o aM cha.2:vo. apJ.:aat: 
principal aM incazM ~ollc:n.r.1.ng' the 'l!rUator,,,' ,death fShal.l ~ 
'gov~d:by the PriDoipal atxt :Income Act o~ the state or. Cal1~ornia 
.in affect: at t:he date of her cieat:h,. :In!sof'ar aa llUeh 1ct i.JI 
applicab1 •• 
l2.5 Any Trusteell by tUing vri~ notic:a in the records 
o-t the t:ruat e.ncl gi-vinq not;ica to all currant bel1eticie.~i.es of tb-
tru!lt lZllly surrender I di$cleim or re1~. eny ri¢t., I powers or 
discretion g:ranted to s~id 1'l:Ustees o~ this bust. such bction 








.. . . 
__ ---Ifili-m>.~ 
12.6 The TruIIt08:J are ~uthori%ec!! to c.llQC4U · any portion 
ot the Tz"Uator'a Genera.tion-Ski~1ng 'rra.na:t.r TalC eGoS'"') belIption A 
At ~ent au1;.hor1s:e4 lly Seot1on 26~1 ot th~ Intal:nal Revenue. Coda, 
which re.maills unal.loc::atad at: tho 1:na. of! th_ Tl:Uator's 4ea.tb. 
12.7 1'he 1'rUstee9 are aut.hol:'izad to divide any t:.ru3t. 
created hereunder into sepe.l:"l:Lte t%usts Q~ property axampt troll the 
GS~ and prcpe.rty INbj.et to QS1Wf. 
dUcretion to P'lY cr apply 1.ncQIIe or princ1pal of any trust so . . . 
P.l.YJI:EN'l! OP 'DDS 
J.3.J. Al.~ inhex-ita.llce·, estate or other death taxes, and 
any g~Uon-~ppi.nq ~~a%" t:-xa ... , t:h4t 1II4Y, by raaaon at the 
"dqth ot ~r, :be a:ttr1D\1t.able to the 'rrUstor' _ probab estate, 
02:" any pgrt.1.on oj! 1. t I ~ to lUll' property. beld l'urauant ~ or 
becOlling subj act to the' teraa ot t:hi. ~ AVr~'t a.t tUG t1llle 
oX' a8 a Clomsequence ot tha ~r'. deGtl:t, sbal] be ~ by the 
~. :froa the lUUUtU of the tl:u$t .. tat. 1ll1oea.t04 to 'l.'RUS'l! U. 
DBl'Dtt'l'IONS· I.HD RI1L.'BS 01' CONS"l'lm'cn:ON 
For purposu o~ t.h1. iluJ1:l::'taIuu:lt, da:tinitiona ot 'c:artun 
terms and J:Ul.4US of construction are pl:OVidad. 
14.1 Re~ere.noes to 'IIi.sue- mel!pl le.watl descendants in the 
:firat, a.oc~d or any othar <1eyreo ot tho ~c.stor dea1gmlte4. 
1.4 • 2 A laga.lly. adopted chi~d who vas D.-e the data or 






child'S l.aWful deaoendant3 by blood or ~c!opt.ion shall l>e oona1deX'ad 
AS lavful deseandanta of the e.dopt.itlg paren:ta and ot e:nycme who 15 
by blood or adoption an ancestor ot tha adopting parents. 
• 1.4. ~ :R.e~.:rencsca to "tillare" or .portionfl J&e4D. a 
henaficdary' _ proportional inta1"aS1: &II d.et:U"JIlined bY' the 1:.e:rID.s 8l'1d 
conditions of this inatx:u:llent. 
14." Ra:t'e.l:"~ to "'oxecuto:" or tfexeC\1t0ts" lII8a:n an 
executor, execc:trix~ lI.dla..1.niJ;t:rator I .adllr.inUt:z;a.tttx, perao!Sal: 
re.prasenta't.ive or other pers.on or persons charged vith the 
~.SPOlUSt..bUiq- for t:.he a~t.iort o;f the cr:r:ust~'. prQ!:Iat • . ~ 
esta.te.. 
14. 5 b:l!~c.. 1::0_ "educa.t.ion" .aha.J.1. weem •• CQ~, 
eol1e<]e, g:raClua.'b. C1l4 poat--gradUat:a st'tldy at public or px-ivate 
"inat:..1tut1olW • 
1.4 .. ' trnl.eas the c::ontext clearly requires another 
<:anstl:Uction, 1::b.o JllBoc::;a.l.ine, ;Cftm1n:i n e Dll4 neutar geMe:1l &bAll. each 
include the others, ADCl the aaingular cm4 plurfll. Dtimbtu:'s sha.11. 
incl1l4e the other .. 
14 ", X:I! mlY prov1Giou or prov1.S1ol:.S of 1:.b1s in.-t::.:r:aa-.nt 111 
inve.lid or unenforceable, the rellUli.ninl;; Pl:'oviaions .ha..l~ co~t:::inu. 
to be tu11y op~tiv •• • 
1: cel:t:.i.t'y ~t. I haVe read. the 1.992 ~a8tat4lUUOllt of the 




1m, I.ol!:OHUDA.I... COWAM 1U:l4 ~ClI an ZEN I tlle T.tUSteae 
of' tho TrUst ~t 0: Leonarda. A. "ccwa."'l, bavUq revi.wed th. 
t:.anlS.o: the t.x"UcIt, .. coutaine4 in th. ~1nt ~ and . . 
Restatement. therao~, bm:~ aoc.~ aM agx.. to' be :b01.In4 by tl1e 






III • • 
WI'l!NESS WI halJd and otfic1a.l seal.." 
tYrt4s·d..~ 
. Not:ary Public 





S31\1T~ 10 ,,........,.. 
, ' , If 
._- .. -----.. ---
" , 
All u.eta now held in 1::he naJae or I.:EO~ A. COWAN, 




























:L:EON.AlU>A A COWAN and. LAWRENCB'CBAZBN. as Tm..~ of the Trust Agreemeut 
dcscrihed a.b<m:, hereby ack:Dowledse aDd accept the ful~ TltIt Amt:ndmem.. 
DUed: '5t:pip"J')r&r ?ti 1997 ot;ifI, ~c ; 
r I.ecn:sarda. A. CO'1fU1 
rfo~~ 









FIRSt AMENDMENT OF 1"H3 
1m:RESTATEMENT OF THE '!'RUST AGREEMENT 
OF 
LEONAlilDA A COWAN 
Punaam to tba applicable proYisioas of the 1m ~ew:ut oftbe Trost Agrer.meat of 
LeonardI. A. ~ executed 00. Oc:tob« 2. 1m.. wbicb re:sbd:es in its eadRty the I.EONA!.DA 
A COWAN'IlUJ'ST all982, Itld wflcttinLcoDuda A. COWJ11 reservtd tbe~ to alter, amend 
or rcvob the trust in whole or m. p2rt..lb:Iaanl A. Ccnnn bcRby pertW1y ~ Iafd Ttwst 
~asmnowr. . 
~ me p:rOvisfoos of~ -i.:z(d) t;n: hereby deIea:d in Wit euthtty, 
SECQND. IiDcemtJST I.,..., dimbrue4 by ~lnRST ~ tho ptovUWl1 of 
Section <4..1(d) are hetCIby darificd to iadi~ &: 'IRIJST II ia dip oaly trust required to be 
ombliabed \JJIdw tho 1'nlft Ap~ md its t.-ma are b:n:by p!ti5ed _ co",6. llwA; azsd 
LASI.. ia. the 1eIeOQd'm1 third kDftJ~ of Section 11.2.. :BiJ:Bmu' MNOOICIN is heRby 
RpIaced by BENllY WINE'ISKY. . 
In doth« ~ the ~ atAid Tnla ~ arehcRby fISitiec1 and 
CUnei!! wed . 
I oeni:fY ~ 1 bavC read tbcI fOrsoiD& F&rIt '.A~ 1o.~ 1m ~ of11lo 
Trust ~~A. CawmaDd tbatit ~ Ibtef b cbaosea I'WiIh to make. I 
approve 5ZdYnt AmeDdmoeat in .n JI~ _  dat thO ~~ it. 
Sipdu C4mId, Califomia. thiI:1'1th rJayof 5tr~tur l!J91 • 
./). /-






LEONAltDA A. COWAN TRUST OF 1982· 
1ANUAlcr 1. 1999 TO DECF.M6ER 31. 1~9 
(Sec~' CnmpilIliOSlRcport) 
ASSETS ON RAW ON DJ3<;El4n;p 11 1239 
&m I 
~ Dcsmilztign 
1 Cub bdd in Bank of America 












Cash held iD·Smith Hamer 
InVt#tl2SrJ1I ~ IICC:OUDt DJI'alber 635-03186·H 
UDdivid.cd ~'" ~ bI mcdi!f;4ll ~ a:od lot 
629 Hamptonlload. A}amcda, CA act olS325.135 
martpg~ to Bank ofOakJand 
UndiviW SO% imI=st iu 554 IClCS 
6215 Oem- Valley Road, ~cx:b, CA 
Wt:Dior, AJabcm· ~ U.s. post o1ftce 
Truz:tlC, Minnesota Main U.s. post: o1lico 
Lewistoa" Mil'.lJ)CSOf;a Main U.s. poISt otftco 
Liznitr.d putDc:nb1p ~ m Ca1c:ah 1982 
Limited pannenhip intc:n::st in T~ Rainer Pattuea 
Limited partDa:sbip iDtr.t"est in Mencm; L.P. 
0001.63 






















, \)Nl \- t114'(,1 
we-so ( ~\( 
_____ eC!!lWI'~ 
LAST WILL & TEST AM F:NT 
OF 
ZACHARY A. COWAN 
I, ZACHARY A. COWAN, of Declo, Cassia County, Idaho, 
publish and declare this to be my Last Will and Testament 
revoking all other and former wills and codicils that may have 
been made by me. 
CLAUSE 1 
DECLARATIONS 
I am single. I have no children. 
All of my property is my separate property. It is my 
intention by this Will to dispose of all property which I am 
entitled to dispose of by will, community and separate, real, 
personal and mixed, which I may own or ,have any interest in 
whatever at the time of my death. 
CLAUSE 2. 
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I nominate and appoint Stephen D. Westfall as the 
Personal Representative of my estate. In the event Stephen D. 
Westfall should predecease me, or fail for any reason to act as 
my Personal Representative, then, in such event, I appoint 
{)\Q('~ K"'.~ ~ e'd ~wN 
Marieann Chris trnan, Meridian I Idaho, as the Personal 
Representative of my estate. I direct that the Personal 











this paragraph shall serve without bond. 
CLAUSE 3 
POWERS OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
My Personal Representative is authorized and empowered 
to exercise all powers in the management of my estate that any 
reasonable and prudent individual would exercise in the manage-
ment of similar property owned in my Personal Representative's 
own right, upon such terms and conditions as may seem best to my 
Personal Representative, and to execute and deliver any and all 
instruments and to do any and all acts which my Personal 
Representative may deem necessary or proper to carry out the 
purposes of this Will. 
CLAUSE 4 
DIRECTIONS TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I direct that my body be cremated with no services. I 
direct that my friend, Bob Soninger, shall be responsible for the 
ashes. My ashes shall be spread over Carson City, Nevada 
brothels. 
CLAUSE 5 
DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN PERSONAL PROPERTY BY SEPARATE WRITING 
I order and direct that certain items of my personal 
property shall be distributed according to a written list of 
items and intended recipients thereof prepared either in my 
handwriting or signed by me, if such a list is in existence at 






All of the rest, residue and remainder of my property 
which I own or have any interest in whatever at the time of my ( 
f\~~ ~~V" SdC,.nt.. r~ 
death, I give, bequeath, and devise to Marieann Christman. All 
interests that I have in any trusts I give, bequeath. and devise 
to Ma~nfr~stman. I exercise any power of appointment that 
fYltrr~ "til ,IJgS 
I might hold and appoint Marieann Christman. If for any reason 
Marieann Christman predeceses me, I give, bequeath, and devise 
all of my property to her children by right of representation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
seal this day of _____________________ , 2000. 
Zachary A. Cowan 
The foregoing instrument, consisting of four (4) 
pages, including the page signed by the undersigned witnesses, 
was, on the date thereof signed, published and declared by the 
above-named Zachary A. Cowan, to be his Last Will and Testament, 
in the presence of us, who, at his request and his presence and 
in the presence of each other, and on the same date, have 
subscribed our names as witnesses thereto. 
__ -----______ --_______________________ Residing at 
________________________________ Residing at 
0001.66 
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STATE OF IDAHO 




We, ZACHARY A. COWAN, the Testator, and 
______________________________________________________ , the witnesses, 
respectively, whose names are signed to the attached or foregoing 
instrument, being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the 
undersigned authority that the Testator signed and executed the 
instrument as his Last Will and Testament and that he had signed 
willingly, and that he executed it as his free and voluntary act 
for the purposes therein expressed; and that each of the 
witnesses, in the presence and hearing of the Testator, signed 
the Will as witnesses and that to the best of his knowledge the 
Testator was at the time an adult, of sound mind and under no 




Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by 
zachary A. Cowan, the Testator, and . ________________________________ __ 
_____________________________ , the witnesses, this day of 
___________________ 1 2000. 
iJih L 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Burley, Idaho 





Craig L. ~tcadoVrs, ISB No. 1081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA. \VLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
Hawley Troxell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLlNS SOlGr\IER, 














REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
Defendant. 
W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell, Ennis 
& Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this Reply ':0 Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
tor Summary Judgment. 
As the Court is aware, and as set forth with dtations in Mr. Fletcher's opening 
memorandum on this motion, this is an attorney malpractice action filed by Plainti ff in which 
Plaintiff asserts that she was denied her testamentary "entitlement" as a named benefk:ary in the 
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 




will of Zachary Cowan. See Memorandum in Opposition to ~1otjon for Stilllmary Judgment 
("Memorandum"), p. I. 
[n the probate case pertaining tl) Mr. Cowan's Will and Estate (Cassia County Case 
No. CV 2006 1234), Plaintiff contested the Personal Representative's interpretation o-~the WiJI, 
claiming she was "entitled" to cCl1ain monies from the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust (hereinafter the 
"Leomu'da Trust"), and that Clause 6 ,.)f Mr. Cowan's Will was ambiguous; thus, Plaintiff 
asserted that the court in the probate case should allow and/or consider parol evidence to aid the 
Court in determining the intent of the testator Mr. Cowan. 
The court in the probate cas~ found there was no ambiguity in Mr. Cowan's Will and 
held that the residue of Mr. Cowan's Estate was to be paid to the American Cancer Society. 
Plaintiff appealed the court's decision. 
On or about September 29, 2008, the parties in the probate case entered into a 
"Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for 
Construction of the Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter 
Stipulation for Settlement"). 
In consideration for Plaintiff signing the Stipulation for Settlement, she dismissed her 
appeal and received payment from the American C,meer Society in the amount of $100,000. 
As a preliminary matter, PlaintEf misstates ;:he nature of the case in her opposition to 
Mr Fletcher's Motion for Summ.ary Judgment. While it is true that Mr. Cowan had at one time a 
beneficial interest in the Leonarda Trust, Plaintiffs claim that the trust referenced in Clause 6 of 
Mr. Cowan's Will - - that Plaintiff receive "all benetIcial interests that [Mr. Cowall has] in any 
trusts is actuaJly referencing the Leonarda Trust. Clause 6 of the Will states in relevant pan 
that, "[aJII beneficial interests that J have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary 
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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Killin[s]." The Will does not reference: the Leonarda Tnlst. Such an inference by PlaintifI is not 
supported by the record. Because the Will does not reference the Leonarda Trust, Plaintiffs 
allegations related to the power of appointment or that the Leonarda Trust terminated when 
Mr. Cowan reached the age of 50, are irrelevant and (.'ertainly do not create an issue of fact 
related to this Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Leonarda Trust could have been one of the trusts in which Mr. Cowan had an interest 
at any given time, but it certainly was not the exclusive trust specified in Clause 6 of 
Mr. Cowan's WiH, nor arguably the only trust in which Mr. Cowan may have had an interest at 
the time the Will was drafted or at the time of his death. 
Secondarily, Plaintiff asSI~rts that Mr. Fle:tcher was negJigent in allegedly not reviewing 
the Leonarda Trust document. Again, the Will does not specifically reference the Leonarda 
Trust. Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit on '\1r. Cowan's intent is clear - -- upon Mr. Fletcher's inquiry, 
Mr. Cowan told Mr. Fletcher that he did not know if all of the property had been transferred to 
him from the Leonarda Trust at the time the Will was drafted, and when asked if he w,mted to 
leave the language in the Will to bequeath whatever interest he had as a beneficiary in "any InlSt" 
to Plaintiff upon his death, Mr. Cowan stated that he wanted to leave that language in his Will. 
Plaintiffs supposition is that she should have received something, or that Mr. Fletcher 
had a duty to assure that she received something under the Will, but that is not so. Plaintiff could 
only receive what interest Mr. Cowan may have had in "any trust. H 1t does not necessarily 
follow that Plaintiff is to receive something if sht;' is named in the Will; Plaintiff can only receive 
something if:\1r. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. There 1: nothing 
specified in Mr. Cowan's Will that he intended Plaintiff to receive any interest specifically in the 
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Leonarda frust. As Sl.!t forth below, W:r Fletcher did not have a duty to assure that Plaintitl 
would in fact receive "something" under the tenns of the Will. 
Mr. Fletcher unambiguously drafted ~1r. em.van's Will as Mr. CO'Nan specilicaHy 
requested, and Plaintiffhas not created any issue of material fact that would prevent this Court 
from making such a findbg. The Will is unambiguous. as the Magistrate Judge determined. The 
Will is unambiguous as agreed to by the Plaintiff, when she settled her Appeal There carmot be 
any "malpractice" when from thl! four ·;;omers of the Will, there is no basis for determining that a 
beneficiary did not receive what th~: te~tator intendj~d. 
Finally, Mr. Fletcher cannot be said to have caused Plaintiff to "recover substantially 
[ess" than the value of the Leonarda Trust property, as asserted by Plaintiff, when the 
unambiguous provision in the Will regarding Plaintiff did not reference the Leonarda Trust and 
which provision was specificaJly kept in the Will at the request of Mr. Cowan to provide for 
Plaintiff in the event Mr. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. Of course, 
at the time of his death, Mr. Cm-van did not hold or possess any interests in any trusts; thus, 
Plaintiff was not entitled to any interest under th,e Will. 
In sum, Plaintiff settled her claim with regard to Mr. Cowan's Esulte for $100,000 .. - a 
payment of which Plaintiff was arguably not entitled given the unambiguous language contained 
in Mr. Cowan's Will. 
1. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
Plaintiff argues that her claim against Mr Fletcher is not barred by the statute of 
limitation because "[ w]here the exis':en<:e, or not, of any alleged negligenc,~ depends on the 
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outcome of litigation, there is no objective proof of actual damage until the litigation is 
concluded." Memorandum, p. 3. 
Plaintiff asserts that until the Magistrate ruled on September 17, 2007, that Plaintiff 
should take nothing under the Will, an:, daim agabSl attorney Fletcher for malpractic~ would be 
"speculative" and the statute of limitations could not begin to run until that date. Memorandum. 
p. 4, Plaimiffs argument is withom merit. 
Plaintiffs claim in the probate case was lhat Plaintiff was entitled to monies yet to be 
distributed to Mr. Cowen from the Leonarda Tnlst. See claim of Mary Killins Soignier, tiled on 
or about January 2, 2007 in Cassia County Case No. CV 06-1234. 
Tellingly, by Plaintiffs own assertion, in drafting Mr. Cowan's Will to include the 
language in the fonn that Mr. Fletcher did, Plaintiffs beneficial interests in trusts was frustrated 
because the Leonarda Trust had been unninated prior to Mr. Cowan's execution of his Will. See 
Complaint and Demand for Jill)' Tlial, p. 3, ~ V. By Plaintiffs own account, it was 
Mr, Fletcher'S act of allegedly negligently drafting Mr. Cowan's Will that caused her to be 
damaged. Contlnnation of that "drunage" by a court (to commence the running of the statute of 
limitations) misconstrues the applic:lbk: law. 
In the probate case, Plaintiff was seeking a finding from the court that Mr. Cowan's WilJ 
was ambiguous and that the Court should look to affidavits to detennine the intent of the testator 
Mr. Cowan. in tenns of what he intellde:d to bequeath to Plaintiff. Quite differently, in this 
malpractice action, Plaintiff is asserting that the inclusion of the provision in Mr. COW<Ul'S \Vill, 
that Plaintiff be awarded any beneficial interest heJd by Mr. Cowan in "any trust" at the time of 
rus death, \V"aS frustrated because the Leonarda Trust was tenninated. These are mutually 
exclusive inquiries. Plaintiffs claim of damage in this case and measure and/or extent of 
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damages is iU'guably entirely different than Plaintiffs claim of "entitlement" before the court in 
the probate case. 
nlC harm 'to Plaintiff actually (lccurred when, according to Plaintiffs allegatiois, 
Mr. Fletcher negligently drafted the Will, not \V;1en the court in the probate case ti:mnd that 
Plaintiffhad no interest in Mr. (o,,·o,:an') Estate. Arguably, even if the court in the probate CJse 
found that there was an ambigui1.Y in Mr. Cowan's Will and that he in fact intended to bequeath 
to Plaintiff certain property of his Estate, the court could not have held that she had an interest in 
the Leonarda Trust, as that trust was terminated at the time Mr. Cowan's Will was drafted by 
Mr. Fletcher; Plaintiff, per her own argument, would still have been damaged notwithstanding 
any finding by the probate court. Put another way, when the court in d1e probate case dismissed 
her claim that she was a beneficiar~ under the Will. that holding did not affect her claj m fi)r 
damages against ~fr. Fletcher. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's asse11ions, a party does not have to have their claim for attorney 
malpractice adjudicated by a trier of fact to trigger the statute of limitations. and City ofly/ceal! 
v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), d.oes not support that unqualified propJsition. 
Mr. Fletcher does not dispute, fbr the purpose of rhis motion, that in certain cases a 
detemination of actual damages will depend upon that outcome of certain litigation. However, 
where the existence of "some damage" does not depend on the outcome of a lawsuit, the statute 
of limitations begins to accrue. See Buxton at 662, 20 I P.3d at 635. 
Plaintiff misconstrues the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Bu.xton. There were two 
distinct rulings in Buxton, wherein the City of McCall sued its attorneys based on allegations of 
negligent advice. Two counts of the City'S complaint were based on aJlegations of negligent 
advice by the City's attorney pertair. ing to termination of a contract and the withholding of 
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certain payments to contJ6ctorS. T1C Idaho Supreme Court held that 'Jntil outcome of the 
litigation related to this "advice" on the breach of contract claims, there ~0ujd nut be a 
determination of damage; that is, the City could have prevailed in the litigation and arguably 
suffered no damage. Id, 146 Idaho at 663,201 P.Jd at 636. The remaining claim ofneg{igence 
in Bu.:rlon had to do with the City attorney advising the City to release a lien against J-U-8 
Engineering. The ldaho Supreme Court held that the date 011 which the City of McCall relea.<;ed 
its lien was the date on which th,~ (i1mage occurred because that was the date on which the City 
of\1cCalllost its opportunity to recover against J-U-B Engineering. ld. at 663,201 P.3d at 636. 
Based on Plaintiff's allegations, there was no "speculation" that she had in fact been 
damaged when Mr. Fletcher allegedly negligently drafted Mr. Cowan's Will in 2005; that is 
when Plaintiff suffered some ascertainable damage, as there was objectivdy ascertainable 
evidence that Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in the Leonarda Trust (which is the stated 
basis of Plaintiff's claim). Alternatively, if there is some question as to whether Plaintiff 
suffered "some damage" when the wm was dralled in May of2005, there is no question that 
some damage occurred at the time of Mr. Cowan's death in October of2006, as any opportunity 
to amend the Will would be impossible. 
The outcome of the probate case was not dispositive regarding Plaintiffs claims against 
Mr. Fletcher and Plaintiff suffered som! damage prior to the commencement of that li1igatiol). 
Plaintiff's claim is barred by the applicable statute ofIimitations. 
H. 
MR. FLETCHER DID NOT HAVE A ))UTY TO PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Fletcher's actions, in drafting the Will of Mr. Cowan, fell below 
the applicable standard of care and, :hercfore, breached a duty of Plaintiff Memorandum. p. 10. 
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As a preliminary, breach of the standard of care and breach of duty in an attorney malpractice 
action (particularly in a claim by a third party bc:neficiary regarding a Will claim) are mutually 
exclusive inquiries. nlllt is, simply because Plaintiff's purported "expert" is of the opinion that 
Mr. Fletcher's actions allegedly fell below the applicable standard of care, such an opmion does 
not create an issue of fact with n:gard 10 Mr. Flf~tcher's Motion for Summary Judgment on this 
issue. 
As set fortb in Mr. Fletcher's opening memorandum on this motion, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has carved (Jut a narrow exception where, "[aJn attorney preparing testamentary 
instruments owes a duty to the benl::ficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such 
instruments ... so as to effectuate the testator's int,em as expressed in the testamentary 
instrument." Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139,90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004). 
A beneficiary will not have a CHse against the la\\)'er for not receiving from the 
testamentary instrument (in this case the Will) what they understood the testator had stated or 
indicated they would receive. ld. 
Plaintiff has no claim against Mr. Fletcher for what Mr. Cowen may have told her she 
would receive, whether it was from the Leonarda Trust or othl!rwise. All Mr, Cowan (;hose to 
express in his Will, in an unambiguous form (ac4:ording to the court in the probate case), was that 
any beneficial interest Me. Cowan had in any trust would go to Plaintiff, and if he didn't have any 
such interest, nothing would go to Plaintiff. See Opinion entered September 18. 2007, pp. 10-11. 
As set forth in the affidavit of Mr. Fletcher, prior to finalizing Mr. Cowan's Wi!l, 
Mr. Fletcher inquired about the interests he had in any trust, including the Leonarda Trust, and 
Mr. Cowan told him that he believ~:d he had receive4 disbursements from the Leonarda Trust but 
wanted to keep the language in the Will regarding Plaintiff in the event there were other 
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interests. If the language of a will is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the testator is derived 
from the v.ill as it reads on its filee. Allen v. Shea. 105 Idaho 31, 34 (1983). The :anguage of 
Mr. Cowan's Will is unambiguous on:ts face and ac\:ure.tely reflect'> the intent of Mr. Cowan. 
Arguably, follov.ring the jatiom;le ofPlaintifi's argument, had .\1r. Fletcher leamed that in 
fact Mr. Cowan had no further beneficI.ary interest in the Leonarda Trust, there would be no 
mention of Plaintiff in the Will at all. However, Mr. Fletcher believed Mr. Cowan's 
representation that there may be some beneficial interests "out there" and if there were', he 
wanted Plaintiff to receive the ben.efit of those interests. 
In support of her opposition, Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of attorney John Magnuson 
to opine that Mr. Fletcher's conduct, in preparation of Mr. Cowan's 2005 Will, fell below the 
applicable standard of care because (1 ) Mr. Fletcher refers to a power of attorney held by the 
testator, which power of attorney is not granted by the Trust (referring to the Leonarda Trust) 
which "indicates" to Mr. Magnm;on that Mr. Fletcher did not review the Trust; (2) had 
Mr. Fletcher reviewed the Trust, he would have leamed that after Mr. Cowan reached the age 
of 50, his mother's trust property would revert to Mr. Cowan; (3) Mr. Fletcher had a duty to 
inquire of Mr. Cowan whether he: had c(!ached the age of 50 and to modify the language in 
Mr. Cowan's Will to reflect that he owned property previously held in trust; (4) Mr. Cowan's 
Will references "all beneficial interests that 1 have in any trusts" indicates to Mr. Magnuson that 
Mr. Fletcher failed to inquire of Mr. Cowan how he wanted the property, previously held in trust, 
devised; and (5) the portion of Mr. Cowan's Will that refers to "all beneficial interests that I have 
in any trusts" is of no force and effect given the absence of such tmst or trusts. 
In Stirn, Mr. Magnuson opines that "under these circumstances, drafting a will, a portion 
of which has no force and etTect .and which fails to effectuate the intention of the testator, 
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constitutes a deviation from the standard of cart: and falls below the standard of care e,f attorney> 
practicing in Idaho in 2005. 
Mr. '\1agnuson's affidavit is no'; relevant to the pending motion for summary judgment, as 
it creates no issue of material fact which would prevent this Court to grant Mr. Fletcher's motion 
for summary judgment. 
As previously set forth, the error in Plaintiffs supposition is that the reference contained 
in Me. Cowan's Will that Plaintitf rece:ve "all beneticial interests that [Mr. Cowan has] in any 
trust.,", actually is referencing the Leonarda Trust. The Will does not reference the Leonarda 
Trust. Notwithstanding that fact, Mr. fletcher's Affidavit confirms that he discussed the status of 
the Leonarda Trust with Mr. Cowan and that MI'. Cowan indicated that certain properties had 
been distributed to him from the Leonarda Trust, but he wanted to keep the language in the Will 
pertaining to Plaintiff. in the event there were additional inteD~sts. There was no indication to 
Mr. Fletcher at any time that Mr. Cowen intend<:d 10 give to Plaintiff anything other than 
interests thal he may have in any trusts at the time of his death. Thus, at the time- of his death, if 
there were additional interests in any trust, Plaintiff would receive said interests, and i:' there 
were not any interests in any trusts, Plaintiff would receive nothing. 
Like Harrigjeld, supra, a duty may be owed to a named beneficiary of a Will, such as 
Plaintiff in this case, to draft a testcunentary document according to the testator's intent. Clause 6 
of Mr. Cowan's Will fulfills any duty owed to Plaintiff because it devises to Plaintiff "[alII 
beneficial interests I have in any trusts" to Plaintiff. Had !vIr, Cowan died vvith any beneficial 
trust interests, Plaintiff would bave ~eceived exactly what Cowan intended. The fact that 
Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in any trust at the time of the Will, or at the time of his 
death, is not relevant to the adequacy of !v{r. Fletcher's drafting, according to Mr, Cowan's 
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intent. The intent of Mr. Cowan, ::i'om the Wilt is clear as to the PlaintitI :vir. Cowan' s intent 
as derived from h:s \inll is dear and unambiguous. If Mr. Cowan had any beneficial interest in 
any trust at the time of his death, those interests would pass to PlaintitT; if not, nothing goes to 
Plaintiff. 
Mr, Fletcher breached no duty :0 PlaintitT and her claim for attorney malpractice should 
be dismissed. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAI~ IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
Through this motion, Mr, Fetc:ler asserts that Plaintiff settled all claims she had rdated 
to Mr. Cowan's Will by executing the StipUlation for Settlement in th,~ probate cas,;! and is, 
therefore, judicially estopped from pursuing this malpractice action against Mr, Fletcher. 
Ibe language of the StipUlation for Settlt:m.ent provides that the parties, inclusive of 
W. Kent Fletcher (as attorney for Mr. Cowan's Estate), stipulated and agreed to the following: 
"[a]H claims of Mary Killins Soignier under the Last Will and Testament of Zachary A. Cowan, 
as heir, devisee, or holder of po\ver of 'lppointm(~nt '" are settled for the sum of One Hundred 
'Thousand Dollars ($100,000):' 
It is the position of Mr. Fletcher that by signing and sUbmittjng a stipulation to the court 
in the probate case, Plaintiff reprl;!sented that any claim that she may have as heir to Mr. Cowan's 
Estate was settled, That is, she effectively, and as a matter of law, agreed to settle all claims as 
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate, which would include he!r malpractice action against Mr. Fletcher, as 
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate. 
In opposition to Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has submitted an 
aflidavit which states that when "she entered into the settlement of her claims against the estate, 
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMAR Y JUDGMENT - 11 
000178 
.41811007016116372 
Hawley Troxell Page 14 
she had no notice that anyone was asserting that, by releasing her claims against the e,tllte, she 
would also be rdeasing her c1aim~ against Mr. Fletcher." Plaintiff goes on to state in her 
affidavit that she "made no statelTI~nt in court, sworn or othem;se, to the e-tfect that she intended 
to release [Mr.) Fletcher by dismissing her claims against the estate." Affidavit of Mf.ry KiHins 
Soignier. 
Plaintiff also claims she ;'e,;eiv(~d "no consijeration" from tv1r. Fletcher for any release of 
claims against him. Id. 
As a preliminary matter, there is no requirement under the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
that there has been consideration for any inconslstent position (including release of claims) taken 
in a preceding case by a party. In this case, Plaintiff took the position that she should have 
received "more" from Mr. Cowan's Estate, through his Will in the probate case. Plaintiff 
specifically alleged in the underlying probate case that Mr. Fletcher "made no attempt to 
investigate the extent of trust int/!re.5ts which clearly exist" and that he had actively soughl "to 
block the claim of devisee MARY SOIGNIER, and ha[s) refused to conslder the intentions and 
the expectations of ZACHARY A. COWAN." See Opposition to Petition for Construction of 
Will and Approval for Plan of Distribu:ion ofE5tate filed March 25,2007, by Plaintiff in the 
probate case. Moreover, the court in the probate case confirmed Plaintiffs allegations in that 
case that Mr. Fletcher had drafted an ambiguous Will, and that her entitlement to any beneficial 
interests in Mr. Cowan's Estate were irustrated, based on the language in the Will. See Opinion 
of September 18, 2007, p. 9. 
Plaintiff clearly alleged and made claims in the probate case that Mr. fletcher was 
negligent in his drafting of Mr. Cowan' s Will, that the Will was ambiguous, and that 
Mr. Fletcher's drafting of Mr. Cowan's Will did not reflect the "true" intent of Mr. Cowan. 
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Through the Stipulation for Seulement, Plaintiff agreed to set1Ie ALL CLAIMS related t'J 
1\1r. Cowan's Wi!l, as an heir of that Will. PlaintitTagrced:o lhe term.; of the settlement as did 
Mr. Fletcher (who was listed as a party and a signe.tory), and Plaintiff should be ordered to abide 
by that agreement, as she represented to the court in the probate case that she would, on .... hkh 
representation the court relied. That the representation of Plaintiff was not made in Hopen court" 
as argued by Plaintiff does not defeat Mr. Fletcher'g motion on this issue. Plaintiff clearly 
represented by signing the stipulati:m 10 dismiss (and receiving the $100,000) that she would in 
fact settle all claims related to proceeds from Mr. Cowar,'s Estate l which must include, as a 
matter of law, Plaintiff s claim t~Jr add,tional proceeds due to her from that Estate based on 
Mr. Fletcher's alleged malpractice. 
In sum, Plaintiff is pursuing the same cj,tim against Mr. Fletcher in this malpractice 
action as she was pursuing in the: probc:.te case (additional proceeds fwm Mr. Cowan's Estate) 
- - which she agreed to settle. Plaintiff should not be allowed to take a position inconsistent \\ith 
that position she took in the probate ca:;e, wherein she agreed to settle "aU claims" related to her 
claim as heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate. 
Plaintiff's motion under the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be granted as a matter of 
law. 
----- .-----
Plaintiff has cited no authority to support the proposition t~1at judicial I;:stoppel doe:; not apply 
if a party signs a written stipLilation and performs the terms of the stipulation. Nor is there 
any requirement that Mr. Fletcher "detrimentally relied" on any representation made by 
PlaintitT in the probate case in order to pursue a claim of estoppel or judicial estoppel. 
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IV. 
CONCLVSION 
There is no issue of material fact that Plaintiff's Complaint is barred hy the applicable 
statute of limitation, that Mr. Fletc:her did not owe or breach any duty to Plaintiff in his drafting 
of the Will of Mr. Co\van, and that Plaintiff's claims are barred under the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel. Mr. Fletcher respectfully requests that the Court make these findings as a matter of la\\' 
and dismiss .Plaintiff's Complaint vr'ith prejudice. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUB MfITED TIUS ,~?ta;of July, 2009. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
-'By&2~,. ~~ 'l.-- MichelJe R. Poi Attorneys for 
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r HEREBY CERTIFY trial: on his ~day of July. 2009, 1 caused to he served a true 
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDAKf'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: v;::"-
Allen B. Ellis __ U.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid 
ELLIS, BRO\VJ\" & SHEILS, CHARTERED Hand Delivered 
707 North 8th Street ____ Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 388 .. v-r-mail 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 __ Tete-copy: 208.345.9564 
(Attorneys for Plainti:ff] 
.r" ~ /f~~-
~~iC-h=e-lle-~R~.p-O-i~--~-----------------
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Allen B. Ellis, ISB No. 1626 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS 
707 North 8th Street 
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P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
Telephone: (208) 345-7832 
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564 
Jeffrey A.. Strother, ISB No. 2014 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
200 N. Fourth Street, Suite 30 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-2425 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2429 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KlLLlNS SOIGNIER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
Defendant. 
Case No. ev 2009-517 
NonCE OF ASSOCIATION OF 
COUNSEL 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Jeffrey A. Strother, of Strother Law Office, 200 N. 4" 
Street. Suite 30, Boise, Idaho 83702, is associating as attorney of record with Allen B. Ellis, 
ofthe firm Ellis, Brown & Sheils, 70i N. a'" Street, P.O. Box 388, Boise,ldaho 83701-0388, 
for plaintiff Mary Kilins Solgnier in the above-captioned matter, and the clerk of court is 
hereby requested to make such entries as may be required to record such association. 
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DATED this ·2- day of August,·2009. 
ELUS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHTD. STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
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Allen B. Ellis 
CERTifiCATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of August. 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing dc)cul1lentto be served upon the following indivldual(s) by the 
method indicated below and addreS$ed as follows: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley. LLP 
877 Main St., .Ste. 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
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REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
W. KENT FLETCHER, 
Defendant. 
) --------------------------------
W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell, Ennis 
& Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this RepJy to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
As the Court is aware, and as set forth with citations in Mr. Fletcher's opening 
memorandum on this motion, this is an attorney malpractice action filed by Plaintiff in which 
Plaintiff asserts that she was denied her testamentary "entitlement" as a named beneficiary in the 
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\vill of Zachary Cowan. See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Memorandum"), p. 1. 
In the probate case pertaining to Mr. Cowan's Will and Estate (Cassia County Case 
No. CV 20061234), Plaintiff contested the Personal Representative's interpretation of the Will, 
claiming she was '"entitled" to certain monies from the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust (hereinafter the 
"Leonarda Trust"), and that Clause 6 of Mr. Cowan's Will was ambiguous; thus, Plaintiff 
asserted that the court in the probate case should allow andlor consider parol evidence to aid the 
Court in determining the intent of the testator Mr. Cowan. 
The court in the probate case found there was no ambiguity in Mr. Cowan's Will and 
held that the residue of Mr. Cowan's Estate was to be paid to the American Cancer Society. 
Plaintiff appealed the court's decision. 
On or about September 29, 2008, the parties in the probate case entered into a 
"Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for 
Construction of the Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter 
Stipulation for Settlement"). 
In consideration for Plaintiff signing the Stipulation for Settlement, she dismissed her 
appeal and received payment from the American Cancer Society in the amount of$100,000. 
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff misstates the nature of the case in her opposition to 
Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment. While it is true that Mr. Cowan had at one time a 
beneficial interest in the Leonarda Trust, Plaintiff's claim that the trust referenced in Clause 6 of 
Mr. Cowan's Will - - that Plaintiff receive "all beneficial interests that [Mr. Cowan has J in any 
trusts - - is actually referencing the Leonarda Trust. Clause 6 of the Will states in relevant part 
that, "[a]11 beneficial interests that I have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary 
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Killin[s]." The Will does not reference the Leonarda Trust. Such an inference by Plaintiff is not 
supported by the record. Because the Will does not reference the Leonarda Trust, Plaintiffs 
allegations related to the power of appointment or that the Leonarda Trust terminated when 
Mr. Cowan reached the age of 50, are irrelevant and certainly do not create an issue of fact 
related to this Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Leonarda Trust could have been one of the trusts in which Mr. Cowan had an interest 
at any given time, but it certainly was not the exclusive trust specified in Clause 6 of 
Mr. Cowan's Will, nor arguably the only trust in which Mr. Cowan may have had an interest at 
the time the Will was drafted or at the time of his death. 
Secondarily, Plaintiff asserts that ~1r. Fletcher was negligent in allegedly not reviewing 
the Leonarda Trust document. Again, the Will does not specifically reference the Leonarda 
Trust. Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit on Mr. Cowan's intent is clear - -- upon Mr. Fletcher's inquiry. 
Mr. Cowan told Mr. Fletcher that he did not know if aU of the property had been transferred to 
him from the Leonarda Trust at the time the Will was drafted, and when asked ifhe wanted to 
leave the language in the Will to bequeath whatever interest he had as a beneficiary in "any trust" 
to Plaintiff upon his death, Mr. Cowan stated that he wanted to leave that language in his Will. 
Plaintiffs supposition is that she should have received something, or that Mr. Fletcher 
had a duty to assure that she received something under the Will, but that is not so. Plaintiff could 
only receive what interest Mr. Cowan may have had in "any trust." It does not necessarily 
follow that Plaintiff is to receive something if she is named in the WiJI; Plaintiff can only receive 
something if Mr, Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. There is nothing 
specified in Mr. Cowan's Will that he intended Plaintiff to receive any interest specifically in the 
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Leonarda Trust. As set forth below, Mr. Fletcher did not have a duty to assure that Plaintiff 
would in fact receive "something" under the terms of the Will. 
Mr. Fletcher unambiguously drafted Mr. Cowan's Will as Mr. Cowan specifically 
requested, and Plaintiff has not created any issue of material fact that would prevent this Court 
from making such a finding. The Will is unambiguous, as the Magistrate Judge determined. The 
Will is unambiguous as agreed to by the Plaintiff, when she settled her Appeal. There cannot be 
any "malpractice" when from the four corners of the Will, there is no basis for determining that a 
beneficiary did not receive what the testator intended. 
Finally, Mr. Fletcher cannot be said to have caused Plaintiff to "recover substantially 
less" than the value of the Leonarda Trust property, as asserted by Plaintiff, when the 
unambiguous provision in the Will regarding Plaintiff did not reference the Leonarda Trust and 
which provision was specifically kept in the Will at the request of Mr. Cowan to provide for 
Plaintiff in the event Mr. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. Of course, 
at the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any interests in any trusts; thus, 
Plaintiff was not entitled to any interest under the Will. 
In sum, Plaintiff settled her claim with regard to Mr. Cowan's Estate for $100,000 - - a 
payment of which Plaintiff was arguably not entitled given the unambiguous language contained 
in Mr. Cowan's Will. 
I. 
PLAIN'TIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
Plaintiff argues that her claim against Mr. Fletcher is not barred by the statute of 
limitation because "[w)here the existence, or not, of any al1eged negligence depends on the 
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outcome of litigation, there is no objective proof of actual damage until the litigation is 
concluded." Memorandum, p. 3. 
PlaintitJ asserts that until the Magistrate ruled on September 17,2007, that Plaintiff 
should take nothing under the Will, any claim against attorney Fletcher for malpractice would be 
"speculative" and the statute of limitations could not begin to run until that date. Memorandum, 
p. 4. Plaintiffs argument is without merit. 
Plaintiffs claim in the probate case was that Plaintiff was entitled to monies yet to be 
distributed to Mr. Cowen from the Leonarda Trust. See claim of Mary Killins Soignier, filed on 
or about January 2, 2007 in Cassia County Case No. CV 06-1234. 
Tellingly, by Plaintiffs own assertion, in drafting Mr. Cowan's Will to include the 
language in the form that Mr. Fletcher did, Plaintiffs beneficial interests in trusts was frustrated 
because the Leonarda Trust had been terminated prior to Mr. Cowan's execution of his Will. See 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, p. 3, , V. By Plaintiffs own account, it was 
Mr. Fletcher's act of allegedly negligently drafting Mr. Cowan's Will that caused her to be 
damaged. Confirmation of that "damage" by a court (to commence the running of the statute of 
limitations) misconstrues the applicable law. 
In the probate case, Plaintiff was seeking a finding from the court that Mr. Cowan's Will 
was ambiguous and that the Court should look to affidavits to determine the intent of the testator 
Mr. Cowan, in terms of what he intended to bequeath to Plaintiff. Quite differently, in this 
malpractice action, Plaintiff is asserting that the inclusion of the provision in Mr. Cowan's Will, 
that Plaintiff be awarded any beneficial interest held by Mr. Cowan in "any trust" at the time of 
his death, was frustrated because the Leonarda Trust was terminated. These are mutually 
exclusive inquiries. Plaintiffs claim of damage in this case and measure andlor extent of 
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damages is arguably entirely different than Plaintiffs claim of "entitlement" before the court in 
the probate case. 
The harm to Plaintiff actually occurred when, according to Plaintiff's allegations, 
Mr. Fletcher negligently drafted the Will, not when the court in the probate case found that 
Plaintiff had no interest in Mr. Cowan's Estate. Arguably. even if the court in the probate case 
found that there was an ambiguity in Mr. Cowan's Will and that he in fact intended to bequeath 
to Plaintiff certain property of his Estate, the court could not have held that she had an interest in 
the Leonarda Trust, as that trust was terminated at the time Mr. Cowan's Will was drafted by 
Mr. Fletcher; Plaintiff, per her 0'M1 argument, would still have been damaged notwithstanding 
any finding by the probate court. Put another way, when the court in the probate case dismissed 
her claim that she was a beneficiary under the Will, that holding did not affect her claim for 
damages against Mr. Fletcher. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, a party does not have to have their claim for attorney 
malpractice adjudicated by a trier of fact to trigger the statute of limitations, and City of McCall 
v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), does not support that unqualified proposition. 
Mr. fletcher does not dispute, for the purpose of this motion, that in certain cases a 
determination of actual damages will depend upon that outcome of certain litigation. However, 
where the existence of "some damage" does not depend on the outcome of a lawsuit, the statute 
oflimitations begins to accrue. See Buxton at 662, 20] P.3d at 635, 
Plaintiff misconstrues the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Buxton. There were two 
distinct rulings in Buxton, wherein the City of McCall sued its attorneys based on allegations of 
negligent advice. Two counts of the City's complaint were based on aHegations ofnegJigent 
advice by the City's attorney pertaining to termination of a contract and the withholding of 
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certain payments to contractors. The [dabo Supreme Court held that until outcome of the 
litigation related to this "advice" on the breach of contract claims, there could not be a 
determination of damage; that is, the City could have prevailed in the litigation and arguably 
sutTered no damage. ld , 146 Idaho at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. The remaining claim ofnegJigence 
in Buxton had to do with the City attorney advising the City to release a lien against J-U-B 
Engineering. The Idaho Supreme Court heJd that the date on which the City of McCall released 
its lien was the date on which the damage occurred because that was the date on which the City 
of McCall lost its opportunity to recover against J-U-B Engineering. ld. at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. 
Based on Plaintiff's allegations, there was no "speculation" that she had in fact been 
damaged when Mr. Fletcher allegedly negligently drafted Mr. Cowan's Will in 2005; that is 
when Plaintiff sutTered some ascertainable damage, as there was objectively ascertainable 
evidence that Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in the Leonarda Trust (which is the stated 
basis of Plaintiffs claim). Alternatively, if there is some question as to whether Plaintiff 
suffered "some damage" when the Will was drafted in May 0[2005, there is no question that 
some damage occurr~d at the time of Mr. Cowan's death in October of2006, as any opportunity 
to amend the Will would be impossible. 
The outcome of the probate case was not dispositive regarding Plaintiff's claims against 
Mr. Fletcher and Plaintiff suffered some damage prior to the commencement of that litigation. 
Plaintiffs claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
II. 
MR. FLETCHER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Fletcher's actions, in drafting the Will of Mr. Cowan, fell below 
the applicable standard of care and, therefore, breached a duty of Plaintiff. Memorandum, p. 10. 
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As a preliminary, breach of the standard of care and breach of duty in an attorney malpractice 
action (particularly in a claim by a third party beneficiary regarding a Will claim) are mutually 
exclusive inquiries. That is, simply because Plaintiirs purported "expert" is of the opinion that 
Mr. Fletcher's actions allegedJy fell below the applicable standard of care, such an opinion does 
not create an issue of fact with regard to Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment on this 
issue. 
As set forth in Mr. Fletcher's opening memorandum on this motion, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has carved out a narrow exception where, "[a]n attorney preparing testamentary 
instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such 
instruments ... so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary 
instrument." Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004). 
A beneficiary will not have a case against the Jawyer for not receiving from the 
testamentary instrument (in this case the WiJI) what they understood the testator had stated or 
indicated they would receive. ld. 
Plaintiff has no claim against Mr. Fletcher for what Mr. Cowen may have told her she 
would receive, whether it was from the Leonarda Trust or otherwise. All Mr. Cowan chose to 
express in his Will, in an unambiguous form (according to the court in the probate case), was that 
any beneficial interest Mr. Cowan had in any trust would go to Plaintiff, and ifhe didn't have any 
such interest, nothing would go to Plaintiff. See Opinion entered September 18, 2007, pp. 10-11. 
As set forth in the affidavit of Mr. Fletcher, prior to finalizing Mr. Cowan's Will, 
Mr. Fletcher inquired about the interests he had in any trust, including the Leonarda Trust, and 
Mr. Cowan told him that he believed he had received disbursements from the Leonarda Trust but I 
wanted to keep the language in the Will regarding Plaintiff in the event there were other I 
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interests. If the language of a will is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the testator is derived 
from the will as it reads on its face . Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 34 (1983). The language of 
Mr. Cowan' s Will is unambiguous on its face and accurately reflects the intent of Mr. Cowan. 
Arguably, following the rationale of Plaintiffs argument, had Mr. Fletcher learned that in 
fact Mr. Cowan had no further beneticiary interest in the Leonarda Trust, there would be no 
mention of Plaintiff in the Will at all. However, Mr. Fletcher believed Mr. Cowan's 
representation that there may be some beneficial interests "out there" and ifthere were, he 
wanted Plaintiff to receive the benefit of those interests. 
In support of her opposition, Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of attorney John Magnuson 
to opine that Mr. Fletcher's conduct, in preparation of Mr. Cowan's 2005 Will, fell below the 
applicable standard of care because (1) Mr. Fletcher refers to a power of attorney held by the 
testator, which power of attorney is not granted by the Trust (referring to the Leonarda Trust) 
which "indicates" to Mr. Magnuson that Mr. fletcher did not review the Trust; (2) had 
Mr. Fletcher reviewed the Trust, he would have learned that after Mr. Cowan reached the age 
of 50, his mother's trust property would revert to Mr. Cowan; (3) Mr. Fletcher had a duty to 
inquire of Mr. Cowan whether he had reached the age of 50 and to modify the language in 
Mr. Cowan's Will to reflect that he owned property previously held in trust; (4) Mr. Cowan's 
Will references "all beneficial interests that I have in any trusts" indicates to Mr. Magnuson that 
Mr. Fletcher failed to inquire of Mr. Cowan how he wanted the property, previously held in trust, 
devised; and (5) the portion of Mr. Cowan's Will that refers to "all beneficial interests that I have 
in any trusts" is of no force and effect given the absence of such trust or trusts. 
In sum, Mr. Magnuson opines that "under these circumstances, drafting a will, a portion 
of which has no force and effect and which fails to effectuate the intention of the testator, 
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constitutes a deviation from the standard of care and falls below the standard of care of attorneys 
practicing in Idaho in 2005. 
Mr. Magnuson's affidavit is not relevant to the pending motion for summary judgment, as 
it creates no issue of material fact which would prevent this Court to grant Mr. Fletcher's motion 
for summary judgment. 
As previously set forth, the eITor in Plaintiffs supposition is that the reference contained 
in Mr. Cowan's Will that Plaintiff receive "all beneficial interests that [Mr. Cowan has] in any 
trusts", actually is referencing the Leonarda Trust. The Will does not reference the Leonarda 
Trust. Notwithstanding that fact, Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit confirms that he discussed the status of 
the Leonarda Trust with Mr. Cowan and that Mr. Cowan indicated that certain properties had 
been distributed to him from the Leonarda Trust, but he wanted to keep the language in the Will 
pertaining to Plaintiff, in the event there were additional interests. There was no indication to 
Mr. Fletcher at any time that Mr. Cowan intended to give to Plaintiff anything other than 
interests that he may have in any trusts at the time of his death. Thus, at the time of his death, if 
there were additional interests in any trust, Plaintiff would receive said interests, and if there 
were not any interests in any trusts, Plaintiff would receive nothing. 
Like Harrigfo/d, supra, a duty may be owed to a named beneficiary of a Will, such as 
Plaintiff in this case, to draft a testamentary document according to the testator's intent. Clause 6 
of Mr. Cowan's WiJI fulfills any duty owed to Plaintiff because it devises to Plaintiff "[a]1I 
beneficial interests I have in any trusts" to Plaintiff. Had Mr. Cowan died with any beneficial 
trust interests, Plaintiff would have received exactly what Cowan intended. The fact that 
Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in any trust at the time of the Will, or at the time of his 
death, is not relevant to the adequacy ofMr. Fletcher's drafting, according to Mr. Cowan's 
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intent. The intent of Mr. Cowan, from the Will, is clear as to the Plaintiff. Mr. Cowan's intent 
as derived from his Will is clear and unambiguous. If Mr. Cowan had any beneficial interest in 
any trust at the time of his death. those interests would pass to Plaintiff; jf not, nothing goes to 
Plaintiff. 
Mr. Fletcher breached no duty to Plaintiff and her claim for attorney malpractice should 
be dismissed. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
Through this motion. Mr. Fletcher asserts that Plaintiff settled all claims she had related 
to Mr. Cowan's Will by executing the Stipulation for Settlement in the probate case and is, 
therefore. judicially estopped from pursuing this malpractice action against Mr. Fletcher. 
The language of the Stipulation for Settlement provides that the parties, inclusive of 
W. Kent Fletcher (as attorney for Mr. Cowan's Estate), stipulated and agreed to the foHowing; 
"[a]lJ claims of Mary Killins Soignier under the Last Will and Testament of Zachary A. Cowan, 
as heir, devisee, or holder of power of appointment ... are settled for the sum of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000)." 
It is the position of Mr. Fletcher that by signing and submitting a stipUlation to the court 
in the probate case, Plaintiff represented that any claim that she may have as heir to Mr. Cowan's 
Estate was settled. That is, she effectively, and as a matter oflaw, agreed to settle aU claims as 
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate, which would include her malpractice action against Mr. Fletcher, as 
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate. 
In opposition to Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has submitted an 
affidavit which states that when "she entered into the settlement of her claims against the estate, 
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she had no notice that anyone was asserting that, by releasing her claims against the estate, she 
would also be releasing her claims against Mr. Fletcher." Plaintiff goes on to state in her 
atlidavit that she "made no statement in court, sworn or otherwise, to the effect that she intended 
to release [Mr.] Fletcher by dismissing her claims against the estate." Affidavit of Mary Killins 
Soignier. 
Plaintiff also claims she received "no consideration" from Mr. Fletcher for any release of 
claims against him. ld. 
As a preliminary matter, there is no requirement under the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
that there has been consideration for any inconsistent position (including release of claims) taken 
in a preceding case by a party. In this case, Plaintiff took the position that she should have 
received "more" from Mr. Cowan's Estate, through his Will in the probate case. Plaintiff 
specifically alleged in the underlying probate case that Mr. Fletcher "made no attempt to 
investigate the extent of trust interests which c1early exist" and that he had actively sought "to 
block the claim of devisee MARY SOIGNIER, and ha[s] refused to consider the intentions and 
the expectations of ZACHARY A. COWAN." See Opposition to Petition for Construction of 
Will and Approval for Plan of Distribution of Estate filed March 25, 2007, by Plaintiff in the 
probate case. Moreover, the court in the probate case confirmed Plaintiff's allegations in that 
case that Mr. Fletcher had drafted an ambiguous Will, and that her entitlement to any beneficial 
interests in Mr. Cowan's Estate were frustrated, based on the language in the Will. See Opinion 
of September 18, 2007, p. 9. 
Plaintiff clearly alleged and made claims in the probate case that Mr. Fletcher was 
negligent in his drafting of Mr. Cowan's Will, that the Will was ambiguous, and that 
Mr. Fletcher's drafting of Mr. Cowan's Will did not reflect the "true" intent of Mr. Cowan. 
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Through the Stipulation for Settlement, Plaintiff agreed to settle ALL CLAIMS related to 
Mr. Cowan's Will, as an heir of that Will. Plaintiff agreed to the terms of the settlement, as did 
Mr. Fletcher (who was listed as a party and a signatory), and Plaintiff should be ordered to abide 
by that agreement, as she represented to the court in the probate case that she would, on which 
representation the court relied. That the representation of Plaintiff was not made in "open court" 
as argued by Plaintiff does not defeat Mr. Fletcher's motion on this issue. Plaintiff clearly 
represented by signing the stipulation to dismiss (and receiving the $100,000) that she would in 
fact settle all claims related to proceeds from Mr. Cowan's Estate l which must include, as a 
matter oflaw. Plaintiffs claim for additional proceeds due to her from that Estate based on 
Mr. Fletcher's alleged malpractice. 
In sum, Plaintiff is pursuing the same claim against Mr. Fletcher in this malpractice 
action as she was pursuing in the probate case (additional proceeds from Mr. Cowan's Estate) 
- - which she agreed to settle. Plaintiff should not be allowed to take a position inconsistent with 
that position she took in the probate case, wherein she agreed to settle "all claims" related to her 
claim as heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate. 
Plaintiffs motion under the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be granted as a matter of 
law. 
1 Plaintiff has cited no authority to support the proposition that judicial estoppel does not apply 
if a party signs a written stipulation and performs the terms of the stipulation. Nor is there 
any requirement that Mr. Fletcher "detrimentally relied" on any representation made by 
Plaintiff in the probate case in order to pursue a claim of estoppel or judicial estoppel. 
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There is no issue of material fact that Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the applicable 
statute of limitation, that Mr. Fletcher did not owe or breach any duty to Plaintiff in his drafting 
of the Will of Mr. Cowan, and that Plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel. Mr. Fletcher respectfully requests that the Court make these findings as a matter of law 
and dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejUdiCe;~ 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED THIS L day of August, 2009. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ay of August. 2009. I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINT FF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
~-mail 
_-V_ T elecopy: 208.345.9564 
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707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL mSTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 











Case No. CV 2009-517 
MOTION TO STRlKE AFFIDAVIT 
OF W. KENT FLETCHER 
flj003/00S 
Comes now plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier, through her attorney of record, and moves the 
Court for an order striking the affidavit ofW. Kent Fletcher. This motion is made upon the grotmds 
that the affidavit attributes certain statements to the decedent/testator Zachary A. COWlill which 
statements are inadmissible for each of the following reasons: (I) such statements are irrelevant to 
the issues presented in these swrunary judgment proceedings (statute of limitations, estoppel and 
dt.ty); (2) there is no ambiguity in the subject Will WhICh would justify the admis~ion of extrinsic 
MonON TO STRIKE AFFlDA Vir OF W. KENT FLETCHER· I 
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evidence (see Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment filed September 18,2007, in the Matter of the 
Estate of Zachary COWall, deceased (Cassia County No. CV 2006-1234); and (3) in malpractice 
actions, an attorney cannot be "subject[ed] to lawsuits" based upon what a putative beneficiary 
"understood the testator had statled". Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 PJd 884 
(2004). Therefore, in the name of consistency and fairness, attorneys cannot claim that they did not 
breach a duty to a named ::'cneficiary by testifying to "what they understood the testator had stated 
or indicated" a beneficiary should receive. Jd 140 I<Lmo at 139. 
This motion is based upon the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the affidavit of Allen B. Ellis, the pleadings and records in this action, and such other oral 
and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing. 
OATED this 6th day of August, 2009. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 6'1\ day of August, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Ida.lJ.o 83701-1617 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,IN A FOR CASSIA COUNTY 
COURT MINUTES 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 
CV -2009-0000517 
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 8/10/2009 
Time: 10:02 am 
Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Court reporter: Denise Schloder 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 
Party: Mary Soignier, Attorney: Allen Ellis 1 Jeffrey A. Strother 
Party: W Fletcher, Attorney: Michelle Points 
Jeffrey A. Strother addresses the Court; cites Counsel would like to address the Motion 
to Strike the Affidavit of Kent Fletcher prior to arguing the Summary Judgment Motion. 
The Court has not received its copy of the Motion to Strike. Counsel provide the Court 
this morning with a copy of the Motion to Strike (previously filed on August 06, 2009). 
Time: 10:04 a.m. 
Jeffrey A. Strother addresses the Court; argues the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Kent Fletcher; cites considerations. 
Time: 10:09 a.m. 
Michelle Points objects to the Motion to Strike Affidavit; cites untimely filed; cites 
considerations for the objection. 
Time: 10:12 a.m. 
Reply by Jeffrey A. Strother. 
Bailiff returns to Counsel the copy of the objection to the affidavit. 
Time: 10:13 a.m. 
Michelle Points addresses the Court; argues the Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; cites considerations. 
Time: 10:22 a.m. 
Court inquires of Counsel re: issue of what facts are in dispute and what facts are not. 
Time: 10:23 a.m. 
Response by Michelle Points. 000203 
'Mary Kif/ins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 
CV-2009-0000S17 
Page 2 
Time: 10:27 a.m. 
Response by Jeffrey A. Strother re: issue of facts; offers plaintiff's response to Motion 
for Summary Judgment; cites considerations. 
Time: 10:50 a.m. 
The Court inquires of Counsel for clarification re: duty. 
Time: 10:51 a.m. 
Jeffrey A. Strother responds. 
Time: 10:52 a.m. 
Reply by Michelle Points. 
Time: 10:56 a.m. 
Court inquires re: Supplemental Briefing. 
Counsel have no request for supplemental briefing. 
The Court takes this matter Under Advisement. 
Time: 10:57 a.m. - Hearing concludes. 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
APPEARANCES 
Allen B. Ellis of the firm Ellis, Brown and Sheils, 
Chartered: and Jeffrey A. Strother. 
Michelle Points of the firm Hawley. Troxell. Ennis and 
Havvley LLP. 
BACKGROUND 
This case is an action by Ms. Soignier against Mr. Fletcher, alleging that Mr. 
Fletcher was negligent and committed malpractice in the preparation of the Will of 
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lachary Cowan, deceased. Ms. Soignier was a named beneficiary in the \ViIL but did not 
have a direct attnrney-clicnt relatinnship with \11'. F1etrher. \ls. Snignier asserts that she 
was to rereive a gilt under the Will. but that Mr. Fletcher's negligcnre in drafting the 
Will predudcd her from n:ceiving the gin. 
There are two matters before the court at this time. Mr. Fletcher filed a motion 
for summary judgment against Ms. Soignier on June 15. 2009. Ms. Soignier filed a 
Motion to Strike Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment 
on August 6,2009. Hearing on both motions was held on August 10.2009, at which time 
the court took the matter under advisement. 
The judge assigned to the instant case in the district court was, before becoming a 
district judge. the magistrate judge assigned to hear the probate case involving the Estate 
of Zachary Cowan. 
FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE 
The following t~lcts are not in dispute, and are relevant to the motion for summary 
judgment: 
Zarhary Cowan \vas Mr. Fletcher's client. (Fletcher AfT ~r 2.) 
Mr. Fletcher drafted a Will for Mr. Cowan. (Fletcher AfT. ~ 2.) 
Mr. Cowan executed his Will on May 24, 2005. (Last Will and Testament of 
Zachary A. Cowan, Def.'s Ex. A, p. 3.) 
During his life time. Mr. Cowan was the beneficiary of the Leonarda A. Cowan 
Trust. (Leonarda A. Cowan Trust. P1.'s Ex. 1; Fletcher AfT. ~f 2.) 
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rhe Leonarda A. Cowan Trust terminated prior to \lr. C\man' s death. and the 
corpus of the trust \\as distributed to \1r. Cowan. (Leonarda A. (\man rrust. I>l.'s Ex. I. 
pp. 5. 8-9.) 
Clause Six of 0.1r. Cowan's \\'ill stated "all beneficial interests that I have in any 
trusts I give, bequeath. and devise to Mary Killings:' \vho is the Plaintiff in this action. 
(Last Will and Testament of Zachary A. Cowan, Dcf.'s Ex. A. p. J.) 
,\11'. Cowan died on October 20. 2006. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment. 
Pl.'s Ex. 3. p. 3: Fletcher Aff. ~f 7.) 
Mr. Cowan's Will was admitted to informal probate on November 3. 2006 in 
Cassia County. Idaho in case number CV -2006-1234. (Opinion Regarding Summary 
Judgment. PI.·s Ex. J. p. J: Fletcher Aff. f: 8.) 
At the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not possess any beneficial interests in any 
trusts. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment PI.'s Ex. J. p. 6; Fletcher AfT. ~r 12.) 
The Personal Representative of Mr. Cowan's estate proposed that the residue of 
the estate should be distributed to the American Cancer Society as directed by the terms 
of the Will. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment. PI. 's Ex. 3, p. 6; Fletcher AfT. ·r 
12.) 
Ms. Soignier appeared in the probate proceedings and contested the Personal 
Representative's proposed distribution of the estate. Neither Ms. Soignicr nor any other 
person objected to. or contested. the validity of the Will on any basis. including that Mr. 
Cmvan was incompetent or that he did not possess testamentary capacity at the time he 
signed the Will. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment PI. 's Ex. 3 p. I; Fletcher Aff. f: 
13.) Furthermore, there was no objection offered that the Will was improperly executed 
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by f\tr. Cowan. or that the Will '>'>as impruperly attested to by the witnesses to Mr. 
Cowan's slgnmg and acknowledgment of his Will. (Opinion Regarding Summary 
Judgment. PI.·s Ex. 3 p. 3: Fletcher Atr ~ 6.) 
Ms. Soignier objected to the proposed distribution of the estate on the grounds 
that the \\'ill was ambiguous on it's face regarding the beneficial interests in trusts. that 
lvlr. Cowan intended to make a gin to her in his Will. there tore the court should 
determine that the Will was ambiguous and permit parol evidence to be presented t()r the 
purpose of interpreting the Will. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment. PI.·s Ex, 3 p, 
6; Fletcher AtT. ~ 13.) 
The court issued a decision that rejected Mr. Soignier's claims and determined 
that the Will was not ambiguous on its face. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment, 
Pl.'s Ex. 3 pp. 8-12.) 
Ms. Soignier appealed the court's decision. (Fletcher AiT. ~ 15.) 
Prior to a decision in the appeal, Mr. Soignier entered into a settlement agreement 
and dismissed her appeal for consideration. (Fletcher Aff. fI 16.); (Stipulation for 
Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for Construction of 
Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal, DeC sEx. B p. 2.) 
SUMMARY .JUDGMENT STANDARDS 
Summary judgment is proper only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IRCP 56(<.:); Bonz 
V. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). 
When a court assesses a motion for summary judgment, all controverted t~lcts are 
to be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. G & Al Farms v. Funk 
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Irrigation ('0 .. 119 Idaho 514. 517. 808 P.~d 851 (1991): TlIsch Enter. v. ('oj/ill. 113 
Idaho }7, }lJ. 7 .. +0 P.~d IO~2 (1987). Likewise. all reasonable inkrences that can be 
drawn lj'OlTI the record must he drawn in the nOI1-movant's bvor. (j & .\1 Farms at 517: 
('Iarke I'. Prenger. 114 Idaho 766. 768. 760 P.~d 118~ ( 1(88); Sanders v. KUlla Joinr ,,'(11 
Dis!., 1~5lJaho 87~. 874. 876 P,2d 154 (CLApp,1994). 
The burden of proving the absence of an issue of material fact rests at all times 
upon the moving pm1y, .\[cCoy I'. Lyons. I ~O Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360 (1991); C; & 
J[ Farms at 517, 
Nevertheless. when a motion for summary judgment has been properly supported 
with evidence indicating the absence of material factual issues. the opposing party's case 
mllst not rest on mere speCUlation. and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create 
a genuine issue of tact. Jfc( 'oy at 769; G & Af Farms at 517. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of that party's pleadings," IRCP 56(e), Rather. the adverse party must set forth 
specific tacts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so 
respond, summary judgment. if appropriate. shall be entered against the adverse party. 
IRep 56(e), 
Evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must be admissible, Hecla JIining Co. v. Star-Morning ,\lining Co., 122 Idaho 
778, 785. 839 P,2d 1192 (1992). Supporting and opposing affidavits to summary 
judgment motions "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show at1im1atively that the affiant is 
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competent to testify to the matters stated therein." I Rep S()( e). This threshold question of 
admissibility of e\idence mllst be decided "before proceeding to the ultimate issue. 
whether summary judgment is appropriak." Ryan \'. Beisner. 123 Idaho -+2. -+5. X-l-l P.2d 
2-l. n (Ct.App. 1992). The general rule that all inferences are drawn in t~lvor of the non-
moving party dOL'S not apply to the initial question of admissibility. fie cia ,\lining Co. at 
]gS. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Motion to Strike 
Ms. Soignier tiled a I\lotion to Strike Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit in support of his 
!vlotion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, she objects to any statements in the 
affidavit that purport to recount statements made by Zachary Cowan to Mr. Fletcher. 
The Court finds that it is unnecessary to reach a decision on Ms. Soignier's 
l\10tion to Strike the Fletcher affidavit, for the reason that. as set forth below, the court 
has not based its summary judgment decision on any of the contested evidence protTered 
in the Fletcher af1idavit. 
B. Summary .Judgment 
A cause of action by a named beneficiary 111 a Will against the attorney who 
prepared the Will was recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Harrigleid v. Hancock. 
140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). The elements of such a legal malpractice 
negligence claim are: "(a) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (b) the 
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) failure to perf()ffTI the duty; and (d) the 
negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client." 
Id. at 136. This represents a very narrow departure from the general rule that an attorney 
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may haw liability for his or her negligence only to his or her client and not to a person 
with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship. Id. at 137. In the 
IimitL'd exception at issue here is the Supreme Court's determination that "an attornt'y 
preparing tt'stamentary instruments owes a duty to tht' benetkiaries named or identified 
thert'in to prepare such instruments "so as to etJectuate the testator's intent as expressed 
in the testamentary instruments:' ld. at 138. 
The undisputed material facts in this case lead the court to conclude as a matter of 
hnv, with respect to the first two elements of the cause of action, that to the extent 
recognized by Harrigjetd, there was an attorney-client relationship between Mr. Fletcher 
and Ms. Soignier that arose from Mr. Fletcher's preparation of Zachary Cowan's Will in 
which Mr. Soignier was a named beneficiary. Mr. Fletcher owed Ms. Soignier a duty as 
a result of this relationship. 
The next clement of the cause of action is whether this duty was breached. The 
court determines that the relevant material facts are undisputed and that these facts do not 
establish that Mr. Fletcher breached the professional duty he owed to Ms. Soignier. 
f{arrig(eld established a very narrow and limited cause of action, The Supreme 
Court discussed the parameters of this cause of action at length and in great detail. The 
Supreme Court very narrowly defined the scope of the attorney's duty to the beneficiary. 
The duty is "very limited" and "the attorney ... has no duty to see that the testator 
distributes his or her property among the named beneticiaries in any particular manner." 
lei. at 138-13(j. Furthermore. the Supreme Court stated that .. this extension of an 
attorney's duty will 110t subject attorneys to lawsuits by persons ... who simply did not 
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recei n.! in the testamentary instruments what they understood the testator had st;lted or 
indicated they would receive." Id at 139. 
The attorney's duty to a beneliciary named or identified in the instrument is: I) to 
prepare the testamentary instrument; and ::n if requested by the testator, to have the 
instrument properly executed so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the 
testamentary instrument. Id at 138 [emphasis addedj. The Supreme Court limited the 
means of ascertaining the testator's intent to a review of the testamentary instrument. 
which would not include any will, codicil or other instrument that had been revoked, 
meaning that only a validly executed instrument is to be examined. Id The Supreme 
Court determined that a person who has the mental capacity to make a valid "viII knows 
the names and identities of the persons who are the objects of his bounty, would also 
know whether or not such persons are included as beneficiaries under the testamentary 
instrument before executing them, and can understand how his or her property will be 
distributed under the testamentary documents. ld. 
The undisputed material facts and inferences establish that Zachary Cowan was 
competent to make his Will, that he possessed testamentary capacity, that he signed and 
declared the Will in the form in which it had been prepared by his attorney, Mr. Fletcher, 
that the witnesses to his Will attested to his competency and his declaration, and that the 
Will was valid and had legal etTect. As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, it is therefore 
presumed that the Will was as he wanted it to be. ld. at J 38. 
The relevant undisputed facts before the court do not establish a genuine dispute 
tbat the Will that Mr. Fletcher prepared in any way frustrated Zachary Cowan's intent, as 
Mr. Cowan's intent was expressed in Will. The facts do not establish a genuine dispute 
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that the preparation of the Will \vas negligent such that the instrument \vas invalid. It may 
\\ell be that Ms. Soignier did not receive a gift of \vhat she understood Zachary Cowan 
may have stated or othemise indicated that he would give to her. Ilowen:r, her 
expedation alone does not satist~ the Hurrigteld test regarding whether or not ~1r. 
Fletcher breached his duty to her. 
The court concludes as a matter of law that Mr. Fletcher did not breach his very 
narrow and limited duty to Ms. Soignier. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. Plaintitrs claim is dismissed. 
Counsel for the Defendant will please prepare an Order consistent with the 
foregoing and present the same to the court for signature. 
DATED thisriay of September, 2009. 
Michael R. Crabtree 
District Judge 
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Case No. CV 2009-517 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
The Court having granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing 
Plaintiffs claim against Defendant, 
Page 2 
i 
., 22 ii'" ... fl . ,; ,,:: '+ 
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE FOREGOrNG, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant W. Kent 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT - 1 000215 
0041880070 H'84930 1 
9/22/2009 10:55:27 AM Crystal Severson Troxell Page 3 
Fletcher. and that the claim of attorney malpractice against Defendant and the Complaint in its 
entirety, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. and with PlaintitTtaking nothing thereby. 
?z-d 
DA TED THIS '" day of September, 2009. 
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Michael R. Crabtree 
District Judge 
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Case No. CV 2009-517 
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF 
A TTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Defendant W Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis 
& Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this motion for his attorney fees and costs incurred in 
defending this matter. 
This motion is brought pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 58, and 
I.e. * J 2-120(3). 
The basis of this motion is that Defendant is the prevailing party, as per the Order and 
Judgment entered September 22,2009, and Plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 
00021.8 





This 1110tion is supported by the Affidavit of ~tichelle R. Points in Support of 
~1t.:morandllm of Costs and Attorney Fees and the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs 
and Attorney Fees, both filed concurrcntly herewith. 
DATED THIS ~fScPtembcr, 2009. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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Case No. CV 2009-517 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
A TTORNEY FEES 
Defendant W. Kent Fletcher ("Defendant"), by and through his attorneys of record, 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, submits this Memorandum in Support of his Motion for 
an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs in connection with his successful defense of this action. 
A. Background 
This is a legal malpractice action. Defendant Zachary Cowan was retained to perlorm 
professional legal services, as his attorney in the underlying case. In this case, Plaintiff alleged 
that Defendant committed an act of malpractice in drafting Mr. Cowans' Will. 
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On September 9, ::::009 this Court entered its Memorandum Decision Granting 
Defendant's Motion tt>r Summary Judgment and entered corollary Order and Judgment on 
September 22. ::::009, dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. For the purpose of an attorney fee and 
cost determination Defendant is the prevailing party. 
Defendant, through this motion, requests an a\vard of attorney fees and costs incurred in 
defending against Plaintiffs claims pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 as the prevailing party, and I.C. 
§ 12-120(3). as the prevailing party in a commercial transaction. 
B. Attorney Fees Must Be Awarded Under I.e. § 2-120(3). 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides a basis for an attorney fee award in this case. That 
statutory provision mandates a fee award in cases based on a "commercial transaction." Before 
the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in Blirnka v. My Web Wholesaler. LLC, 143 Idaho 
723,152 P.3d 592 (2007), however, section 12-120(3) had been interpreted not to apply in 
"commercial transaction" cases in which the theory of recovery was a tort theory. In Blirnka, the 
court overruled all prior decisions prohibiting fee awards in such cases. Id. One decision plainly 
overruled by Blimka, is Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991). There, 
the court refused to award fees under section 12-120(3) in a legal malpractice case simply 
because such a case is a tort case, "even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the 
malpractice was a 'commercial transaction.'" /d. There is no doubt that the Defendants' 
attorney-client relationship with Cady is a "commercial transaction." Accordingly, on its face, 
section 12-120(3) appl ies, and it mandates an award of attorney fees. 
In a recent attorney malpractice case, District Judge McLaughlin held that given the 
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Blimka. supra, an attorney fee award was appropriate under 
I.e. § 12-120(3). Judge McLaughlin's Decision (City of Me Call v. Burton. et al.) is attached 
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hereto as Exhibit A for the Court's review. Judge McLaughlin specifically held that a contract 
ft)r attorney sen ices was a commercial transaction, and, .. the fact that the contract was lor 
attornt.:y st.:nices. not any other service, Jot.:s not change the nature of the transaction into one for 
either personal services or houst.:hold services." Exhibit A, p. 5. 
~fore recently, District Judge Copsey also held that attorney fees are a\vardable under 
I.e. 12-120(3) to a prevailing party in an attorney malpractice case because the underlying action 
is based on an attorney-client relationship, a contract to perfonn professional services. A true 
and correct copy of Judge Copsey's decision (Cady v. Jones, et 01.) is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B. 
Given the clear applicability of I.e. § 12-120(3) to the facts of this case, and because 
Defendant is the prevailing party, attorney fees should be awarded to Defendant incurred in 
defending this action. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED THI~f September, 2009. 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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For Plaintiff: Alfen B. Ellis of Ellis, Brown & Sheils, Chartered and Jeffrey A. 
Strother of Strother Law Office for City of McCall 
For Defendants: Craig L. Meadows and Jason D. Scott of Hawley Troxell Ennis 
& Hawley LlP for Susan E. Buxton and Moore, Smith. Buxton & Turcke, 
Chartered 
Matthew L. Walters of Elam & Burke, P.A. for Wifliam A. McCurdy and Brassey. 
Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett 
PROCEEDINGS 
This matter came before the Court on September 18. 2007 upon the Plaintiff's 
Motion to Disallow Fees. Following oral argument by counsel the Court took the matter 
under advisement. 
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This litigation arises out of allegations of legal malpractice by the Defendants. 










the City of McCall during a course of events leading up to and throughout the litigation 
invoMng Employers Insurance of Wausau and the construction of a wastewater storage 
lagoon. As a result of this al/eged malpractice, the Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on 
May 3, 2006, filing a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. On June 15, 2006, the 
Plaintiff filed their First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. On November 
13.2006, Defendants William A. McCurdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett, 
filed their Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. And on 
> , 
November 14, 2006, Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore. Smith, Buxton & Turcke, 
13 Chartered filed their Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. 
14 Subsequently, on January 17, 2007, the Court entered an Order Denying 
15 Plaintiffs Motion to Hold Matter in Abeyance Pending Completion of Ninth Circuit· 
16 Appeal and Motion for Protective Order. The Defendants separately filed motions for 
17 summary judgment, which the Court granted on June 22, 2007. The Defendants 
18 






Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees on July 23, 2007. Also on July 23, 2007, the 
Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore, Smith. Buxton & Turcke fifed a Memorandum 
of Costs and Attorney Fees, which was followed by a Supplemental Memorandum 
asking for an additional $2,819.00. The Plaintiff fifed the present Motion to Disallow 
24 Attorney Fees on August 3, 2007. The Plaintiff also requested that the Court 
25 reconsider the original decision granting summary judgment and the Court issued a 
26 
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Memorandum Decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration. 
2 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
:1 The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants are not entitled to the attorney fees 












I. Attorney fees for civil actIon to recover In commercia' transaction 
A trial court may provide for attorney fees to the prevailing party when there is a 
nexus between the lawsuit and a commercial transaction, under Idaho Code § 12-
120(3). Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812 
(1995). A commercia' transaction is defined as any transaction that is not for 
"personal or household" purposes. Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
II. Attorney fees for claim defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation 
Under Idaho Code § 12-121, a trial court may award attorney fees to a 
prevailing party where it finds that the case was "brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Bums v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 
16 
17 486,65 P.3d 502,508 (2003). However. if any alternative legal basis can be found to 








Hanf v. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 370, 816 P.2d 320, 326 (1991). This 
determination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, but any such award "must 
be supported by findings and those findings, in tum, must be supported by the 
record." Sunshine Mining Co. v. Metropolitan Mines Corp., 111 Idaho 654, 659, 726 
P.2d 766, n1 (1986). 
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III. Attorney fees for party adverse to a state agency that did not act 
with a reasonable basIs In fact or raw 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides that if a state agency against whom the 
judgment is rendered acted 'Without a reasonable basis in fact or law," the prevailing 
party shall be awarded attorney fees. Idaho Code § 12-117(1}. 
DISCUSSION 
The fact that the Plaintiffs lawsuit is one in tort, rather than contract, does not 
mean that the lawsuit is not a "commercial transaction" under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-729. 152 P.3d 594, 599-600 
10 (2007). Prior to Blimka, the Idaho Supreme Court did not award attorney fees for 
11 professional malpractice cases because the theory of recovery was in tort. See Fuller 
12 v. Wolters, 119 fdaho 415,424-425,807 P.2d 633, 642-643 (1991). Since Fu/lerand 
13 
the cases that followed no longer bar recovery after Blimka, the only issue is whether a 
14 
contract to provide attorney services is a "commercial transaction." 
15 
16 
The Idaho Supreme Court has, in dicta, addressed this issue. In Fuller, the 
17 Court held that "an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and even though the 
18 underlying transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial transaction,' 
19 attorney fees under 12-120(3) are not authoriZed." Id. at 425, 807 P.2d at 643. This 
20 statement by the Court indicates that, had the Court been able to award attorney fees 
21 under the statute for a tort claim, the Court would have because the underlying 
22 
transaction - a contract for attorney services - was a commercial o"e. The Court has 
23 
articulated this same reasoning in other cases that follow Fuller. See B.g. Brooks v. 
24 
Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 79, 910 P.2d 744, 751 (1996). 
25 
26 
The Defendants are the prevailing parties in this action, which is not an issue 
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'that Plaintiff argues otherwise. The record demonstrates that this transaction is a 
contract for attorney services and therefore was a commercial transaction. The fact 
2 
3 that the contract was for legal services, rather than another type of services, does not 
4 change the nature of the transaction into one for either personal services or household 
5 services. Since the two requirements set forth in section 12-120(3) have been fulfilled, 








The Defendants have also argued that they are entitled to attorney fees under 
Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and 12-117. While the Court does not necessarily believe that 
this lawsuit was without foundation or without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the 
Court need not continue analysis under either sections 12-121 or 12-117 since attomey 
fees are both appropriate and required under section 12-120(3). 
The record does not reflect any objection to the amount of attorney fees or costs 
14 claimed by any of the Defendants. The Defendants William A. McCurdy and Brassey, 
15 Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett have asked for $58.00 in costs as a matter of right and 
16 $30,285.00 as reasonable attorney fees. The Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore, 
17 Smith, Buxton &' Turcke have asked for $58.00 in costs as a matter of right and 
18 









Defendant's counsel the Court finds that the attorney fees incurred by the Defendants 
were reasonable conSidering the time and labor involved in this litigation. The Court will 
award the Defendants these costs and reasonable attorney fees, as requested. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court will DENY the Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and will 
award the Defendants Wilfiam A. McCurdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett 
000229 





costs as a matter of right in the amount of $58.00 and reasonable attorney fees in the 
amount of $30,285.00. The Court will also award the Defendants Susan E. Buxton and 
Moore, Smith. Buxton & Turcke costs as a matter of right in the amount of $58.00 and· 
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $26,731.00. Counsel for the Defendant 
5 William McCurdy will prepare a judgment with an IRCP 54 (b) certification that comports 





















IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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:f I),~he( 
I hereby certify that on the L day of ~er 2007. I mailed (served) a 
3 
true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
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Ellis Brown & Sheils 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, 10 83701 
Jeffrey A. Strother 
Strother Law Office 
200 N. 4th St., Ste 30 
Boise, lD 83702 
Craig Meadows 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, 10 83701 
James D. laRue 
14 Elam & Burke 
P.O. Box 1539 












J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlC 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY ADA 
I 
I 
STEVEN P. CADY, et aI., 
Plaintiffs, Case No. CV OC-2007-13830 
vs. ORDER GRANTING COSTS AND 
ROR Y R. JONES, JONES, HESS, 
FURHMAN & EIDEN, P.A. 
Defendants. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
On July 10, 2008, the Court entered final judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' case with 
prejudice having granted summary judgment to Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, 
P.A. that same day. On July 17,2008, Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. timely 
filed their Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs as the prevailing party asking the Court to award 
attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3). The Plaintiffs never replied or opposed. The Court heard 
argument on August 21, 2008. The Plaintiffs did not appear. 
LR.C.P. 54(e)(6) states that "[a]ny objection to the allowance of attorney fees, or to the 
amount thereof, shaH be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as provided by Rule 
54(d)(6)." LR.C.P. 54(d){6) provides that "[a]ny party may object to the claimed costs of another 
party set forth in a memorandum of costs by filing and serving on adverse parties a motion to 
disallow part or all of such costs within ten days of service of the memorandum of costs .... 
Failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all 
objections to the costs claimed." 
By failing to respond at all or to appear at the oral argument, the Plaintiffs thereby waived 
their right to further contest the amount of the award of attorney fees. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) and 
54(d)(6); I.C. § 12-120(3); Conner v. Dake, 103 Idaho 761,653 P.2d 1173, (1982). The Court 
OOOZ32 
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notes that both the Defendants and the Plainti ffs clearly requested costs and attorney fees in their 
respective pleadings and that the Defendants requested attorney fees pursuant to I.e. § t 2- t 20(3). 
Based on the following, in an exercise of discretion, the Court awards $216.75 in non-
discretionary costs! and grants an award for attorney fees in the amount of $19, 144.50. The Court 
denies any award for discretionary costs because the Court does not find these costs 
ex traordinary. 2 
ANALYSIS 
In Idaho, parties pay their own attorney's fees unless a statute or contract provides 
otherwise. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 911 P.2d 133 (1996); Owner-Operator Independent 
Drivers v. Idaho Public Utilities Com 'n, 125 Idaho 401,871 P.2d 818 (1994); Matter of Estate of 
Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1994) (also called the "American Rule"). The 
party who claims attorney fees must present the Court either a statute or contract between the 
parties permitting such an award; if the party does not point the Court to a statute or contract, 
attorney fees may be denied. Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 74 P.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. moved for attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to I.C. §12-120(3), I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) and 54(e)(1). They cite to no other statutory 
authority in support of the requested fees. They further contend they are the prevailing parties and 
that the gravamen of the case was a commercial transaction making attorney's fees proper under 
I.e. § 12-120(3). 
I While the Defendants request an expert witness fee of $9.320.51 as a cost pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(I)(C), only 
expert witness fees may be awarded as a matter of right where the witness either testified at trial or in a deposition and 
the amount is limited to $2,000.00. I.R.C.P .. 54(d)( I )(C)(8) reads as follows: "Reasonable expert witness fees for 
an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an action not to exceed the sum of $2,000 for each expert 
witness for all appearances." (Emphasis added.) Since there is no evidence that Dennis Reinstein either testified at 
trial or in a deposition, the Defendants cannot get these costs as a matter of right. If the Defendants provide evidence 
that Reinstein testified, the Court will reconsider. 
2 Rule 54(d)(1 )(0) governs discretionary costs and provides in relevant part as follows: 
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph 
(C) {"Costs as a Matter of Right"], ron be allowed upon a show in" that said costs were netessary 
and exceptional coslS reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against 
the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon objettions to such discretionary costs contained in 
the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to why such s~cific item of discretionary 




The Court recognizes this issue as one of discretion. Although the costs may be reasonable and necessary. the Court 
cannot find that these are "exceptional" costs as contemplated by the Rule. 
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The PlaintifTs did not oppose. However, the fact that the Plaintiffs failed to timely object 
2 does not absolve the Court of its responsibility to independently review the legal basis for the 
3 attorney fee award or the amount of the award; whether a statute authorizes an award of fees is a 
4 question of law. See Security Pacific Bank of Idaho. FSB. v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 320, 847 P.2d 
5 1181, 1189 (Ct. App. 1993); Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho I, 713 P.2d 437 (Cl. App.1986); Fearless 
6 Farris Wholesale. Inc. v. Howell, 105 Idaho 699, 704,672 P.2d 577,582 (Ct. App. 1983).3 

























The Court finds Defendants are the prevailing parties. The determination as to which 
party, if any, prevailed is within the Court's discretion. Holmes, 125 Idaho at 787, 874 P.2d at 
598 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 450, 835 P.2d 677, 685 (Ct. 
App.1992». In determining whether there is a prevailing party, the Court first looks to the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(e)(1) incorporates Rule 54(d)(l)(8) which provides in part: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought' by the respective parties, whether there 
were multiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-
claims, or other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and the extent to 
which each party prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. 
See also Jerry J Joseph c.L. U Ins. Associates v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct. 
App.1990). 
The Plaintiffs prevailed on no issue, and the Court finds in an exercise of its discretion 
that Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. are the prevailing parties in this matter. 
3 In Fearless Farris, the court wrote as follows: 
Failure to timely object to a memorandum of costs and attorney fees constitutes a waiver of the right 
10 contest the requesting party's entitlement to the fees sought. Conner v. Dralce, 103 Idaho 761, 
653 P.2d 1173 (1982). This don nol me .. n lite trial COli" alltomatlcally mllst award tlte full 
IImount .rpec/flttd /11 Ihe memonmdllm. See Operating Engineers local Union ] 70 v. Goodwin 
Construction Co. of Blaclcfool. 104 Idaho 83, 656 P.2d 144 (el. App.1982). But it does mean [hat 
the party who fails to object has waived its right to contest any award within the amount sought. 
Therefore, we hold that, having failed to object to Fearless Farris' memorandum in support of an 
award of attorney fees, [he Howells cannot now be heard to complain either concerning the fonn of 
the request or [hat the court erred in failing to make a written finding as to the basis and reasons for 
awarding such fees to Fearless Farris. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The Court therefore finds they are entitled to a reasonable award of attorney's fees provided a 
2 statute applies to its request. 







I.e. § 12-120(3) provides that the prevailing party in an action based upon "any 
commercial transaction" is entitled to recover attorney fees. The statute defines "commercial 
9 
transaction" as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." The test 
for the application of this section is "whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen 
of the lawsuit, that is, whether the commercial transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes 
the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 776, 
890 P.2d 714, 717 (1995). The term "commercial transaction" is defined in I.e. §12-120(3) to 
mean "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Thus, by the 
plain terms of the statute, "[ w Jhere a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a 
type embraced by section 12-120(3), ... that claim triggers the application of the statute." 
Continental Casualty, 127 Idaho 835, 907 P.2d 812. However, there must also be a nexus 






















[T]he award of attorney's fees [under § 12-120(3) J is not warranted every time a 
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is 
whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. 
Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.e. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party 
is attempting to recover. 
/d. (quoting Brower v. E.l DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 
(1990». This case is a legal malpractice case. 
In Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991), the Idaho Supreme Court 
decided "that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and even though the underlying 
transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial transaction,' attorney fees under 
12-120(3) are not authorized." Id. at 425, 807 P.2d at 643. The Fuller court ruled that "under our 
present statute, 'tort actions are essentially actions in which the parties bear their own attorney's 
fees, regardless of [who J prevail( ed}. '" Id. The Fuller rule has been continuously applied to 
reject claims for attorney fee awards in legal malpractice actions. See Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho 
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897,901. 980 P,2d 561, 565 (1999); Smith v, David S Shurtleff & Assoc., 124 Idaho 239,858 
2 P.2d 778 (Ct. App.1993). 
3 The Defendants cite the recent Supreme Court case, Blimlca v. My Web 1f1zolesaler. LLC. 






between them and the Plaintiffs is a commercial transaction, attorney fees are authorized. 
However, a close reading of Blimlca and its recent progeny suggests otherwise. In Blimlca. the 
fraud arose in the commercial transaction itself. In Blimlca. the Supreme Court observed that I.e. 
§ 12-120(3) does not prohibit attorney fees for commercial transactions involving tortious conduct 
when "the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which 
the party is attempting to recover." Id at 728,152 P.3d at 599 (quoting Brower v. £1 DuPont De 
Nemours & Co .. 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990) (emphasis added». In this case, 
the commercial transaction, the parties' attorney client relationship, is integral to the Plaintiffs' 






















The Supreme Court's recent reading of Blimka in Lee v. Nickerson, _Idaho_,189 PJd 
(2008) suggests that where the nexus of the claim even where it sounds in tort is the relevant 
inquiry.4 In Lee, the Nickersons hired Lee to construct a level bam pad and do some work on a 
pond on their property. Lee filed suit against the Nickersons. Lee's complaint contained claims 
of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and implied contract. Lee also filed a $20,000 tort claim 
based on the Nickersons' alleged refusal to allow Lee to retrieve his equipment left on the 
Nickerson's property. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Nickersons after a jury 
trial. On the question of attorney fees, the district court stated that I.C. §12-120(3) did not entitle 
the Nickersons to attorney fees on the tort claim. Based on its reading of Blimka, the Idaho 
Supreme Court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees and held that the Nickersons 
were entitled to reasonable attorney fees relating to their defense of Lee's tort claim. The 
Supreme Court stated that the commercial transaction, the parties' contract, initiated the presence 
afLee's equipment on the Nickerson's property and was integral to Lee's claim. 
4 The Court recognizes that the Honorable Judge Michael Mclaughlin's decision awarding attorney fees in City uf 
M(..~all v. Buxton, et a/., (a legal malpractice case) is currently on appeal. 
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Lee seems to create a "but for" standard for determining whether a civil action is "to 
2 recover ... in any commercial transaction" for purposes of I.e. § 12-120(3). In other words, but 
3 for the contract or commercial transaction between Lee and the Nickersons, Lee's equipment 
4 would not have been on the Nickersons' property and no tort could have been committed. Under 
5 this standard, most, if not all, legal malpractice claims would faU within the scope of I.c. § 12-
6 120(3) since legal malpractice can only occur where the parties have entered into an attorney-
7 client relationship, which most often involves a contract or commercial transaction. In short, Lee 
8 greatly expands the scope of I.e. § 12-120(3). 
9 In this case, the commercial transaction, the contract or attorney-client relationship 
10 between the parties, gave rise to the attorney's duties and obligations to his client. But for the 
I 1 underlying contract, no legal malpractice could have occurred. Therefore, Plaintiffs were seeking 
I 2 recovery of damages sustained as a result of a commercial transaction and the prevailing parties, 
13 the Defendants, are entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
14 The Court finds there was such a nexus. Clearly, the contractual relationship was central 
15 to all the Plaintiffs' claims and attorney fees are awardable. 
16 C. ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF 519,144.50 ARE REASONABLE. 
17 The Defendants sought an award of 519,144.50 in attorney fees. Determining whether the 
18 amount of an attorney fee award is reasonable is within the Court's sound discretion. P.o. 
19 Ventures. Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 159 P.3d 870 (2007); Craft 
20 Wall of Idaho. Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 701 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1985). What 
21 constitutes a reasonable fee is controlled by the criteria of I.R.C.P. 54{e)(3). See Sanders v. 
22 Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000); Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 876, 81 I 
23 P.2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1991). "These factors are applicable wherever they would not conflict with 
24 the contract or statute upon which the award is based. See Rule 54(e)(8)." Banlc of Idaho v. 
25 Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 326, 647 P.2d 776, 782 (Ct. App. 1982). 
26 The Court is "permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by 
27 the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the 
28 attorney." Craft Wall, I 08 Idaho at 705-706, 701 P.2d at 325. In this case, Cady does not contest 
29 
30 
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the reasonableness of the claimed attorney fees and, in fact, waived any objection to the amount. 
However, the Court independently examined the bills. 
The Court finds that fees charged by each individual attorney given their respective 
experience and the prevailing fees for similarly experienced attorneys are reasonable. The Court 
further finds that the number of hours claimed are reasonable. 
After considering all the factors listed in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3), the Court finds, in its 
discretion, attorney's fees in the total amount of $19,144.50 are reasonable fees and awards the 
Defendants $19,144.50 in attorney fees. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Rory R. Jones and Jones, Hess, Furhrnan 
& Eiden, P.A's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees is hereby GRANTED and Rory R. Jones and 
Jones, Hess, Furhrnan & Eiden, P.A. are awarded attorney's fees in the amount of$19,144.50 and 
costs as a matter of right in the amount of $216. 75. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 11 th day of September 2008. 
District Judge 
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2 CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING 
3 
I hereby certify that on this Jl-day of September 2008, I mailed (served) a true and 
4 
5 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
6 CHRIST T. TROUPIS 
7 TROUPIS LA W OFFICE 






EAGLE, IDAHO 83616-9116 
R. BRAD MASINGILL 
P.O. BOX 467 
WEISER, IDAHO 83672 
CRAIG L. MEADOWS 
MICHELLE R. POINTS 13 
14 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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1. DAVID NA V ARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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Michelle R. Points, ISH No. 622.t 
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P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlTNTY OF CASSIA 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CV 2009-517 
AFFIDA VIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS 
SETTING FORTH MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Michelle R. Points, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
I. Affiant. I am an attorney with the law tirm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
LLP, which represents Defendant W. Kent Fletcher in this action. I am licensed to practice law 
in the state of Idaho. This aftidavit is submitted in support of Defendant's motion for attorney 
fees and costs, filed concurrently herewith. It is intended to comply with provisions of Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54, including but not limited to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5) 
and 5.t( e)( 5). 
000240 
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Basis of Affidavit. The matt.:rs set forth in this aftidavit are bas.:d upon my 
personal knowledge, the work records of my law tirnl, and a review of those records made by me 
and other persons with knowl.:dge. The records w.:re mad.: contemporaneously with the events 
set t(xth in the records, were made in the ordinary course, and were regularly kept by llawley 
Troxell Ennis & I lawley LLP. counsel tor Plaintiff. 
3. Fees and Costs Claimed. Accompanying this affidavit is Exhibit A, which 
itemizes the requested attorney's fees and costs, organized in a manner which details the nature 
and amount of attorney's fees and costs sought by Defendant, based upon Defendant having 
successfully defended against all claims asserted by Plaintiff I am familiar with the fact of, and 
the necessity for, such attorney's fees and costs having been incurred in this case. Such fees and 
costs were actually, necessarily, and reasonably incurred. To the best of my knO\vledge and 
belief, the items are correct and the costs claimed are in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(5). The attorney's fees claimed are for work actually performed in this action 
and represent time which relates to Plaintiff against whom Defendant seeks recovery of fees and 
costs. The costs are claimed in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l). 
Defendant is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as Defendant is the 
prevailing party in this case, the underlying case of which was a commercial transaction. 
4. Parties Against Whom Defendant Claims Fees and Costs. Defendant W. Kent 
Fletcher seeks recovery of fees and costs from Plaintitf Mary Killins Soignicr. 
5. Basis for Claim ft.gainst Plaintiff The basis for Defendant's claim arises from 
this Court's finding that Defendant is the prevailing party in the Order and Judgment entered 
September 22,2009. 
000241. 
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6. Fa,-=tors Supporting the Reasonableness of Ddl:ndant's CI~lim for Attornev Fees. 
Factors that the Cnurt should consider in determining the reasonableness of Defendant's claim 
tt)r attorney fees are set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)(3). Those factors arc 
individually di~ussed in the follmving paragraphs of this affidavit. 
7. The Time and Labor Required. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3 )(:\) 
provides that the Court shall consider the time and labor required. There were several 
characteristics about this case which required substantial time and labor in order to fully and 
fairly pursue and obtain Defendant's complete defense in this case. In addition, thorough 
evaluation of client documents, Court filings, as vvell as applicable law vvas required. 
8. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(e)(3)(8) provides that the Court shall consider the novelty and difficulty orthe questions. As 
discussed in the previous paragraph, it was necessary to review voluminous documents and 
research applicable law to evaluate the case and craft a successful Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
9. The Skill, Experience and Abilitv of the Attorney. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(e)(3)(C) provides that the Court shall consider the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly and the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular tield of law. The lawyers 
primarily involved in this case are: Craig Meadows, IS8 No. 1081, Partner, and myself, 
Mi,-=helle R Points, IS8 No. 6224, Associate. Mr. Meadows and I have the requisite skill and 
experience to properly and efficiently handle this case. 
10. The Prevailing Charges. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(D) provides that 
the Court shall consider the prevailing charges for like work. Throughout the course of this 
00024.2 
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litigation. I bdic\e that the charges billed for lawyers and litigation assistance staff have been at 
[he prevailing charges for like work. 
11. l\IandatoryJ.:Qsts. 1\tandatory costs, as outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54( d)( J )( C) are as follows: 
I.R.C.P 54(d)( I )(C)( I) Court tiling fees: $ 58.00 
12. Discretionarv Costs. Discretionary costs, as outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(l )(0) are as follows: 
Photocopies (at 18¢/pg): 





13. Factors Supporting the Reasonableness of Defendant's Claim for Costs. 
Defendant is claiming costs as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(I)(C), and discretionary costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D). The 
date set forth to each cost, on the exhibit attached hereto, is the date the cost was posted to the 
accounting records of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and not necessarily the date the 
cost was incurred. 
SUMMARY OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED: 
Attorney fees 
Mandatory costs (LR.C.P 54(d)(J )(C) 
Discretionary costs (I.R.C.P 54(d)(I)(0) 
Total 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this ~~day of September, 2009. 
~ina Slegers 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at N4mf'tA. , Idaho 
My commission expires Jut1(. II ~ 2015'" 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CER nFY that on thi~SePtember, :::009, I caused to be sened a 
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDA VIT OF MICI fELLE R. POINTS SETTING FORTll 
MEMORANDUrv1 OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES by the method indicated below. and 
addressed to each of the follO\ving: 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BRO\VN & Sf fElLS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff1 
Jeffrey A. Strother 
STROTHER LA W OFFICE 
200 N. Fourth Street, Suite 30 
Boise, ID 83702 
[Attorneys for Plaintiffj 
000245 
/u.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
V'" U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 
AFFIDA VIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS SETTING FORTH MEMORANDUM 
OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 6 
04188007016725051 
Date Initials Hours 
4/3/2009 CLM 3 5 
4/3/2009 MPOI 08 
4/6/2009 CLM 04 
4/6/2009 MPOI 1 5 
4/7/2009 MPOI 1.5 
4/8/2009 MPOI 0.8 
4/9/2009 ClM 02 
4/9/2009 MPOI 0.3 
4/10/2009 MPOI 0.5 
4/15/2009 MPOI 0.3 
4/16/2009 MPOI 1 3 
FEES FOR 4188-070 
Amount Description 
61250 E-mail wIth attachments from J Ries, review 
letter from K. Fletcher; revIew complaint 
with attachments. telephone call wIth J 
Ries, telephone conference with K Fletcher; 
review Idaho Supreme Court case on duty owed 
to beneficiary by scrivener of will; e-mail 
to J. Ries; telephone call with A Ellis. 
11600 Conference with C Meadows re factual history 
of claims and e-mail exchanges with client re 
same; research most recent Supreme Court 
decisions re statute of limitation and "some 
damage" rule. 
70.00 Receipt of acknowledgement of service from A 
Ellis; conference with M. POints re 
stipulation to move matter to Cassia County. 
217.50 Create caption and draft stipulation and 
order re change of venue; call to court re 
assigned judge; review civil rule for 
provision for transfer outside of judicial 
district; review recent cases on standing and 
statute of limitation issues. 
217.50 Draft answer with affirmative defenses 
responsive to Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial. 
116.00 Final edits to answer and forward to clients 
for review; brief conference with C. Meadows 
re additional affirmative defenses. 
35.00 E-mail from K Fletcher; e-mail to K. 
Fletcher regarding documents to be copied. 
43.50 Review and execute stipulation for change of 
venue and final edits to answer, both for 
filing today. 
72 50 Brief review of client file; exchange calls 
with court clerk re check for change of venue 
to Cassia County. 
43 50 Draft amended complaint to include citation to 
applicable statute of limitation; exchange 
e-mails with client re case file. 
188.50 Identify potential estoppel issue re 
Plaintiffs settlement of claim with American 








4/17/2009 MPOI 02 
4/22/2009 MPOI 0.2 
4/27/2009 MPOI 0.8 
4/28/2009 MPOI 0.5 
4/29/2009 MPOI 0.7 
5/11/2009 MPOI 1.3 
5/13/2009 MPOI 0.8 
5/13/2009 DBRO 0.4 
5/14/2009 MPOI 0.3 
5/18/2009 MPOI 0.2 
5/19/2009 DBRO 0.2 
5/20/2009 MPOI 1.3 
5/21/2009 MPOI 0.3 
5/27/2009 MPOI 03 
5/27/2009 MODO 2.6 
FEES FOR 4188-070 
K. Fletcher. 
29.00 Call from court clerk in Cassia County re 
change of venue issues and filing of answer. 
29.00 Review exhibits to deposition of K. Fletcher. 
116.00 Finish review of clients deposition and 
exhibits and outline potential summary 
judgment motion. 
72.50 Begin review of deposition of Stephen 
Westfall. 
101 50 Continue to review deposition of S. Westfall. 
188.50 Continue to review client file and outline 
potential issues. 
116.00 Exchange e-mails with client re documents and 
pleadings from underlying case; brief 
research re Idaho cases on relevant duty 
issues. 
22.00 Retrieve docket; edit docket for speCific 
document requests and supply to Clerk of the 
Court for processing. 
43.50 Review stipulation re settlement of 
underlying case and brief conference with C. 
Meadows re the same. 
~v11l . 
29.00 Follow up with D. Brown re obtaining ~ t 6\'SSi",-
County records. 
1100 Receive documents from Court, copy, supply 
set to M. Points. Draft and Finalize Letter 
to Clerk with Payment and Mail. 
188.50 Review underlying will contest pleadings from 
Cassia County. 
43.50 Draft e-mail to N. Trammel re research on 
issues of duty and statute of limitation 
regarding Plaintiffs. claims. 
43.50 Conference with M. O'Dowd re research on 
statute of limitation and duty issues; 
research case law re estoppel argument. 
32500 Read and review project assignment from M. 
Points regarding attorney malpractice case 
2 000247 1666420_1.XLS 
5/28/2009 MODO 31 
5/28/2009 MPOI 15 
5/29/2009 MODO 3 
5/31/2009 MODO 2.4 
6/1/2009 MPOI 0.3 
6/1/2009 MODO 7.7 
6/2/2009 MODO 2.8 
6/2/2009 MPOI 1.8 
6/3/2009 MPOI 1.7 
6/7/2009 MPOI 0.2 
6/11/2009 MPOI 04 
6/12/2009 MPOI 0.8 
FEES FOR 4188-010 
including complaint, will and will construction 
opinion e-mail M points regarding research; 
find and print recent Idaho cases regarding 
statute of limitations for attorney 
malpractice; meeting with M. Points regarding 
project 
38750 Telephone call with reference attorney at 
Westlaw; research caselaw regarding duty to 
third party beneficiaries; read and review 
caselaw regarding statute of limitations. 
217.50 Draft motion for summary judgment and begin 
draft of memorandum and affidavit of K. 
Fletcher in support of motion. 
37500 Drafting argument outline for statute of 
limitations issue. 
300.00 Drafting statute of limitations section of 
motion for summary judgment brief. 
43.50 Draft e-mail to client re issues for 
potential motion for summary judgment 
962.50 Complete drafting argument section for 
statute of limitations; draft argument 
section for breach of duty owed to named 
beneficiaries in testamentary documents. 
350.00 Finish draft of brief; review and make 
corrections suggested by 8. Smethers; meeting 
with M. Points. 
261.00 Meet with M. O'Dowd re research on issues for 
motion for summary judgment; continue to 
draft motion and memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment 
246.50 Continue to draft and edit all pleadings in 
support of motion for summary judgment. 
29.00 Exchange e-mails with client re motion for 
summary judgment. 
58.00 Exchange e-mails with client re motion for 
summary judgment and issues re deposition; 
e-mail J. Ries re the same. 
116.00 Call to court clerk re hearing on motion for 
summary judgment and draft notice of hearing; 
edit memorandum to reflect changes in client 
3 00024.8 1666420_1XLS 
6/30/2009 MPOI 04 
7/212009 MPOI 03 
7/16/2009 CLM 0.5 
7/16/2009 MPOI 1.2 
7/21/2009 MPOI 0.3 
7/21/2009 ClM 
7/21/2009 CWAM 2.3 
7/22/2009 CWAM 5 
7/27/2009 CLM 1 4 
7/28/2009 ClM 2 
7/28/2009 MPOI 1 5 
FEES FOR 4188-070 
affidavit; finalize all pleadings and 
exhibits for fili~g today. 
58 00 Review motion and proposed order on motion to 
disqualify Judge Crabtree; exchange e-mails 
with client re same and related matters. 
4350 Review pleading from counsel vacating motion 
to disqualify and forward the same to client; 
review notice of hearing on motion 
87.50 Telephone call from A Ellis; e-mail from A 
Ellis; conference with M. Points on issues 
raised by A Ellis in response to motion for 
summary Judgment and production of K. 
Fletcher's will file. 
174 00 Call from counsel for Plaintiff re deposition 
of client and related 56{f) motion; 
conference with C. Meadows and calls with 
client re the same; review of client file in 
anticipation of providing file to counsel for 
Plaintiff and call to the same re arranging a 
time for inspection. 
43.50 Brief conference with A Ellis ra client 
file; draft e-mail to client re case status 
and related matters. 
175.00 Conference with A Ellis; produce K. Fletcher 
documents to A Ellis; arrange for copying of 
K. Fletcher documents; conference with M. 
Points. 
218.50 Scan, process, bates number documents 
electronically in preparation for production. 
47500 Continue to bates number documents 
electronically in preparation for production. 
245.00 Receipt and review of Reply Memorandum, 
Affidavit and exhibits in response to Motion 
for Summary Judgment; e-mail materials to M. 
Points; e-mail to K. Fletcher. 
350.00 Research issues raised by Response Memorandum; 
review of will for Cowan; e-mail research 
issues and thoughts to M. Points on motion for 
summary judgment. 
217. 50 Review and outline opposition of Plaintiff to 
motion for summary judgment. 
4 000249 
FEES FOR 4188-070 
7/29/2009 MPOI 22 319 00 Begin draft of reply bnef or. motion for 
summary judgment. 
7/30/2009 MPOI 32 464 00 Continue to draft reply to plaintiffs 
opposition to motion to summary Judgment 
7/30/2009 ClM 23 402 50 E-mail from M. Paints. review and revise 
Reply Memorandum on Motion for Summary 
Judgment; forward to K Fletcher and file 
with Court. 
8/412009 MPOI 0.3 4350 Follow-up on service and filing of reply 
brief and review association of counsel 
8/5/2009 MPOI 0.3 43.50 Conference with C Meadows re argument in 
motion for summary judgment 
8/7/2009 MPOI 09 130.50 Prepare materials for upcoming motion for 
summary judgment and outline argument motion 
to strike client's affidavit; conference with 
C. Meadows re the same. 
8/9/2009 MPOI 0.9 130.50 Prepare for hearing on motion for summary 
judgment 
8/10/2009 MPOI 4.2 609.00 Travel to Burley, continue to prepare for 
hearing, meet with client and argue motion 
for summary judgment to Judge Crabtree. 
9/11/2009 MPOI 0.6 87.00 Review decision on motion for summary 
jUdgment; exchange calls and e-mails with 
client and J. Ries re the same. 
9/14/2009 MPOI 0.4 58.00 Exchange e-mails with J. Ries and client re 
potential motion for attorney fees and 
settlement issues. 
9/16/2009 MPOI 0.3 43.50 Draft e-mail to counsel for Plaintiff re 
proposed settlement of case re waiver of fee 
motion for agreement to not appeal recent 
motion for summary judgment decision. 
9/22/2009 MPOI 0.4 58.00 Call from judge's clerk re order and judgment 
re decision on motion for summary judgment; 
draft same. 
TOTALS 78.8 10914.00 
5 000250 1666420_1XLS 
COSTS FOR 4188-0070 
Date Initials Qty. Rate Amount Description 
4/6/2009 HTEH 2 o 18 036 COPYING USER-=454 UNIT-=13 TIME=12 00 PAGES:::2 
4/9/2009 MPOI 1 58 58 CLIENT CHARGES - ADA COUNTY CLERK Filing fee 
for Answer 
419/2009 HTEH 24 018 432 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME:11 32 PAGES=24 
4/10/2009 MPOI 9 9 CLIENT CHARGES - CASSIA COUNTY Fee for transfer 
of venue to Cassia County 
4/15/2009 HTEH 557 0.18 100.26 COPYING USER:::111 UNIT=11 TIME=0803 PAGES=557 
4/15/2009 HTEH 322 0.18 5796 COPYING USER:::111 UNIT=9 TIME=0838 PAGES=322 
4/15/2009 HTEH 499 0.18 89.82 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=11 TIME=0857 PAGES=499 
4/15/2009 HTEH 65 0.18 117 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=15:18 PAGES=65 
4/15/2009 HTEH 14 0.18 2.52 COPYING USER=454 UNIT=13 TIME=1523 PAGES=14 
4/16/2009 HTEH 6 0.18 1.08 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=10:59 PAGES=6 
4/16/2009 HTEH 6 0.18 108 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=11:08 PAGES=6 
4/17/2009 HTEH 46 0.18 8.28 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=10:54 PAGES=46 
4/23/2009 HTEH 1 4 4 MESSENGER 
4/28/2009 HTEH 40 0.18 7.2 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=16:01 PAGES=40 
5/4/2009 HTEH 1 0.18 0.18 COPYING USER=401 UNIT=13 TIME=15:47 PAGES=1 
5/13/2009 HTEH 224 0.18 4032 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=9 TIME=1327 PAGES=224 
5/19/2009 DBRO 288 288 CLIENT CHARGES - CLERK OF THE COURT For Records 
of the docket of Zachary A Cowan 
5/19/2009 HTEH 578 0.18 104.04 COPYING USER=474 UNIT=11 TIME=10:15 PAGES=578 
5/19/2009 HTEH 3 o 18 0.54 COPYING USER=474 UNIT=13 TIME=1439 PAGES=3 
5/21/2009 HTEH 22 0.18 396 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=12:31 PAGES=22 
5/27/2009 HTEH 31 0.18 558 COPYING USER=111 UNIT:::13 TIME=17.18 PAGES=31 
5/27/2009 MODO 1 133.74 133.74 COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH WESTLAW 
RESEARCH. 




COSTS FOR 4188-0070 
5/28/2009 MODO 74.14 74.14 COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH WESTLAW 
RESEARCH. 
6/2/2009 HTEH 3 018 054 COPYING USER=401 UNIT=13 TIME=1049 PAGES=3 
6/5/2009 MPOI 1 21 36 21 36 COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH WESTlAW 
RESEARCH. 
6/12/2009 HTEH 3 018 054 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=10 36 PAGES=3 
6/12/2009 HTEH 90 0.18 16.2 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=16.08 PAGES=90 
6/16/2009 HTEH 2 0.18 036 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=13.34 PAGES=2 
7/2/2009 HTEH 2 0.18 036 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=1355 PAGES=2 
7/30/2009 HTEH 75 0.18 13.5 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=1516 PAGES=75 
8/7/2009 HTEH 15 0.18 2.7 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=09:59 PAGES=15 
8/7/2009 MPOI 13.68 1368 COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH WESTLAW 
RESEARCH. 
8/28/2009 MPOI 1 93.5 93.5 OUT-OF-TOWN TRAVEL- MICHELLE POINTS 
Reimbursement for mileage to Burley, 10 for 
Motion hearing on 8/10109 (Miles 170) 
8/31/2009 HTEH 1 4 4 MESSENGER 






Craig L. Meado\',s, ISB No. 108! 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 16J 7 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
ley Troxell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF ruE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE Cor:rF CASSIA 
MARY KILL INS SOIGNIER., ) II ; i 
) Case No. CV 2009 .. S 17 
Plaintiff, ) 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
vs. ) 
) 




TO: ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-named Defendant will call up for hearing his 
Pa.ge 2 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs on the 25th day of November, 2009, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may be heard, at the Cassia County Courthouse. before the Honorable 
Michael R. Crabtree Burley. Idaho. 
! j 
The parties have stipulated to conduO! thehearing telePhOnitrIY; I 
I 
I 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
000253 04183 0010 1681'22.1 
~~y6~al Severson ley Troxell Page 3 
DATED THIS 1-!;;.y of October. 2009. 
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP 
NOTICE OF HEARING· 2 
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_ -- ~ _ ... """...,,,. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREB Y CER TIFY that on thiS"J!!;;; of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
I..'opy of the foregoing :.10 liCE OF HEARfNG by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
ea\:h of the following: 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS. BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P,O. Box 388 
Boise, 10 83701-0388 
[Attorneys for Plaintifi] 
Jeffrey A. Strother 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
200 N. Fourth Street. Suite 30 
Boise, 10 83702 
[Attorneys for Plaintifi] 
;\OTICF OF HEARJ~G - 3 
__ U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
---:;7 Telecopy: 208.345.9564 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail L Telecop~: 208.342.2429 
, I f, 
, ( I 




ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
A ttorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
JEFFREY A. STROTIfER 
STROTHER LA W OFFICE 
200 North 4th Street, Suite 30 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone) 
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 2014 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
, , j ' 
~ .. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 












Case No. CV 2009-517 
MOTION TO DISALLOW 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Comes now the plaintiff, through her attorneys of record, and moves the Court for an 
order disallowing a portion of defendant's claimed costs and the entirety of the claimed attorney 
~013/015 
1 
fees set forth in defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees and 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND A TIORNEY FEES - I 
000259 
~014/015 
supporting affidavit. both dated September 30, 2009. This motion is made upon the following 
grounds: 
(1 ) Plaintiff s complaint is not based upon a contract with the defendant nor is it based 
upon a "commercial transaction" with defendant. Accordingly, I.e. § 12-120(3) does not entitle 
defendant to attorney fees. 
(2) Unlike City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), the underlying 
matter here, in which the alleged malpractice occurred, was not a commercial matter. 
(3) Even if this action is deemed to arise from a commercial transaction, the commercial 
transaction is not essential or integral to plaintiffs cause of action. 
(4) Portions of defendant's claimed attorney fees are service fees for work which may 
have been performed by persons who are not licensed attorneys; and 
(5) With respect to the claimed discretionruy costs, defendant has failed to demonstrate 
that these costs were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred" and "in the interest 
of justice be assessed against" the plaintiffhere. See Rule 54(d)(1)(D), LR.C.P. 
This motion is based upon the Memorandum of Law filed herewith, the pleadings and 
records in this action, and such other oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the 
hearing. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2009. 
AllenB.EC_ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND A TIORNEY FEES - 2 
000260 
12I0l5/0l5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13th day of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following; 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
-X- Facsimile 
954-5238 
Boise, Idaho 83701-J 617 
~~ A11enB~S 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 3 
000261. 
ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, fdaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345·7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
JEFFREY A. STROTHER 
STROTHER LA W OFFICE 
200 North 4tll Street, Suite 30 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone) 
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 2014 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
,r I i 
tIl 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA 
Mary Killins Soignier, 
Plaintiff, 












Case No. CV 2009-517 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISALLOW 
COSTS AND A TIORNEY FEES 
~005/015 
Basis of motion: Defendant's claimed attorney fees should be disallowed for each of the 
following reasons: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND A TIORNEY FEES - 1 
000262 
t4n006/015 
(I) Plaintitrs complaint is not based upon a contract with the defendant; nor is it based upon 
a "commercial transaction" with defendant. Accordingly, 1. C. § 12-120(3) does not entitle defendant 
to attorney fees. 
(2) Unlike City of McCall v. Bux/on, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), this action does 
arise from a commercial matter. 
(3) Even if this action is deemed to arise from a commercial transaction, the commercial 
transaction is not essential or integral to plaintiff's cause of action. 
(4) A portion of defendant's claimed attorney fees are service fees for work performed by 
non-attorneys; and 
(5) With respect to the claimed discretionary costs, defendant has failed to demonstrate that 
these costs were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred" and "in the interest of justice 
be assessed against" the plaintiff here. See Rule 54(dXl)(D), I.R.C.P. 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFf DID NOT ENTER INTO A CONTRACT OR 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION WITH DEFENDANT. DEFENDANT IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO ATIOR1%YFEES UNDERIDAHQ CODE §12-120(3) 
Plaintiff's status in this matter is as a named beneficiary in the Will of Zachary Cowan. She 
never enjoyed an attorney/relationship with the defendant Fletcher. The duty owed to plaintiff 
Soignier arose out of the common law as articulated in Harrigfold \I. Hancock, not out of an 
attorney/client relationship with defendant: 
Considering these factors we hold that an attorney preparing 
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or 
identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the 
testator to have them properly executed, so as to effectuate the 
testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments. 
Harrigfoldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138, 90P.3d 884 (2004) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND A TIORNEY FEES· 2 
000263 
lal001/015 
This duty was identified by the Court in its Memorandum Decision (p. 7). 
Because the plaintiff and defendant never entered into a contract or commercial transaction. 
Idaho Code §12·120(3) is simply not applicabJe: "In any civil action to recover on a 
contract . . . and in any commercial transaction . . . the prevailing party shall be allowed 
a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." The statute 
requires that there be a contract or commercial transaction. City of McCall v. Buxton, supra. In this 
case there were no dealings whatsoever between the parties, commercial or otherwise. 
Plaintiff's "civil action" against defendant is based upon the common law duty articulated 
in Harrigfe/d, not upon a "contract" or upon a "commercial transaction". Accordingly, defendant, 
as prevailing party, has no entitlement to attorney fees. 
held: 
AS DISTINGYISijED FROM CITY OF MCCAll v BUXTON, 
TIIE l.lNQE~ YING MATTER HERE WAS NOr A COMMERCIAL MAmR 
City 0/ McCall overruled Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991). Fuller 
We now hold that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and 
even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the 
malpractice was a "commercial transaction", attorney fees under 
12-120(3) are not authorized. 
Id 119 Idaho at 425. 
The City o/McCali case does not hold that all actions for legal malpractice qualify as actions 
to enforce a "commercial transaction". Notably the defendant in his brief eschews reference to the 
Supreme Court's language in the City o/McCall but references the district court's statement, which 
is !lQ1 the holding in City of McCall: "The record demonstrates that this transaction is a contract for 
attorney services and therefore was a commercial transaction". See Exhibit A, p. 5. Rather, City 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND AITORNEY FEES· 3 
000264 
\ 
_ ....... ." ... .J;7.J 0''' ~008/015 
of McCall holds that: "It [I.e. § 12-120(3)} mandates the awarding of a reasonable attorney's fee to 
the prevailing party "in any commercial transaction"." [d., 146 Idaho at 665. That is a far cry from 
stating that every time someone hires an attorney, he has entered into a commercial transaction. 
In City o/McCall, (he underlying transaction was a construction contract between the City and 
a general contractor. The matter was "commercial" in nature from its very outset. The allegedly 
negligent advice, i.e., to terminate the general contractor, was with respect to a commercial matter. 
Likewise, in Fuller v. Wolters, now ovenuled, the clients hired the attorney to represent them in a 
lawsuit arising from the purchase and sale of farm equipment, clearly a commercial matter. Id, 119 
Idaho at 418. 
In the case at bench, the underlying matter was with respect to the drafting of a will and 
plaintiff's status as a beneficiary, clearly not a commercial matter. Idaho Code §12-120(3) excepts 
"personal or household" transactions from the scope of the statute. 
THE GRAVAMEN OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT IS NOT 
COMMERCIAL IN NATURE, RENDERlNG IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) INAPPLICABLe 
In Brower v. E.l DuPont de Newmours and Co .. 117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990), Idaho's 
Supreme Court made clear that Section 12-120(3) applies only when the essence of plaintiff's claim 
is commercial in nature: 
These cases [dealing with section 12-120(3)] lead to the conclusion 
that the award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a 
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, 
the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen 
of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-
120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and 
constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. To 
hold otherwise would be to convert the award of attorney's fees from 
an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter 
of right in virtually every lawsuit filed. (bracketed material 
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explanatory) 
117 Idaho at 784, partiaJly quoted in Blimka, 143 Idaho at 728. 
In AG Services of America v. Kechter, 137 Idaho 62, 44 PJd 1117 (2002) 
The statute (section 12-120(3)] does not authorize the awarding of 
attorney fees every time a commercial transaction is connected with 
the case. Bingham v. Montane Resource Assoc., 133 Idaho 420,987 
P.2d 1035 (I 999). The test is whether the commercial transaction 
constitutes the essential part of the lawsuit. (bracketed material 
explanatory) 
~009/0l5 
As indicated above, the transaction between the City of McCall and its attorneys was 
inherently commercial in nature from the beginning. That is not so in this case, where plaintiff had 
no relationship of any nature with defendant. That a third party attempted to name plaintiff as a 
beneficiary in his will did not give rise to any commercial relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant. Even if there were such a relationship, it was hardly essential to plaintiff' 5 claim, which 
arose under common law not the Uniform Commercial Code. 
DEFENDANT APpeARS TO Be SEEKING ATTORNEY FEES . 
FOR SERVICES PERFORMED BY NON-ATTORNEYS 
In her affidavit, Ms. Points recites that the fees identified in Exhibit A reflect "attorney fees 
claimed for work actually performed". These fees include fees for legal work performed by 
"MODO", i.e., 23.4 hours ($2917.50). Although "MODO" is not actually identified, an entry dated 
6/2/09 states: "Meet with M. O'Dowd re research on issues for motion for summary judgment". 
Neither the Idaho State Bar website nor The Advocate (2009 -20 I 0), identify an attorney with the 
surname of "O'Dowd" as an attorney licensed by the State ofIdaho. Plaintiff requests the Court to 
take judicial notice of this fact. Rule 20 1 (b), Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Also, on page 4 of Exhibit A there are entries for bates numbering documents by "CWAM", 
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totaling 7.3 hours ($693.50), apparently secretarial work charged out at $95 per hour. 
Assuming attorney fees are deemed appropriate, these fees ($3610) may not be not recoverable 
as attorney fees. These fees are not claimed as paralegal fees. In the case of MODO, these fees may 
not be characterized as "attorney fees" if MODO is not a licensed attorney. In the case of bates 
stamping documents, if this work was done by a paralegal, he or she was severely underemployed 
and the dient was overcharged (at $95 per hour). 
WITH RESPECT TO DISCRETIONARY COSTS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED THAT THpSE COSTS WERE "NECESSARY AND EXCEPTIONAL" 
AND. TH;EREFO&E. SHOULD NOT BE ASSESSED AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
See Rule 54(d)(l)(D), l.R.C.P. 
CONCLUSION 
Inapplicability of Idaho Code §12-1200}: This malpractice action is not a "civil action" to 
enforce or collect damages in a commercial transaction, i.e., section 12-120(3) is not applicable. The 
herein matter is a suit for damages arising from breach of the attorney's common law duty to a person 
(the plaintiff) to whom a duty of care was owed. Unlike City of McCall and Fuller v. Wolters. the 
underlying matter was not commercial in nature. 
The inspiration for the City of McCall decision was Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 
Idaho 723, 152P.3d 594 (2007) which stood for the simple proposition that tortious conduct arising 
during a commercial transaction does not disqualify that transaction from treatment under section 12-
120(3) because of the tort. The defendant now seeks to construe City of McCall as holding that (1) 
because all attorney/client relationships are commercial relationships, and (2) because Blimka allow3 
attorney fees even where there is tortious conduct in a commercial transaction, (3) therefore, attorney 
fees are recoverable under section 12~ 120(3) in all malpractice actions. 
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First, City o/McCall does not hold that the prevailing party in all legal malpractice cases is 
entitled to attorney fees. Defendant cited the district court's opinion, ignoring the language in City 
o/McCall. 
Secondly, no attorney/client relationship existed between defendant and plaintiff, the district 
court's conclusion notwithstanding.' 
Thirdly, in addition to the absence of a relationship with the plaintiff, defendant was 
performing services of a "personal" nature for the testator. See the "personal or household" exception 
in I.C. §120-120(3), i.e., it was not a "commercial transaction". 
Finally, plaintiffs entitlement to non-negligent conduct on the part of defendant is not 
grounded on the terms of or course of dealing in a "commercial" matter; rather it is based upon the 
common law of Idaho respecting the duty of an attorney to his client and others. Harrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 Idaho at 138. That is, in contrastto the language ofI.C. § 12-120(3), this is not a "civil 
action" to enforce a commercial transaction. There is a consistent line of cases which holds, that in 
order for a "commercial transaction" to qUalifY the prevailing party for attorney fees, "the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to 
recover", e.g., Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594 (2007); Lee v. 
Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 12, 189P.3d467(2008). Such is notour case. 
A portion of the atto~ey fees claimed appear to be services by non-attorneys: If "MODO" 
is M. O'Dowd, plaintiff can find no evidence that this person is a licensed attorney. Attorney fees 
I Had an attorney/client existed between defendant and plaintiff, defendant would have placed 
himself in a conflict of interest given his relationship with the testator. 
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incurred as a result of services by "CWAM" appear to secretarial services billed at $95.00 per hour. 
There is no evidence presented that the claimed discretionary costs are "necessary ang 
exceptional" as required by the Rules. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2009. 
Allen B. s 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13th day of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated beJow, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig 1. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & HaWley. LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Allen . E ' 
U.S. Mail 
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-L Telecopy (FAX) 
954-5238 
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NOTICE OF HEARING 
~003/015 




Please take notice that a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
will be held on the 25th day of November, 2009, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable 
Michael R. Crabtree at the Cassia County Courthouse, Burley, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
000270 
DATED this nIh day of October, 2009. 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~004/015 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13th day of October, 2009, J caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following; 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Allen B. Ellis 




__ Overnight Mail 
-X.... Facsimile 
954-5238 
ALLEN B. ELUS 
ELLIS, BRO\VN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Attorneys-at-Law 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388 
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone) 
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 1626 
JEFFREY A. STROTHER 
STROTHER LA W OFFICE 
200 North 4th Street, Suite 30 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone) 
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimile) 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named plaintiff, Mary Killins Soignier, appeals against the above-named 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 
OR\G\l~AL 
, . 
defendant to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order and Judgment granting defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment entered September 22, 2009, the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree. 
2. The appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order and 
Judgment identified in paragraph I is appealable under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant intends to assert 
in the appeal is as follows: 
a. Whether the district court committed an error of law in ruling that defendant 
Fletcher did not breach the professional duty he owed to plaintiff, to wit, 
that defendant Fletcher was not negligent; 
b. Whether the district committed an error of law in ruling that defendant 
Fletcher, in drafting the testator's Will, did not frustrate the testator's intent; 
c. Whether in granting summary judgment based upon issues (a) or (b) above, 
the district court committed reversible error given the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact. 
4. There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
S. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: that hearing held on August 10,2009. 
6. The appellant requests those portions of the clerk's record automatically included 
under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as the following: 
a. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
b. Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher; 
c. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment; 
NOTJCE OF APPEAL - 2 
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d. Aftidavit of Mary Killins Soignier; 
e. At1idavit of John F. Magnuson; 
f. Af11davit of Allen B. Ellis; 
g. Motion to Strike At1idavit ofW. Kent Fletcher; 
h. Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's Mtn. For Summary Judgment; 
I. Order and Judgment. 
7. I certifY: 
(a) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript. 
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(d) That the court reporter has been served pursuant to Rule 17(k)(l), I.A.R. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20,I.A.R. 
Dated this 22nd day of October, 2009. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Ll'cu~· 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 220d day of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
follo\ving: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. Meadows 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Denise Schloder 
Court Reporter 
Cassia County Courthouse 
1459 Overland Ave. 
Burley, Idaho 83318 
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Craig L. Meadows. ISB ~o. 1081 
Michelle R. Points. ISB No. 6224 
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877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIfTH JUDICIAl DISTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN .o\N,J FOR THE COUNTY Of C ~SS.A 
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER, 
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vs. 
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REPL Y TO PL.t\INTIFF S lvWffOH TO 
D1SALLOW C)STS AhD ATTOR'lEY 
FEES 
( jJ 
Defendant W. Kent Fletcher, by and H rough his ;ounsei of record. H",wley Trmell End:; 
& Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this resl>Jnse to Plainti:l's "Motion to DiHJlow Ccsts and 
Attorney Fees" filed on or about October 13, ::009. 
As the Court is aware, this is a legal nnlpractice il,~tion. Defer:dant WII.';' ret'l;led to 
perform professional legal servicts, as his attl)rt1e:;' in the '.mdcrlying ClSe. [n this ca:;e, P~a.ntjff 
alleged that Defendant committed an act of mdpractice by acting with negligence in perfor:ning 
the professional service of drafting Mr. Cowar 's Will, 
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DIS t\LLOW COSTS AND ATTOMEY FEES· 1 
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On September 9, 2009, this Court ent~red its Memorandum Decision Cranting 
Defendant's Motion for S'lmmary Judgmen1 and er:.terd :cro/lary O~der and hjg:~len: (Ill 
September 22, 2009, dismissing PlaintirTs CJmplaint. For the purpcse of an attome~r :ee and 
cost detennination, Defendant is the prevailing party. 
Defendant, thro~gh this motion, requ:sts an aWHd c f anome~f fees and co:;r.:; in ;urt d : r 
defending against Plaintiff's claims pursuan:. to I R.C.P 54, and I.e. ~ 12-120(3), (;~; lh,! 
prevailing party, as the underlying case invol ved a commercial transaction. 
1. That Plaintiff Did Not Conti sct With ])dc!ndant Is Not Di!J:positiH: Of 
Defendant's Motion For A":I)rney }'eeH. 
The underlying transaction involved i:achary C(wan retaining the proi{'ssional ler/ice, 
of Mr. Fletcher. It is the commercial transaction at issue in the underlying action that dictates 
whether attorney fees shmJd be award,ed und~r I.e. § 1:~··;,20(3)~ thu~, it is iceJev<lnt to this 
motion whether Plaintiff a:so had a contract ~/ith Dc;'end,mt. ?Iaintiff canno r,!mO\'e her 
malpractice claim outside of the underlying c,)mmercial transaction based on her reasoning that 
Defendant only had a duty to her as a benefic: my. or that she was not a part cf the conunelc ,al 
transaction as between DefendanT and 1"fr. Cowan. Plaintiff's claim i;; based or the .:onunercid 
transaction as between Defendant and Mr. Cowan. 
As set forth in Defendant's opening memorandum on this motion, Idahc Co,::e 
§ 12-120(3) mandates a fee award in cases b~:::ed ;m c: ccmmercial transactior.. Beflne the ldane 
Supreme Court's recent decision in BIimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723. 
152 P.3d 592 (2007). however, section 12-12')(3) had been interpreted not to apply n 
"commercial transaction" cases in which the ::leOlY ofrecovl!ry was a tort theory. f~ llrm~a, the 
court overruled all prior decisions prohibiting fee aW2.rds in such cases. /d. On,; dedsicn Flllinly 
overruled by Blimka is Fullen'. Wolters, 119 dato 415.425,807 P.2,j 633, (4:; (19j 1) Th,.:re, 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S \tOT]ON'lODISAL .. OWCOSTSANDATTOR~lE'! FEES· 2 
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the court refused to award fees under section 12-120(3) in a legal malpractic e case sirn )/y 
because such a case is a tort case, "even thou3h the underlying transaction which resulted in the 
malpractice was a 'commercial t·a11saction. ,.,. Id There 3 no doubt hat the dt t~ndam:i' 
attorney-client relatiomhip w:th Cady is a "(,>;nme:HiaJ trlr.~action." AccJrdirlgly. on its fcc,~. 
section 12-120(3) applies, and it mandates an award of atlOmey fees. 
As also pointed cut in Defendant's opening memorandum on this mo;icn, In a r!cen; 
attorney malpractice case, District Judge McLaughlin hdd that given the Ida,1o Surn~me C(ur~':; 
holding in Blimka, supra, an attorney fee award in a malpractice case was appropriate .:mder 
I.e. § 12-120(3). See City of McCall v. Buxtcn, et ar Plaintiff attempts to distJnguish Cit)' rJ/ 
McCall by asserting that ttc t~:ln~;actions at i:Bllf: in that (i.Sf! involved a cont"2.<:t How~ver, 
Plaintiff ignores Judge McLaughlin's plain slatement that a contract for attorr..ey se::l'vlces was a 
commercial transaction, and, "the- fact that the: contract was for attorney seryic,~s, not any ether 
service, does not change the natu::e of the transac:lion int:> ,)ne for either pers{,rcal servic,~s or 
household services." Exhibit A to Defendant's Opening :Memorandum. p. 5. S?e Also, Cady v. 
Jones, et aJ., Opening Memorandum, Exh. B. 
Plaintiff in this case is suhg Defendant fo:" hi!: pu:'ormance of profi!s~il)nal :;~rv eeli :Or 
Mr. Cowan. The gravamen of the underlying ;;ase on which Plaintiff .;omplains was a 
commercial transaction. Given the applicability of I.e. S' 12-120(3) to the facts of this case, and 
because Defendant is the prevailing party, attcrney fees ~hould be awC'xded to Defet1.dan~ incmeJ 
in defending this action. 
REPL Y TO PLAfNTIFF'S MOT10N TO D[S t\LLOW COSTS AND ATTOR}' EY :~EES . 1 
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2. Mr. Fletcher Can Seek Fee~ Fo!" Non-A.!;torneys. 
Pursuant to the Supplemental Affida'lt of \1ichelle R Points In Sup )ort (.1' ~v'~ctio 1 for 
Attorney Fees and Costs, submitted herewith. the fees of "MODO" and "CW.\,\f' are 
recoverable and should be awarded to Defendant. 
3. There Is Sufficient Evidencf For Cairns Of Discretionary (OS18. 
Plaintiff asserts, in a heading, that there is "no evidence presented that these cm;ts were 
'necessary and exceptional' and therefore, sh:)Uld not be assessed against Pkintiff." Plaintitl 
then states. "[sJee Rule 5"4·:d)( 1)(0). LR.C.P" Defe:ndall re·quested n32.04 in cE:;,:retiorutry 
costs, consisting of $467.46 in photocopy co~ t5 and S264 5E in assist<!d legal re sean;h. 
Paragraphs 3 and 8 of the Affidavit of Michd Ie R. Poin'.s Setting ForlI Memorandum (If CCS1.~ 
and Fees address the necessity for the costs claimed. 
Discretionary costs may include photccopying. Hayden Lake Fire Plotgction Dist. v. 
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161,168 (2005). The use of assisted legal resear·;h:o t.'li:; 
case, given the breadth of legal issues partic1.Jarly contained in Defendant' s ~,fction fer Sunmary 
Judgment, was minirnat Given the cornplexJY of the is~;ues subject of this Ii :igatior" me 
amounts sought for discretionary costs are more than reasonable. The: discretknary costs SOUg;1! 
were necessary and exceptional, and were rea:;onE:bly in(:IL'red in the defense of this cag.~ mll:i 
should in the interest of justice be assessf~d against th~~:intifr. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED THI, J~ day of November, 2009. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DIS.\LLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES· 4 
000279 
0418800701726231 • 
~"'_ .... __ _ ,,-",Y'.I.l.WV1J naW.1ey Troxell 
CERTIFICf. T~ OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisl.~~~:NoVCmber, 2009, I cau:;d to he sened a 
true copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAJNTIFF' 5 MOTION TO DISAL~OW c:m;~~ A>I) 
A TIO~\1EY FEES by t:11! mdhod imfk:ated Je/ow, mc !Iddressed to each 0' Jl~ t(>.~o\{in r 
Allen B. Ellis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
Jeffrey A. Strother 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
200 N. Fourth Street, Suite 30 
Boise, ro 83702 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff: 
__ U.S. Mail, ?cslagc Prep,Jd 
Hand DeJh ered 
___ OVffnight Jv!.ml 
~-lllail 
__ '_Tel,!cop}: 2:8J4S.:f:;6·~ 
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",J.y<:>I.d..l :everson Hawley Troxell 
Craig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081 
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
HA WLEY TROXELL EI\"NIS &: I IA WLEY Lt» 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Defendant W. Ken, Fletcher 
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TN THE DISTRICT COURT 0; THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OFDAHO, fN .\l\n) FI)R THE COUNfV OF C".SSIA 
MAR Y KILL INS SOIGNIER, 
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SU:[>P~_EMEN1AL APFIDA\Tf 0':: 
MCHELLE R. POINTS fN SCP?();(T 
OF .\10TION FOR ATTORN::Y FEES 
AND COSTS 
Page 7 
MICHELLE R. POINTS, being first d'lly :;wom tr::OIl e.ath, deJoses lllJ(J state s a:: fdJo·.F~; 
1. I am an attorney with t~e law firm ef Hawley T:-oxell Ennis & Hawley 
LLP, counsel of record for W. Kent Fletcher, Defendant in the above-referenced matter. I make 
this affidavit based upon my own personal kncwledge, and em testify as to the lruth e.fthe 
matters contained here in if .;:all cd upon as a wi tIless at th(~ trial of this action. 
2. 'vlODO, who is listed in EX:11bit A to the previous affidavit r submined in 
support of this motion and ,vhc 5C fee) a~~: chal t;n~,ed ,),:>1 :ti:1titf, is tv egan 0'[ o\\'(!, who 
Sl'PPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. ?Oll'-TS IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR A ITORNE Y FEES AND CO~;TS - 1 
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worked in this office as a second year Sum.'TIi~r Asso:ia'e attorney. Her fee~ are pr:p'!Ily 
documented. Ms. O'Dowd worked on this eESe Cit a \0\"(:1' tOUTly ratl~ in a:1 cfbr1 tc conser:e 
costs, but did perform attorney functions. 
3. CW AM, who is also li ,ted in Exhi:,it A to the previous affidav:t I 
submitted in support of this motion and whase fees are ehaLenged b} Plainti [1; is C1ristian 
Wamhoff, who is a member of the Litigation Support Group at this firm and who pe·rforms 
paralegal functions, including those listed in Exh:;bit A. !'''fr. Warnhotfs fees are pr,:perly 
documented. 
I~ 
Further, your affiant sayetb naught. /.7 .' O. / I .f' 
""'---~. Il !h £1 ' '/ / // /1 I j ~/'!], 11'? ~~. ,f 4 .;~ W.Jc~!l!:ll-------
l < l'~.: omts ~. 
I 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I 
''-'/ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this I:S+~~day ofNovembe;r. 2009. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R PO[,'ITS TN SUPPORT (I:: 
MOTION FOR ATIOR;\iEY FEES Al\D CCGfS - 2 
000282 
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Haw ley Tn.xell 
CERTIfIC'~Or SERVICE 
( . --~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY th.lt on this L~ ar~lN,)vcmber, 20C9, I caus.!j to be senej" 
true copy of the foregoing SUPPLE\fENTAt AFF!DAV [T OF MICHELLE'S .. poers iN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORi~JEY FEES AND COSTS by the J:1.:t.od in.:li:Htec 
below, and addressed to each of i:he following: 
Allen B. EHis 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS. CHARTERED 
707 North 8th Street 
P.O. Box 388 
Boise, ID 83701-0388 
(Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Jeffrey A. Strother 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
200 N. Fourth Street, SU.lte 30 
__ U.S. Mail, Pestage Prepaid 
Hand Deli\ ered 
___ Ov( might lv~ml 
_fo-n .ail 
_V_T elecopy: 2=8J.:".~;,64 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Pr!paid 
Har.d Detiver!d 
_~ Ove mig!'.t r IJ~ il 
Boise, ID 83702 
[Attorneys for Plainti:fI] 
.-."~' __ -'- E-rr ail 
c~/ /, __ -\7_- TeI(C~Y: /~8 34:!.2.:;,29 
.! I i ~ htL-fj~i'di~~' ___ ---
1 H(~ If 0 nts I J 
I 
vI 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POfNTS IN SUPPORT Ot; 
MOnON FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND cc:,rs - 3 
UUU~S3 
()4I188. l070 • 7::52 '7.1 
I 
" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY 
COURT MINUTES 
CV -2009-0000517 
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher 
Hearing type: Motion for Fees and Costs 
Hearing date: 11/25/2009 
Time: 8:58 am 
Judge: Michael R Crabtree 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson 




Michelle Points argues Motion for Fees and Costs; cites considerations. 
Objection by Allen Ellis; cites considerations. 
Reply by Michelle Points. 
The Court takes this matter Under Advisement. 
9:09 a.m. Hearing concludes. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIf'TH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TilE STATE OF II) A II 0, IN AND FOR CASSIA COliNTY 
MARY KILLlNS SOIGNIER. ) 
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) CASE NO. CY 2009-517 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Appearances: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Allen B. Ellis of the firm Ellis, Brown and Sheils, Chartered; and 
Jeffrey A. Strother. 
Michelle Points of the firm Hawley, Troxell. Ennis and Hawley 
LLP. 
Held: Defendant's Motion Granted in Part. Denied in Part. 
BACKGROUND 
On September 22, 2009, the court entered an Order dismissing the Plaintiff's (hereafter 
Ms. Soignier) Complaint after granting the Defendant's (hereafter Mr. Fletcher) motion for 
summary judgment. Subsequently, Mr. fletcher filed a memorandum of costs and attorney's 
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fees on October l, 2009. Ms. Soignier tiled a motion to disallow costs and attorney's fees on 
October 13, 2009. I Iearing on the motions took place on November 25. 2009. at \\hich time 
the court took the matter under advisement. 
Mr. Fletcher argues that the Court should enter an award of costs and attorneys fees in 
its t:lVor, pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). and I.R.Civ.P. 54 (d) and 54( e). 
Ms. Soignier opposes an award of either costs or attorneys fees because: 1) the 
discretionary costs submitted by Mr. Fletcher are not exceptional, and therefore not authorized 
by I.R.Civ.P. 54(1.1)(1); 2) attorney's fees are not mandatory under I.C. § 12-120(3) because the 
underlying action in this case was not a commercial transaction; and 3) Mr. Fletcher requests 
attorney's fees for \vork performed by non-attorneys. 
DISCUSSION 
A.COSTS 
I.R.Civ.P. 54( d)(l )(A), provides that except as otherwise limited by the Rules, certain 
costs are allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party. 
Prevailing party is de tined at LR.Civ.P. 54(d)(1)(8). In reaching this determination, the 
court is to exercise discretion and consider the tinal result of the casc in relation to the relief 
sought. In this case, Mr. Fletcher is the prevailing party because the court granted his motion 
for summary judgment and the claims against him were dismissed with prejUdice, thereby 
affording him complete relief in thc action. Therefore. costs are awardcd to Mr. Fletcher as set 
forth below. 
1. Costs as a Matter of Right. I.R.Civ.P. S4(d)(l)(C) 
~fr. Fletcher claims the follmving costs as a matter of right. Thc court's disposition on 
each item claimed is set forth below: 






Gnmted: Rule 54(d)( I )(C)( 1) 
Total costs awarded to Mr. Fldcher as a matter of right: $58.00 
2. Discretionarv Costs. I.R.Civ.P. 5 ... ( d)( 1)( D). 
\Ir. Fletcher claims certain costs as discretionary costs. The court has discretion to 
consider and allow costs as discretionary costs upon a showing tbat the cost claimed were 
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred. and should in the interest of justice be 
assessed against the adverse party. 
In support of his claim It)!" discretionary costs. Mr. Fletcher argues that the requirement 
that the cost be exceptional was satisiied because of the complexity of the legal issues in this 
case. 
Notwithstanding this argument, the court determines that Mr. fletcher has not met its 
burden to show that either of the two requests for discretionary costs it claims were necessary 
and exceptional, reasonably incurred within the meaning ofI.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1)(D). 
The discretionary costs claimed by Mr. Fletcher are: 
1. $467.46 for photocopies. Mr. Fletcher did not make a showing that these copy 
charges were exceptional. Copy charges are usual costs of litigation. The court is not 
convinced that the interest of justice requires that these copy charges should be assessed 
against Ms. Soignier. Therefore. this cost is denied. 
2. 264.58 for assisted legal research (Westlaw). Mr. Fletcher did not make a showing 
that these costs were exceptional. Mr. Fletcher made a strategic decision to argue several legal 
theories on summary judgment: each of these theories necessarily required research. The court 
is not convinced that the interest of justice requires that these costs for legal research should be 
against Ms. Suignier. Therefore. this cost is denied. 
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B. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
1. Attornev's Fc.'es under I.e. § 12-120(3). 
Idaho Code § 12-1 20( 3) pnn ides in relevant part that "'in any commcrcial transaction 
unk'ss provided by law. the prc\ailing party shall be all()\\ed a reasonahle attorney's I\:e to be 
set by the court." A commercial transaction is any transaction that is not for "personal or 
household" purposcs. I.e. § 12-120(3). Mr. Flctcher assel1s that he is entitled to attorney's 
t\:es under this statute hecause Ms. Soignier hrought the case as an attorney-malpractice action 
arising from a "commercial transaction;" and that the commercial transaction was the 
transaction he tween Mr. Fletcher and Zachary Cowan, who hired Mr. Fletcher to draft his will. 
Ms. Soignier argues that her claim against Mr. Fletcher sounds solely in tort, and arose from a 
judicially created duty as articulatcd in !!arrigleld v. Hancock. in which the court held: 
that an attorney preparing testamentary instruments 
owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified 
therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested 
by the testator to have them properly executed, so as 
to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the 
testamentary instruments. 
140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). 
In determining whether to award attorney's fees under I.e. § 12-120(3), the test is in 
two parts. "First. there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim. Second. 
the commercial transaction mllst be the basis upon which recovery is sought." Brooks 1'. 
Gigt(~v Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 78,910 P.2d 744 (1996). J\ lawsuit which sounds in tort 
rather than contract, does not preclude the prevailing party from collecting attorney fees under 
I.e. § 12-120(3). Blimka 1'. Aly Weh Wholesaler, LLC 143 Idaho 723,728-729, 152 P . .1d 594 
(2007). Moreover. the prevailing party in an attorney malpractice lawsuit may collect attorney 
fees under I.e. § 12-120(3). City oj'AfcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009). 





Mr. ('tman contracted with Mr. Fletcher to prepare his will. Ms. Soignier was a named 
heneficiary in the will that t\fr. Fletcher prepared t()r Mr. Cowan. AllY claim that \1s. Soignier 
had as named heneliciary against \fr. Fletcher for attorney-malpractice arose from the duty set 
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in l!(/rrigleld l'. l!allcock, as cited above. \1s. Soignier was 
not Mr. Fletcher's client. and the two dill not have a contractual relationship. Ilo\\e\\~r, \ls. 
Soignier is. in manner of speaking. a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Zachary 
Cowan and \k Fletcher. 
In this case, the commercial transaction between Zachary Cowan and Mr. Fletcher is 
hoth integral to Ms. Soignier's claim and the basis upon \vhich she sought recovery because 
without that transaction, she \\:ould not have any sort of claim against Mr. Fletcher. 
Accordingly, an award of attorney's tees under I.e. § 12-120(3) is appropriate in this case. 
2. Amount of Attorney's Fees under I.R.Civ.P.54(e)(3) 
The amount of an award of attorney fees is a discretionary matter for the trial court. and 
the court perceives it as such. 5;un Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Relinery Corp., 139 
Idaho 761,769,86 P.3d 475,483 (2004). The bounds of the court's discretion are a function of 
the "reasonableness" of an attorney fee claim, and is considered by the court based on the 
factors in LR.Civ.P. 54(e)(3). Id. For an award based upon I.e. §12-120(3), it is not necessary 
that the court address all of the LR.Civ.P. 54(e)(3) factors in writing, however the record must 
clearly indicate the court considered all the factors. Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, I L 189 P.3d 
467 (2008). 
I.R.Civ.P. 54(e)(3) states: 
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it 
shall consiLler the following factors in determining the amount of sllch fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 




expl.'ril.'ncl.' and anility or the attornl.'Y in thl.' particular lield of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like \vork. 
(E) Whether the lee is lixed or contingent. 
(F) Till.' time limitations il1lposed by the client or the circumstances of the 
L'ase. 
(0) Thl.' amount imoln:d and the results obtained. 
(I {) fhe undesirability of the case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
tJ) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automatl.'d legal research (Computl.'r Assisted 
Legal Resl.'arch), if the court finds it was rl.'Llsonably necessary in 
preparing a party's case. 
(L) Any other t~lctor which the court deems appropriate in the particular 
cuse. 
Mr. Fletcher submitted an affidavit and memorandum of fees and costs and a 
supplemental affidavit in support of the motion, which the court has duly considered. Thl.' 
affidavit and memorandum of fees and costs addressed several of the t~1Ctors listed above. Ms. 
Soignier specifically disputed the requested kes incurred by a second year Summer Associate 
attorney. and a paralegal, which are documented in the affidavit and memorandum, and 
explained in the supplemental atlidavit. It appears that the work performed by the second year 
Summer Associate was billed at only a slightly lower hourly rate ($125.00) than the work 
performed by the attorneys in this case ($145.00). The court, in its discretion, finds that this 
rate is disproportionate. Mr. Fletcher did not offer a basis for which the court should consider 
the high rate attributed to the Sumer Associate and paralegal as the usual rates charged in this 
jurisdiction. The court considers a lower rate for the work performed by these individuals 
more appropriate given that they are not licensed legal professionals, and will therefore reduce 
the amount of attorney's fees requested by Mr. Fletcher accordingly 
CONCLUSION 
The court hereby awards costs and attorneys tees against the Plaintiff and in favor of 
the Defendant as follows: 





Discretionary costs: denied 
Attorney's fees total: 58,.2.2S.00 
Counsel for the Ddt:ndant will please submit an Order and Amended Judgment to the 
court ttn signature, consistent with above. 
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MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
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